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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ILLICIT INTEREST GROUPS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE MEDELLIN 
DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS IN COLOMBIA 
by 
Patricia Helena Micolta 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor 
Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, 
crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political 
organizations.  Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence 
domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters.  Illicit 
groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on 
interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and 
international politics in similar ways.   
Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest 
groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group 
formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and 
policy impact.  The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which 
include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government 
documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. 
To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO 
leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the 
vii 
 
external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to 
the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the 
implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the 
United States.  The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the 
principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating 
the illicit drug business.  
The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda 
and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches 
of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate 
the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty 
correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the 
Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for 
tougher counternarcotics efforts.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
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The human use and development of psychoactive drugs1 has created a trade for 
these substances. The practice of chewing coca leaves in the Andes dates back 8000 years 
(Dillihay et al., 2010). The coca leaves have mild stimulating effects that can reduce 
fatigue, hunger, aid digestion, and help with altitude sickness. The Peruvian Altiplano 
society in the 1780-1930s not only used the coca leaf for its chemical qualities, but also 
as a form of currency to pay for services rendered (Jacobsen, 1993:298-299). During the 
19th, 20th, and 21st centuries the psychoactive drug trade incorporated both formal and 
informal organizations.  Governments, international governmental organizations, and 
businesses exemplify formal organizations that have attempted to control drug markets.  
The Dutch and British East India Companies2 during imperial rule and Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Kuomintang benefited from the trade of opium in the early 20th century.3  In more 
modern times, the dictatorship of General Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama provided a 
                                                        
1 Throughout this project the term “drug” is defined as “any chemical substance, natural or synthetic, that 
changes a person’s mental state and that maybe used repeatedly by a person for that effect” (Northern, 
1998). Psychoactive drugs are defined as “chemical substances that affect mood, perception, or 
consciousness because they affect the functioning of the central nervous system (brain and spinal cord). 
Psychoactive drugs are divided into 3 groups: (1) Depressants- they slow down the central nervous system, 
for example, tranquillizers, alcohol, petrol, heroin and other opiates, cannabis (in low doses). (2) Stimulants 
- they excite the nervous system; for example: nicotine, amphetamines, cocaine, and caffeine. (3) 
Hallucinogens: they distort how things are perceived; for example: LSD, mescaline, 'magic mushrooms', 
cannabis (in high doses)” (Seymour & Smith, 1987, p.1; Northern, 1998). 
2 The Dutch and British traded opium illegally with China to reduce their trade deficit and open the Chinese 
market.  The British East India Company introduced the opium trade in Burma, which was the main 
gateway for introducing opium to Chinese customers (Renard, 1996).  The Chinese Qing Dynasty 
prohibited the trade of opium because it caused addiction among its population. According to John Stuart 
Mill, opium had become the British East India Company’s second biggest source of revenue (Mill, 1858, p. 
21-22) because the prohibition of opium led to an increase in its price, as Chinese demand for opium 
continued. The Westminster Review’s account of the opium trade circa 1831 before the first Opium War 
(1839-1842), described a situation where opium smuggling into China was rampant, where Chinese 
smugglers and consumers disregarded Chinese laws, and in which prohibition was disregarded “by the 
(Chinese) government officers, who appear systematically to connive at the smuggling of opium, and to 
derive a large profit from the bribes of smugglers” (Bentham, Bowring, & Mill, 1831, p. 98-99).    
 
3 Though Chiang Kai-shek publicly denounced the opium trade, his political party and military efforts 
benefited from the profit of opium (Walker, 1991). 
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haven for laundering drug money in the 1980s, and associations of coca growers like the 
Cocaleros in Bolivia have advocated for the legal growth of the coca plant.4  In contrast 
to these governments and associations, which have benefited or facilitated the trade in 
psychoactive drugs, the U.S. government has attempted to do away with the trade of 
psychoactive drugs since the 1920s.5  In the same vein, the United Nations established the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which studies the illicit drug trade 
and assists countries in developing counternarcotics efforts.  Other supranational 
organizations, such as the European Union, have created counternarcotics programs, but 
concentrate mostly in funding alternative development programs, judicial reform, and 
humanitarian assistance (Department of State, 2005). 
Throughout the 20th century, the psychoactive drug trade has also incorporated 
informal and illicit organizations:  Chinese warlords,6 Caribbean marijuana runners, 
country-specific Mafias,7 Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations, 
                                                        
4 See Lee (1990).  According to Rensselaer Lee, an expert on the politics of drug trafficking, the Bolivian 
and Peruvian coca grower associations are active lobbies, which are well funded and have the capacity to 
mobilize its membership in opposition to counter-narcotics efforts.  In Bolivia the Cocaleros operate as a 
legal interest group and have an active membership.  At the millennium, the Cocaleros launched the 
presidential candidacy of Evo Morales, a Cocalero leader, who in December 2005 was elected President of 
Bolivia.  Although Morales is the President, he continues to serve simultaneously as the Secretary General 
of the Coca Growers Federation.  He has launched an international effort aimed at decriminalizing the use 
of coca for traditional purposes such as chewing and brewing teas. 
 
5 The U.S. government has had a policy of intolerance for the drug trade, however during the Cold War 
some of its agencies forwent anti-drug policies to pursue anti-communist forces in Asia and in Central 
America (Walker, 1991; The Iran-Contra, 2006). 
 
6 These organizations benefited from the growth and sale of opium to sustain their armies, which would 
fight against communist armies in the early to mid 20th Century China (Walker, 1991).   
 
7 Popular mafias have risen worldwide regardless of geographic location.  The United States has had 
organized criminal organizations made up of differing ethnicities and races, and which hail from different 
cities, The Italian Cossa Nostra, the Russian Mafya, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Irish “Brat Pack” (who 
are suspected of assassinating Irish journalist Veronica Guerin) are examples of international crime 
syndicates that have or continue to venture in the drug business.   
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Burmese tribes, armed social movements,8 Afghan warlords,9 and street gangs in various 
countries including the United States, Central America, and Brazil are among countless 
other examples.10 All of these organizations have profited from the demand of 
psychoactive drugs for gain or to fund other objectives.   
Overall, both formal and informal organizations, whether they profit or prohibit 
the trade of psychoactive drugs, are part of the international system.   
In the 20th century the United States government heralded the creation of an 
international counternarcotics regime of prohibition.  Since the 1920s, a number of 
international policies were created to restrict the psychoactive drug trade and in the 1960s, 
U.S. policymakers created the “War on Drugs” to raise the level of the perceived threat 
posed by drugs.  Anti-drug policies tackled domestic consumption and the sale of illicit 
psychoactive drugs by establishing a prohibition regime with the objective of eliminating 
the supply of illegal drugs like opium into the United States.   
Counternarcotics policies11 consist of complementary domestic and international 
strategies.  The domestic strategy involves the enforcement of anti-drug legislation, 
                                                        
 
8 Some guerrillas which have at some point participated in the drug trade have been the Sendero Luminoso 
of Peru, the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the 
Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN).  The Loyalist Volunteer Force and Irish Republican Army were 
also involved in the drug trade at local levels, according to a U.S. Congress General Accounting Office 
(GAO) special investigation done in 2000 (Hast, 2000).   Right-wing paramilitary forces such as the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) also participated in the drug trade.   
 
9 As reported by the Christian Science Monitor, the UNODC reported that opium poppy production 
increased by 49% in 2006 (Cooley, 2006), and according to pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski, 
drug profits were being used to fund Taliban insurgents in Southern Afghanistan (Regan, 2006).  Also 
Human Rights Watch, a watchdog organization, reported that warlords backed by the U.S. and Afghan 
governments were involved in the drug trade and in human rights abuses (Afghanistan, 2006). 
 
10 Street gangs in many urban populations throughout the world are major networks for the local 
distribution of drugs and weapons.   
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which penalizes and jails dealers and users.  It also calls for the interdiction of illicit 
psychoactive drugs at U.S. borders, ports, airports, and along its maritime borders.  The 
international strategy establishes agreements and treaties with other countries.  Some 
treaties include extradition treaties, which allow the U.S. government to request the 
extradition of individuals accused of trafficking psychoactive drugs so they can be judged 
within the U.S. judicial system.  Other agreements establish crop eradication programs in 
drug-producing countries, destroying crops manually or with aerial chemical pesticides.  
Since the 1920s, the United States has gradually escalated its investment in governmental, 
human, and economic resources geared toward controlling these criminalized 
psychoactive drugs.  Paradoxically, the progressive increase in resources has not 
permanently curtailed the supply or use of the drugs in the United States, nor eradicated 
the international drug trade or the rise of illicit drug trafficking organizations.  Many 
analysts argue that counternarcotics policies have unintentionally increased the trade of 
drugs by making drugs like cocaine a valuable commodity (Thoumi, 1994; Bertram et al., 
1996; Reuter, 2004; Buxton, 2006). 
Students of U.S. counternarcotics efforts also believe that policies formulated in 
the United States largely underestimate how informal organizations involved in the drug 
trade have a continued economic incentive to engage in the business (Thoumi, 1994; 
Bertram et al., 1996; Walker, 1996; Reuter, 2004; Buruma, 2004).  According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the retail value of the global drug 
market is approximately 85 billion-dollars (UNODC, 2011).  The UNODC’s “World 
                                                                                                                                                                     
11 This is the popular term for anti-drug policies.  The name is a misnomer because counternarcotics 
policies target all types of psychoactive drugs not just narcotics.  For example medically, cocaine—a 
prohibited drug, is a stimulant not a narcotic.  However, cocaine is referred popularly as a narcotic because 
legally it is labeled as a narcotic by the U.S. government.   
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Drug Report 2011” indicates that in 2009 coca farmers in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 
earned $1 billion (UNODC, 2011); in 2008 coca paste dealers in the Andes earned about 
$400 million; and Colombian wholesale cocaine traffickers earned about $2.4 billion per 
year (UNODC, 2010b, p. 79). The latest UNODC report issued, while this project was 
written, indicate that in 2009 “profits from international trafficking to North America and 
Europe amount to some US$15 bn” (UNODC, 2011, p. 125).  Given the continued 
multimillion-dollar earnings of cocaine traffickers in relation to other licit businesses 
operating in Latin American countries, the economic power of informal organizations 
involved in the illicit drug business provides informal organizations at the least, with the 
ability to affect domestic and international politics.  The political influence of informal 
organizations involved in the illicit drug trade is the subject of inquiry of this dissertation 
project. 
Although governments implementing counternarcotics policies and analysts of 
counternarcotics policies believe that drug trafficking organizations exist and have an 
effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities 
as political organizations.  Legally established interest groups and movements have been 
found to influence domestic and international politics because they generally operate 
within legal state structures.  Illicit groups, such as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), 
have been rarely accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though 
they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar 
ways, especially when non-violent methods for influencing policy are taken into account.   
Using an interest group model, my dissertation analyzes drug trafficking 
organizations as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The 
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questions the dissertation hopes to answer are the following: Under what conditions do 
IIGs flourish/develop? What effect do IIGs have on policy? And, what are the effects of 
these groups on democratic institutions? An interest group analysis of IIGs includes a 
study of group formation, development, and demise (or potential demise) that examines 
how IIGs organize, what motivates them, and how effective they can be at influencing 
policy.  
The study also relies on organizational theory to explain the rise and development 
of illicit interest groups. Specifically, this study assesses the literature on interest group 
models to create a Macro-Micro Interest Group Model that examines—(1) the external 
variables that lead to the rise of IIGs and (2) the internal variables that allow IIGs to 
influence politics. External conditions such as weak laws and law enforcement, large 
economic incentives derived from the illicit drug trade, and extreme income inequality 
among other factors can be hypothesized to have an impact on the emergence of IIGs. 
Moreover, internal conditions such as the availability of economic resources, leadership 
characteristics, the degree of group cohesion, expertise, membership size, the role of 
selective incentives in motivating members, as well as, the group’s ability to promote its 
agenda to a greater sector of a population, among other factors, are hypothesized to 
influence a group’s ability to impact policy.     
The dynamic between governments and IIGs is also examined in this project. To 
address what effect IIGs have on democratic institutions, it can by hypothesized that the 
greater the economic and political cohesion and disciple IIGs have, the more likely they 
will influence democratic institutions to accomplish their goals. Factors such as state 
autonomy and capacity can shed light on the ability of governments to deal with IIGs. In 
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addition, factors such as an IIG’s resources, representativeness, and cohesiveness can 
explain how IIGs use different tools to affect elections and government institutions such 
as the judiciary, the legislature, and the presidency.   
To illustrate the interest group model and test organizational theory, the case 
study method will be used on the Medellin Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), 
popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the case study method will focus 
on the external factors that led to the rise of DTOs in Colombia and how DTOs based in 
Medellin reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion will 
be framed by the implementation of the Treaty on Extradition of 1979 negotiated 
between Colombia and the United States.  The treaty was significant because as drug 
trafficking became the principal issue of the bilateral agenda between the U.S. and 
Colombia in the 1980s; the extradition of Colombian nationals became an important and 
pivotal method of combating the illicit drug business.  Illicit interests groups, like drug 
traffickers based in Medellin, became politically active in opposition to the extradition 
treaty because it endangered their livelihood by threatening DTO leaders with criminal 
punishment in the United States.  The findings of my study suggest that DTO leaders 
based in Medellin had a one issue agenda and organized politically to influence the 
electoral system and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and 
the executive—in an effort to invalidate the Extradition Treaty. The impact of DTOs on 
politics will be shown in congruence to the life cycle of the treaty as it was invalidated in 
1986, revived in 1989, banned through a 1991 Constitutional Article, and reinstated in 
1997 as a result of a constitutional amendment.  The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 
Extradition Treaty correlate with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs 
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in relation to the Colombian government and international forces such as the U.S. 
government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.  For this reason, the analysis 
focuses only on the Medellin DTOs as pioneers in the drug trade and as protagonists of 
the “extradition debate” that took place in Colombian in the 1980s until the mid-1990s.  
Other groups such as: Cali based DTOs, the Cartel del Norte del Valle (a series of DTOs, 
which developed in the mid-1990s), guerrilla organizations involved in the drug trade 
such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de 
Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC), have also been affected by the 1979 Treaty of Extradition, but the 
Medellin-based DTOs were the first to actively engage in and affect the public debate on 
the policy of extradition.  Although the scope of this study is limited to Medellin-based 
DTOs, data already gathered on the groups just mentioned will be the subject of future 
studies.  
Developing a definition for IIGs alters the current notion of interest groups by 
demonstrating the political impact of groups normally regarded as criminal.  The new 
conceptualization builds on scholarly work in security and political economy.  Illicit 
groups, like drug traffickers, are commonly categorized as transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs), and relevant studies explore the rise of TCOs in weak states, 
emphasizing the economic and political impact they have as industries.12 An analysis of 
TCOs as interest groups can further develop our understanding of the political impact that 
these social entities may have on democratic institutions and international relations.  
                                                        
12 See Thoumi, Francisco work in Political economy and illegal drugs in Colombia.  See chapters by 
Rensselaer Lee and Eduardo Gamarra in Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Interamerican Dialogue. 
Also, see Phil Williams’ article in World Security: Challenges for a New Century. 
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 The inclusion of groups commonly regarded as “criminal” into the scope of 
political science through the use of an interest group framework is not done to excuse 
criminal behavior such as homicide, kidnapping, extortion, or property damage, among 
other activities. The main intent of this project is to methodically study the development 
of DTOs which are criminal in nature, but which have political repercussions and are 
currently understudied. DTOs are usually dismissed as criminal organizations 
participating in political corruption, which is defined as “a deviation from the norms that 
involves a hidden exchange between a public agent and a third party” (Della Porta et al., 
1999).13 However, how can researchers study cases of systematic political corruption, 
where corruption is not a deviation but the norm—where the criminal-political nexus is 
pervasive? The purpose of this study is to examine the political influence of the illicit 
drug industry, since in the 1980s, Medellin-based DTO leaders participated openly, “in 
the light of day” and through the political system (especially since leaders did not have 
criminal charges against them in Colombia), which allowed some to feel entitled to 
participate in the political process. Moreover, evidence on the political nexus of DTOs in 
the 1990s (Lee et al., 1999) and 2000s (Ungar et al., 2010a & 2010b) suggests that since 
the 1980s, DTO leaders have continued to foster relationships with politicians, which 
have generated a systematically corrupt political system, one described by Lee et al. 
(1999) in which: 
                                                        
13 Della Porta et al.’s study on political corruption examines the relationships of mafias and politicians in 
Italy. In the book Corrupt Exchanges, she denotes a variety of political corruption styles depending on the 
state and social incentives given to politicians and criminal groups that engage in political corruption. Of 
specific importance is that Della Porta et al. adopt a definition of “systematic corruption,” where, “the illicit 
becomes the norm and… corruption (is) so common and institutionalized that those behaving illegally are 
rewarded and those continuing to accept the older norms penalized (Della Porta et al., 1999:16).  
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…corruption, viewed broadly as an exchange of values between criminals and government or 
political authorities, has become almost inseparable from the activities and purposes of statecraft 
in Colombia. Here the issue is no longer the delivery of specific services or favors in exchange for 
bribes but rather the management of relations with a powerful (if illegal) interest group to achieve 
specific political objectives (Lee et al., 1999).   
 
My study has implications for policy studies. In the post-9/11 era, politically and 
financially motivated organizations such as traffickers, paramilitary, or guerrilla 
movements are regarded as terrorists because of the potential for aggressive attacks on 
civilian populations.  Policymakers have criminalized the term “terrorist” to lessen the 
political importance and motivation of criminal and armed belligerent groups.  This 
creates a problem for policymakers and scholars.  For scholars, the “criminalization” 
dismisses the significance of viewing these groups as political organizations and may blur 
the focus of research about the root causes of the violence generated by illegal groups.  
Criminalizing such groups ignores their motivations, administrative and economic 
organization, and decision-making power.  In essence, ignoring the political motivation 
of terrorists creates a significant research bias.14 For policymakers, criminalizing 
“terrorists” leads to a superficial understanding of why these violent actors form, how 
they organize, and how their organizations persist.  Ignoring these questions makes the 
creation of comprehensive solutions for resolving domestic and international problems a 
difficult task. 
An example of criminalizing the term “terrorist” and how this confusion may lead 
to an erroneous analysis is illustrated in the perception of Pablo Escobar in a 2002 Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) drug intelligence brief (titled Drugs and Terrorism: A New 
                                                        
14 See Stanley Cohen’s, “Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference.” 
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Perspective).  In this document Pablo Escobar is defined by the DEA as a narco-terrorist.  
They define narco-terrorism as: 
an organized group (or an individual) that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking 
in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets with the intention to influence (a government or group of 
people) (United States, 2002).15  
 
Though the brief does mention that terrorism is a politically motivated form of violence, 
when the DEA further attempts to analyze Pablo Escobar and his political strategies, it 
focuses on Escobar’s personality traits:  
At the height of his success, Escobar was listed in Forbes Magazine among the world’s 
wealthiest men.  While on the surface, he was nothing more than a street thug who 
became successful by trafficking in cocaine, Escobar had political aspirations and strove 
to project the appearance of legitimacy, claiming his wealth was the result of real estate 
investments. He eventually ran for Congress and campaigned for foreign policy changes 
that would prohibit the extradition of Colombian citizens to the United States… Escobar 
had a penchant for violence.  He wreaked havoc on Colombia while attempting to 
persuade the government to change its extradition policy.  Due to the numerous 
assassinations of politicians, presidential candidates, Supreme Court justices, police 
officers, and civilians, as well as a number of bombings culminating in the bombing of an 
Avianca commercial airliner in 1989, Escobar enraged both Colombia and the world… 
Moreover, he funded his terrorist activities with the money obtained from his drug 
trafficking endeavors.  He was the classic narco-terrorist; his cause was simply himself 
(United States, 2002). 
 
Summarizing that Escobar’s “cause was simply himself” ignores the conditions 
that led to his rise, his political motivations, the qualities of his business 
organization and the cost of his organization’s actions on Colombia’s democratic 
institutions.   
Years after Escobar’s death, Colombia has transitioned from being a drug-
trafficking country to a drug-producing country.  Many of the economic, social, and 
political conditions that were present when Escobar was alive still stimulate the illicit 
                                                        
 
 
15 See Drugs and Terrorism: A New Perspective. Retrieved February 1, 2012, from  
http://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/DEASeptember2002.pdf.  
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drug business not just in the Andes, but also throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Criminology studies focusing on “kingpin” strategies have not reduced the rise of drug-
trafficking organizations because they focus on the leaders, rather than on the conditions 
that motivate individuals to organize and act within illicit networks.  Strategies like “Plan 
Colombia” implemented in 2000, focus mainly on eradicating cocaine plantations, 
helping the Colombian government attack insurgent groups in southern Colombia and 
restoring security around urban centers, but do not focus on structural, political, and 
economic incentives that stimulate drug traffic and fund the war effort of armed groups in 
the first place.   
Colombia has weak democratic institutions, high economic inequalities, and 
suffers from a historical legacy of violence.16  These conditions have given rise to many 
drug trafficking organizations and armed belligerent forces, which have become 
dependent on the illicit drug economy. In contrast to politically driven explanations, this 
study methodically studies the rise and political impact of DTOs as illicit interest groups 
so that the model can be used in understanding: (1) the development of DTOs in other 
countries with similar conditions, and (2) the political impact of DTOs.   
The data used in this dissertation drew from author interviews, government 
documents, documentaries, newspaper and journalistic accounts, journal articles, and 
scholarly books.  In-person interviews were conducted with ex-members of DTOs and 
government officials during 2004, 2005, and 2008. Many of the interviews with former 
                                                        
16 Colombia has about 3.7 million internally displaced persons (Human Rights Watch, 2012); the number of 
kidnappings has been reduced from 1,250 in 2004 to about 249 in 2011 (UNODC, 2010a; República de 
Colombia, 2004 and 2011); the number of homicides in 2004 was 18,579 and was reduced to 12,159 in 
2011. The number of massacres in 2004 was 43, which took the lives of 243 people, and in 2011 the 
massacre number was 32 and took the life of 149 people (República de Colombia, 2004 and 2011).  
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DTO members were done with former sicarios (gunmen), middle traffickers, and coca 
farmers. First-person accounts recorded for the study complied with Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) requirements for working with human subjects, and the anonymity of 
subjects has been maintained throughout the dissertation.  Much additional sources were 
derived from news media, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research.  
Because of the difficulty in finding trustworthy sources on sensitive issues like the inner 
workings of DTOs, to make sure that sources acquired for this study were reliable, when 
possible several accounts were triangulated with other data sources.  
An assessment of the literature on DTOs and on interest group models begins on 
Chapter 2. It also introduces the Macro-Micro Interest Group Model used to study illicit 
interest groups.  Chapter 3 evaluates the external variables that gave rise to Medellin-
based DTOs. Chapter 4 evaluates the internal variables, which allowed Medellin-based 
DTOs to impact politics. Finally, the concluding analysis examines the model’s 
effectiveness and discusses the implication of this study on future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: USING A HYBRID MACRO-MICRO-MODEL EMPLOYING 
PLURALIST AND INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES TO STUDY ILLICIT 
INTEREST GROUPS 
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Studies on drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) highlight the social, economic, 
and political implications that the illicit drug business presents for nations like the United 
States and Colombia.  The existing research typically analyzes the effects of DTOs on 
states (Thoumi, 1995; Lee 1989) and the strategies states implement to counteract DTO 
effects (Bagley and Tokatlian 1985; Bagley, 1988; Tokatlian, 1988).  Colombian-based 
drug trafficking organizations, such as the “Medellin Cartel,” have been analyzed as 
participants of an underground industry and as transnational criminal organizations 
(TCOs) (Thoumi, 1995; Thoumi et al., 1999, Williams, 1998; Lee 1989, 1996, 1999; 
Bagley, 2003).  The works of Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer Lee pioneered the 
analytic study of the illicit drug industry by discussing the political and economic 
implications of these groups in Colombia.  Lee’s The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and 
Political Power is one of the first analyses to acknowledge the political importance of 
these groups.  His work on the cocaine industry refers to drug traffickers as “interest 
groups with extensive resources and political connections” that interact with “coca 
lobbies” in Bolivia and Peru (Lee, 1989).17  Lee’s work extensively describes the 
objectives and actions of the early narcotics industry, but does not evaluate the drug 
industry in Colombia as an interest group, although in the 1999 journal article co-
authored with Francisco Thoumi (entitled “The Criminal-Political Nexus in Colombia”) 
both authors refer to DTOs as the most powerful of interest groups:  
In other words drug profits amounted to roughly 6 percent to 8 percent of Colombia’s Gross 
Domestic Product in the 1990s, which makes narcotics barons possibly the dominant interest 
group in Colombia. Colombian traffickers’ large surplus implies a significant capability for system 
penetration activities such as lobbying, bribes, and legal investments, as well as for the exercise of 
violence and intimidation against the Colombian state (Lee et al., 1999).  
                                                        
17 For other analysis on Bolivian coca farmer mobilization and TCO interaction see Eduardo Gamarra’s 
“Transnational Criminal Organizations in Bolivia” (Farer, 1999, p. 183).  
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The article highlights the criminal-political nexus and set the stage for further research, 
which is the starting point for my project as my research will link previous work on 
DTOs with political science models on interest groups.   
An interest group model can explain three events: how structural conditions 
influence the formation of a political actor; how a group develops an internal 
organization; and what the dynamics are between a group and its environment.  Because 
illicit interest groups (IIGs) engage in criminal activity and have used violence to 
influence policy, it is difficult to associate IIGs with the activities of legally established 
interest groups, for this reason it is important to examine the characteristics of interest 
groups, explain how they differ from social movements (which are on the fringes of 
society), and to explore how an interest group model can be useful in studying IIG 
political activity. Whether a group is defined as a politically influential criminal group, an 
interest group, or a social movement, it is valuable to analyze politically active groups 
with an interest group model as an analytical tool because the variables used are designed 
to measure the political impact of groups in general. An interest group model can explore 
external influences on a group, which may affect a group’s organization or a group’s 
capacity to formulate a policy goal. The variables of an interest group model are valuable 
because they can examine a group’s internal dynamics, measure how its membership 
organizes behind a policy issue, and show how a group interacts with its external 
environment to influence politics. 
The chapter provides a literature review and the theoretical basis for analyzing 
groups commonly depicted as criminal; moreover, the chapter defines these groups as 
Illicit Interest Groups (IIGs) by using a macro-micro interest group model derived from 
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pluralist and institutionalist analyses on interest groups.  The model is used because of its 
explanatory power and because it reduces the deficiencies of interest group models; in 
particular, elite and corporatist interest group models which analyze power from the top-
down. The usefulness of the proposed model is that it combines two different but 
complimentary models (the pluralist and the institutionalist), which examine external 
influences on a group and internal factors that allow groups to impact policy. The 
following discussion will: (1) discuss the literature on social movements and interest 
groups; (2) define the hybrid Macro-Micro interest group model; and (3) present the 
organizational framework used to analyze IIGs.  
Social Movements and Interest Groups 
 All societal groups (including interest groups and social movements) unite 
individuals who have common viewpoints even if they are considered criminal.  
Sometimes it is difficult to clearly differentiate social movements from interest groups 
because both may support a particular policy or use similar tactics to influence 
policymaking. The main differences between social movements and interest groups lies 
in the scope of their policy agenda, the tactics they use to influence policymaking, and 
their lifecycle. Determining the difference is important because it assesses whether a 
groups lies in the fringes of society (i.e. an armed social movement), or if it has become 
part of the political establishment (i.e. an issue specific lobbying association).  
 Social movements are generally composed of a broad network of organizations 
that can promote numerous policy agendas.  These networks can include a variety of 
groups working loosely together or can lead to the creation of a substantial entity like a 
political party to represent the demands of a particular movement.  But since social 
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movements promote broad policy agendas, participants usually have differing overall 
goals and values (Bashevkin, 1996:138).18  For instance, some activists of a social 
movement may be preoccupied with advancing a general social cause while others 
belonging to the same movement may be participating to make more specific political 
demands.  Social movements aim to transform the status quo by promoting new social 
institutions and consequently the movement either dissolves or transitions based on the 
effort’s success or failure.  Because of this, social movements have been defined as 
organizations that “cooperate to advance political claims.”19   
 Social movements are regarded as confrontational actors because their tactics tend 
to challenge existing political systems.  In many circumstances, social movements 
represent the demands of societal actors that do not have regular access to an established 
avenue for persuading government, and thus do not have equal access to methods of 
policy change.  For this reason, the strategies that social movements typically employ can 
range from peaceful demonstrations to more extreme measures involving the use of 
violence towards civilians and property (i.e. terrorist events).  The use of violence, as a 
strategy, is probably why violent elements and organizations on the fringes of society are 
commonly examined in the context of a social movement.  Still, it has been observed that 
as organized movements become more developed, they regularly rely less on 
confrontational tactics20 and in many cases form more standard lobbying relationships 
                                                        
18 While some activists may want to form political parties because their main goal is to obtain the power to 
govern, others may be solely concerned with furthering just one cause.  An example of a broad social 
movement is the U.S. civil rights movement that agglutinated different groups, which specifically furthered 
the rights of women and people of color.  
 
19 See David Meyer et al., The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century.  
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with political parties and/or public officials, morphing into a structure more similar to 
traditional interest groups if they succeed.  Societal groups that use violent tactics to 
achieve a political goal are difficult to analyze, because their ambiguous legal status blurs 
how they are perceived by societies. Usually societies create polarized perceptions on 
violent groups, where those who oppose the violent social movements regard them as 
criminals, and those who support the group regard them as a movement, which makes a 
political demand. State authorities usually regard violent movements as “criminal” 
because in the defense of their political demands such violent social groups break laws. 
The ambiguous status of social armed movements is a predicament that researchers have 
when analyzing such groups especially when they engage in criminal activities. Should 
political science leave the study of these groups to sociologists, criminologists, or 
economists, even though these groups have political demands and effects on 
governments? In the case of Colombia, groups such as Los Extraditables (the Medellin-
based DTO’s terrorist group), the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC, have made or continue 
to make political demands, but are illegal because they are either engaged in an illicit 
business or use violence to pursue their political demands (or both). Because of the 
political influence of these groups on state institutions, it is argued in this dissertation that 
these social groups should be studied within the scope of political science.  
 Political scientists have generally defined interest groups as individuals who share 
common attitudes and who band together to protect their established interests and seek to 
influence political decisions.  Rather than challenging the status quo on a particular issue 
                                                                                                                                                                     
20 See Meyer et al., (1998) for the development and institutionalization of social movements in 
industrialized states.  By more developed it is meant that the social movement’s organization establishes a 
permanent professional staff, has centralized control, is well financed, and has a large number of supportive 
members.   
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in the way a social movement would, interest groups look after the welfare of the group 
by influencing government decision makers (Cigler et al., 1998; Bashevkin, 1996).21   
 For an interest group, having access to public officials is essential because it 
allows for the presentation (and fulfillment) of demands (Ainsworth, 2002, p.131).  When 
public officials deny standard access to an interest group, it severely weakens their ability 
to influence policy.22 These demands, or policy agendas, are typically narrow and usually 
represent a singular cause.  Because of this, members of an interest group regularly have 
more cohesive ideas and goals than those of activists within a social movement.  In 
democracies, a multitude of social groups have been represented directly by interest 
groups.  Some examples include corporations, labor unions, women’s rights 
organizations, and ethnic groups.   
 As will be suggested in more detail in further chapters, the Medellin-based DTOs, 
in addition to employing violent tactics, operated like any other legal interest groups by 
presenting their political demands to policymakers in an effort to affect the Colombian 
government’s domestic and international policy agenda.   
                                                        
 
21 Cigler and Loomis base their definition on the David Truman’s widely cited definition.  “An ‘interest 
group’ refers to any group that on the basis of one or more shared attitudes makes certain claims upon other 
groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are 
implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman, 1981).  Other definitions for interest groups are: “Any 
association of individuals, whether formally organized or not, that attempts to influence public policy” 
(Hrebenar et al., 1993, p. 9);  “An organization which seeks or claims to represent people or organizations 
which share one or more common interests or ideals” (Wilson, 1981);  “An interest group is an organized 
association which engages in activity relative to governmental institutions” (Salisbury, 1970); and 
“[Interest groups] promote their interests by attempting to influence government rather than by nominating 
candidates and seeking responsibility for the management of government,” (Key, 1964).    
 
22 It is probable that if an interest group is denied access to present its demands, then it will resort to more 
confrontational methods for influencing policy.   
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Armed Social Movements and Illicit Interest Groups 
One problematic area for political science and social studies is how to categorize, 
describe, and fully understand illegal social groups and how to best examine their 
relationships to other state entities.  Labeled as “criminal,” belligerent groups often 
receive different treatment when analyzed or, as is the case when viewing them as a 
social movement, they are studied in the context of a lifecycle from emergence to decline.   
The problem of categorizing a group as “criminal” is that it dismisses a clearer 
understanding of illegal groups that maintain an extended presence on the fringes of a 
state’s legal system and how those groups, even if depicted as movements, continue to 
affect policy from the outside.  But by using interest group models, a closer analysis can 
reveal more.  These fringe groups, for the purposes of this dissertation are referred to as 
illicit interest groups (IIGs); and in this study the focus is on the Medellin-based DTOs.   
Research on interest groups has established different models for understanding the 
power interplay between social groups and the state.  Such research focuses on the 
influence of legal interest groups on domestic and international politics.23  Models 
encompass variables from sociological analyses and focus on environmental/structural 
conditions.  They allow for an examination of internal conditions that can account for the 
differences in behavior of different groups such as a group’s internal power relations and 
the individual preferences of group members.  Though they have mainly been used to 
describe legal entities, the models can provide insights into IIGs because, like legitimate 
groups, IIGs can similarly impact government decision-making.24  Interest groups 
                                                        
23 See Thomas Risse’s “Transnational actors and world politics” (2002).  
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influence domestic and international politics and so do IIGs.  Like interest groups, IIGs 
can finance political campaigns and have shifting bases of popular support.  While 
interest groups can represent the formal foundations of various economic sectors, IIGs 
can represent certain informal counterparts.25 Both exist within states, but both can be 
transnational in nature, and both can become politically active to counteract policies that 
affect them.  
But IIGs promote illicit activities that challenge state authority by engaging in 
violent conflicts, trafficking arms, or engaging in illegal commercial ventures like the 
narcotics industry (Farer, 1999). While interest groups appear in all democracies, IIGs 
typically arise in weak states because the presence of the state apparatus is not capable of 
enforcing laws that will restrict their activities (Thoumi, 1994; Farer, 1999).  
Applying an interest group model can reassess how armed movements are studied.  
It can confirm the structural influences that affect a movement, shed light on the qualities 
of individual members, and examine why IIGs persist.   
Traditional Interest Group Models  
 There are a number of interest group models that analyze and try to explain the 
power interplay between societal groups and the state.  Some of the more traditional 
models include the power elite model, the pluralist model, the institutionalist model, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
24 The author of this dissertation considers that not all organized criminal organizations are illicit interest 
groups, organized criminal organizations need to be politically active, and they need to influence policy to 
be considered an illicit interest group.   
 
25 Examples of political-economic bases of support are: residents of Brazilian slums, which receive 
economic benefits from donos da droga (drug dealers), the strengthening of the coca growers movement in 
Bolivia, and the popular basis of support for armed groups linked to the drug trade such as the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Auto Defensas de Colombia (AUC).   
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the corporatist model, but others provide a better structural starting point for a discussion 
of IIGs than others. 
The models can be placed along an ideological continuum from those, on the one 
hand, that have a structure and philosophy more suited for explaining the strength of 
social group influence on state policy, to those models that have a structure and 
philosophy more suited for explaining the state’s control over a social group.  Certain 
models are better equipped to analyze the power interplay from the point-of-view of the 
state and social elites (a top-down approach) while others are better equipped to analyze 
the power interplay from the point-of-view of social groups (a bottom-up approach). 
The power elite model, as described in The Power Elite (1970), by C.  Wright 
Mills, diagrams a power structure to explain politics in the United States from the top 
down.  Mills argues that a small cohesive business elite controls government decision-
making.  In so doing, the elite elements perpetuated political power by limiting the 
participation of other groups in society.  Mills’ model develops a pyramidal power 
structure containing an instrumental view of the state-interest group dynamic that 
attempts to show how a social group, in this case a business group, influences state actors 
to create policies that benefit a particular industry.  Mills’ approach may be an interesting 
and insightful way to analyze IIGs, but it leans toward providing a better understanding 
of established elites rather than nascent interest groups.  Mills uses benefits and 
consequences in the model popularly known as the “iron triangle” to better understand 
the United States military-industrial complex.  His model shows how the common 
interests of elite business groups, congresspersons, and bureaucrats align and reinforce 
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each other for long periods of time.26 Although Mills’ power elite model is helpful in 
depicting the political relationships among elites, it is not as useful when analyzing less 
elite interest groups.  Especially interest groups that may not have the economic means, 
social status, or social pedigree to be able to coax, build social relationships, or “good 
ol’boy networks” with powerful and established politicians. 
 After C. Wright Mills proposed this model of representation, scholars such as G.  
William Domhoff in Who Rules America (2002) empirically expanded Mills’s original 
research.  Domhoff’s research linked members of the upper class to the corporate 
economy concluding that a corporate elite exists.  He also did surveys where respondents 
belonging to the political elite verified that they knew other members in corporate society 
at a personal level.  While valuable for future discussions, this model explains more about 
the established groups than those along the fringe and so is less valuable to the purposes 
of this study.27  
 The pluralist model, on the other hand, developed as a response to the power elite 
model, and can be used to examine non-elite groups with more clarity from the bottom up.  
Core pluralist theorists like David Truman and Robert Dahl were behavioralists and 
                                                        
26 For example, the defense industrial lobby provides electoral support to members of congress in exchange 
for favorable legislation.  Congresspersons benefit from electoral support provided by defense lobbies such 
as campaign funding and/or votes.  As a consequence, legislators create favorable legislation for the 
defense industry, and oversee the bureaucracy that enforces the desired policy.  In turn, the defense 
bureaucracy obtains a mission as well as Congressional budgetary support to enforce legislation.  At the 
individual level, bureaucrats could potentially secure future jobs in the private sector by working on a 
particular policy or by knowing the rules and procedures of the defense bureaucracy.  Though it seems as 
though the relationships are equally beneficial for all parities involved, the defense industrial lobby is 
argued to be the most powerful party because it sets the agenda through the economic power that it has to 
advance the political careers of members of Congress and of bureaucracies and their officers.  
 
27 Although Medellin-based DTO leaders became multimillionaires by the time many were in their mid-
twenties in the late 1970s, DTO leaders had the economic means to build relationships with politicians, 
however they did not have the status to penetrate the high social status held by Colombian political elites of 
the time. Since they were unable to build rapport with the political elite, many DTOs launched their own 
campaigns or funded the campaigns of local level politicians.   
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believed that policy outcomes in the United States could be better explained—not by 
observing governmental institutions—but by observing the behavior of societal groups.  
Before the behavioral revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, most institutional work was less 
analytical because it focused on describing the structure of formal government 
institutions and the rules and constitutions that produced those structures.  Pluralists 
considered that focusing on the description of formal institutions did little to actually 
explain politics.  They believed that they could understand political behavior if more 
attention was paid to social actors and their negotiations with state officials rather than to 
the legal process.  An underlying assumption was the belief that societal group action 
could explain more about politics than institutional rules.  Their social focus allowed 
them to believe that they were creating a more analytical version of political events. 
 Behavioralists reversed the emphasis on description by concentrating on creating 
functional models that explain political behavior.  David Easton’s Framework for 
Political Analysis (1965) depicts social activity as inputs and government activity as 
outputs.  Using Easton’s framework, pluralists concentrated on social aspects of political 
behavior like voting, interest group activity, and mass political behavior, while 
minimizing the importance of studying formal state institutions.  The behavioralist focus 
on society partially explains why David Truman was the first scientist to define interest 
groups as groups that share common attitudes and make claims upon other groups.28 
Though interest groups form to further their common interests this quality does not make 
social groups politically active.  According to this perspective, groups become politically 
                                                        
28 An ‘interest group’ refers to “any group that on the basis of one or more shared attitudes makes certain 
claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of 
behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman, 1981).  
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active when they need to make claims upon others through the use of government 
institutions, especially when groups have a lot at stake and specific rights are not well 
established (Ainsworth, 2002).   
 As an interest group model created in response to the power elite model, pluralists 
disagree with elite theorists on the issue of interest group competition.  Pluralists do not 
believe that group competition is limited to a privileged group.  Instead, they assume that 
group competition for influencing government is fluid, open, and fair.  Interest group 
access to different branches of government at local and national levels guarantees 
increased political participation.  The model assumes that political access is available to 
all groups regardless of their economic status.  Because of this assumption the political 
theatre is commonly referred to as a political “marketplace,” where various social groups 
representing opposing interests compete for influence in a level playing field.  It is also 
believed that because of the existence of many divergent groups their claims balance each 
other out creating a natural equilibrium.  Finally the model assumes that the state is an 
impartial actor that maintains order by settling disputes among competing interests. 
In the pluralist model, the power of groups to influence policy is determined by 
five internal group characteristics: individual member characteristics, group resources, 
cohesion, expertise, and representativeness.29 In a competitive political marketplace, it is 
believed that the group that excels in all of these characteristics will be the most 
successful at influencing policy.  Besides focusing on internal characteristics of a group, 
                                                        
 
 29 Member characteristics refer to socioeconomic status, media access, and the education of group leaders.  
Group resources refer to financial and human resources controlled by a group.  Group cohesion is the 
degree of organizational control, discipline, and ideological unity.  Group expertise refers to policy and 
administrative knowledge.  Finally representativeness is the group’s policy position relative to society 
(Bashevkin, 1996).   
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pluralists like David Truman argued that external characteristics such as changes in the 
political, economic, social, or technological environment were important in accounting 
for group development and demise.  These variables were incorporated in what is known 
as Truman’s disturbance theory, which contends that groups form in response to changes 
in society and the economy (Truman, 1981).  Disturbances such as war and economic 
recession can stimulate the creation of groups whose purpose is to “restore the balance in 
society.”  
  A pluralist approach is important to discussing IIGs because it allows for a closer 
analysis of interest groups from the bottom up.  By understanding the composition of a 
societal group through the use of a variety of variables, regardless of its legal status, 
social scientists can further explain the power interplay between a group, the state, or its 
social environment.  For this reason, the pluralist model is an essential part of describing 
and analyzing IIGs in more detail. The pluralist model does have two main shortcomings: 
The first is its assumption that the state is an impartial actor. The second is that all groups 
can equally compete in the political “marketplace.” The institutionalist approach to the 
study of interest groups addresses these biases.  
 Institutionalist models developed as a response to pluralist beliefs and question 
three assumptions of the pluralist model: the nature of group competition, the pluralist 
view of the state, and the nature of a group’s internal workings.  While still focusing on 
societal groups as opposed to the powered elite, and by studying the formation and 
effects of institutions, the model is therefore a helpful counterpoint to the pluralist model. 
 Two scholars central to the creation of an institutionalist model for interest group 
studies were E.E. Schattschneider and Mancur Olson.  Both studied American politics, 
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but while E.E. Schattschneider concentrated on laying out the foundations of rationalist 
notions on group competition and the state, Olson explained group action by looking at 
the internal dynamics of a group. 
 Schattschneider was not satisfied with pluralist explanations of interest group 
competition in American politics.  In his opinion, interest group competition was not free 
of favoritism: “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a 
strong upper class accent” (Schattschneider, 1960).  The freedom of competition was 
biased because the outcomes of group competition favored certain interests.  Although 
pluralists believed that interest group competition at different levels of government 
dispersed power and allowed more segments of a population to be represented, in reality 
competition in the political marketplace concentrated power among the upper classes 
rather than dispersing power equally to other groups (Ainsworth, 2002). Schattschneider 
saw the class system as an institutional aspect that affected the fair play of ideas.  To 
account for biases in social group competition, Schattschneider believed that it was 
necessary to move away from viewing societal groups as a sole reference point. While 
pluralist notions depicted the state as an impartial actor allocating resources among 
competing interests, Schattschneider believed that a state’s institutional rules and 
procedures structure the competition, and largely determine which interests survive for 
consideration among decision-makers.30  By studying a state’s institutional mechanisms, 
policymakers, and norms, a larger understanding of the social context for how 
movements and groups form and compete could now be explained.  Schattschneider’s 
                                                        
30 Though Schattschneider used an institutionalist perspective, it was an improvement on the “old” 
institutionalist school because rather than just describing the rules and procedures of an institution, 
Schattschneider and others explained the effects of these rules on the behavior of individuals.   
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model, has influenced contemporary scholars such as Peter Evans et al.’s in Bringing The 
State Back In (1985), John Ikenberry et al.’s The State and American Foreign Economic 
Policy (1988), and Thomas Risse-Kappen’s in Bringing Transnational Relations Back In 
(1995) among others, to incorporate the study of state and its relation with non-state 
actors.   
 Mancur Olson’s major question in The Logic of Collective Action (1971) dealt 
with why individuals join groups.  The question led him to analyze the interactions within 
interest groups in order to identify common variables.  His work (and that of others who 
have followed) has constructed models that indicate why groups form, why some are 
more successful in influencing policy, and why they eventually disband.  Olson, like 
Schattschneider, was unconvinced with pluralist explanations of why interest groups 
formed and behaved.  Whereas pluralists focused on environmental causes such as 
political, economic, social, and technological events31 to explain a group’s lifespan, 
rationalists like Olson did not believe that these events in themselves specifically 
stimulated a group’s formation or demise.  The traditional pluralist variables designed to 
measure a group’s ability to influence policy such as member characteristics, group 
resources, cohesion, expertise, and representativeness, were inadequate in determining 
why certain groups failed to influence policy.   
 Another rationalist critique of the pluralist model was its assumption of why 
people joined a group.  Pluralists assumed that members joined a group because of 
cohesion in beliefs and attitudes, and this quality allowed political scientists to study 
                                                        
31 Environmental effects on group behavior are usually referred to as Truman’s disturbance theory.  Any 
disturbance that affected the interactions within or between groups led to the demise of some and the 
creation of others.   
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interest groups as single entities, regardless of individual member preferences.  Olson 
argued that this was a mistake; he did not believe that interest groups acted as monolithic 
entities where all members within an organization acted on behalf of a common interest.  
In his view, the pluralist treatment of interest groups committed an ecological fallacy in 
which individuals took on the qualities normally attributed to a group.  Such treatment of 
interest groups assumed that individuals joined organizations to support a common cause, 
but never really inquired why.  Olson believed that more could be explained about group 
action and success, if groups could be dissected to expose the different preferences of 
individuals belonging to a group.  In other words, Olson considered that individuals 
within a group also had their own self-interest, and just because they joined a group, their 
own interest would not cede to the common interest of the group.  For Olson, an inquiry 
on the preferences of individuals in a group would reveal the real explanations behind 
why individuals choose to form, belong, or leave a group.   
 Both Schattschneider and Olson developed institutional approaches to analyzing 
interest groups.  By looking at the structures and mechanisms of states that affected 
interest group formation, competition, and demise; and by focusing on characteristics of 
individual members within a group, their efforts can also be drawn from the bottom up—
focusing on individual and group effects on the competition for the attention of 
political/government elites.  For this reason, incorporating an institutional approach is 
important to discussing IIGs because it allows for a closer analysis of the social purpose 
behind how groups act and the governing agents that can affect the supposedly “balanced” 
power play between competing groups and the state.  The interaction between 
governments and groups makes the intuitionalist model an essential part of describing 
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IIGs in more detail. This analysis can delve on a number of questions: how laws and law 
enforcement allowed DTOs to flourish, what were the perceptions of government elites 
towards DTOs and DTO leaders, and why did DTO members join DTOs, among others. 
At the opposite end of the continuum is the corporatist model—where interest 
groups are dominated or incorporated into the state’s structure.  There are two major 
categories of corporatist regimes: authoritarian corporatism and liberal, neo-, or societal 
corporatism.   
In corporatist models, interest groups are recognized, licensed, or given a 
monopoly by the state.  Competition among groups is limited and is organized according 
to a state’s design.  In corporatist models, interest groups become an integral part of the 
state and this loss of political autonomy reduces the political impact of interest groups on 
society, thereby reducing conflict and competition. Alfred C.  Stepan (1978), a well-
known specialist on corporatist interest group models in Latin America, has shown that 
corporatism is an elite response to state crisis because elites can control an emergent 
group’s demands by using institutional mechanisms to incorporate social sectors into the 
state.  Thus, corporatism emphasizes structured interactions with a state’s politicians, 
bureaucratic actors, and interest groups.  The gist of the interaction is based on the state’s 
ability to control the selection of group leaders, group demands, and group support.   
 In corporatist models, the balance of power tilts toward state actors.  In contrast to 
the power elite model, corporatist models believe that social actors do not manipulate the 
state because it is the state or state officials that determine group competition.  Though in 
the pluralist model, group competition is refereed by state institutions, in the corporatist 
model the state intervenes in the internal decision-making process of interest groups, thus 
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regulating group competition according to a state’s parameters.  Similar to the power elite 
model, while valuable for future discussions, the corporatist perspective explains more 
about the state than those groups competing for change along the fringe of society and so 
it is less valuable to the purposes of the study at hand.   
 The two models that explain the political impact of societal groups, which focus 
the effect of environmental factors that influence their actions and formation, while at the 
same time offering insights into internal group characteristics are the pluralist and 
institutional models of interest group analysis.  By analyzing IIGs through both models, a 
better picture can be illustrated of criminal organizations and how they can affect 
domestic and international policy.   
The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Interest Group Model 
In addition to taking an hybrid of institutionalist and pluralist approaches, the 
interest group model used in this exploration of Colombian drug trafficking organizations 
is made more efficient by including two additional aspects: a macro-view and a micro-
view.  The two perspectives organize how external and internal factors influence group 
behavior.  The macro-micro-model tries to predict the character of internal reforms that 
can result from environmental demands on a societal group.  Without analyzing the 
dynamics within the internal organization of a group and the motivations of a group’s 
individual members, it is difficult to assert whether an environmental factor has any 
effect.  The hybridization of two models is derived from an organizational model created 
by Amie Kreppel in her study on the institutional development of the European 
Parliament (Kreppel, 2002).  Some of the hypotheses used and tested in my dissertation 
are derived from Kreppel’s organizational development study.    
34 
 
Using a hybrid approach makes sense because one model by itself can only 
partially describe the qualities of interest groups.  In my project it is necessary to combine 
the two models to produce a more complete and comprehensive explanation of IIG 
behavior.  Table 1 below shows the fusion of variables used to analyze groups in the 
study. 
Table 1: The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Model Employing Pluralist and Institutionalist 
Approaches 
 Macro-model variables 
(external variables) 
Micro-model variables 
(internal variables) 
Pluralist approach • Political events 
• Economic events 
• Social events 
• Technological events 
• Membership 
characteristics 
• Resources 
• Cohesion 
• Expertise 
• Representativeness 
Institutionalist 
approach 
• A state’s legal 
parameters 
• Individual preferences 
of state officials 
• Autonomy 
• A state’s capacity 
• Selective incentives 
• Group size 
• Existence of high- and 
low-demanders 
 
 
The Macro-model column variables listed in the left column of Table 1 above, 
assumes that external variables will influence internal group behavior and those internal 
changes will follow external events (Kreppel, 2002:26, 214).  The following hypotheses 
can be used to test Macro-model variables as they explain how an interest group 
flourishes and develops: 
• Hypothesis 1: The presence of favourable external variables (occurring 
within a larger political environment) is more likely to influence the formation 
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and development of illicit interest groups, and a group’s formation and 
development should follow external events. 
• Hypothesis 1a: Changes to the internal organization and structure of an illicit 
interest group should be related and deal with the environmental events that 
influence the group, and the changes made should be collective goods because 
they benefit the organization as a whole. 
Hypothesis 1 identifies external conditions that influence the emergence or development 
of a group. It also tries to determine a causal relation between an external event and the 
changes within the organization. Hypothesis 1a determines whether a group’s internal 
organization is affected or if a group creates a policy objective as a result of an external 
event. Hypothesis 1a also tries to ascertain whether the internal organizational changes 
are of collective benefit to all group members or just a few. 
 The Micro-model column variables, listed in the right column of Table 1 above, 
can be used to determine how a group affects policy. The Micro-model variables in 
Table 1 can be used to effectively describe how individuals within a group will act to 
achieve a common goal and can help to explain how a group’s action will be constrained 
by group dynamics (Kreppel, 2002:214).  For example, in order to understand another 
facet of how members achieve policy goals, the preferences and interests of the leaders of 
drug trafficking organizations can be examined.  The following hypotheses can be used to 
test Micro-model variables as they explain how an interest group develops and impacts 
policy: 
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• Hypothesis 2: The presence of internal variables, which favor a group’s 
mobilization towards the accomplishment a policy goal, will allow an IIG to 
affect governmental policy. 
• Hypothesis 2a: If members of an illicit interest group need to deal with a 
particular issue, members will work together and the political achievements 
obtained by the group will benefit all members. 
• Hypothesis 2b: Once a group has clear leadership and influence, the group 
will have greater incentive to discipline its membership and attain internal 
cohesion.  
• Hypothesis 2c: When a group has no clear leadership, or is unable to impact 
policy, there will be little incentive for a group’s leader(s) to organize and 
discipline their members.   
• Hypothesis 2d: When a group has realized a common goal, in periods of 
transition, consensus among a group’s membership will decrease and may 
deteriorate group development.32 
 Hypothesis 2 examines whether the presence of internal variables has an effect on 
a group’s ability to affect policy. Hyphotheses 2a-2d look at the internal organization of 
a group when it is formed and once it begins to unravel. By examining the different 
internal variables, it is possible to determine whether a group will stay united to 
implement a policy or if it will begin to disband.  
                                                        
32 Hypotheses 1-2d are derived from Amie Kreppel’s organizational study on the European Parliament 
(EP) (Kreppel, 2002, p.25,48), and participating political parties, but in this study the hypotheses are 
applied to the study of interest groups. 
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 Finally, to gage on the effect of IIGs on democratic institutions, Hypothesis 3 is 
formulated: 
• Hypothesis 3: The greater the economic and political cohesiveness and 
discipline IIGs have, the more likely they will be able to influence 
democratic institutions to accomplish their goals.  
Macro-model Variables 
 The Macro-model external factors that make up the pluralist area of group study 
and investigation concentrate on describing how external events (political, economic, 
social, technological) can influence a group’s formation, development, or demise.  These 
external factors are part of David Truman’s “Disturbance Theory,” which contends that 
groups form to counterbalance opposition and to respond to changes in society and the 
economy (Truman, 1981).  As introduced earlier, disturbances such as war and economic 
recessions can stimulate groups to “restore the balance in society.”  
The institutionalist model’s external variables include looking at a state’s legal 
parameters, the preferences of government officials, and a state’s autonomy and 
capacity.33 
An explanation of a state’s legal parameters is a general description of the legal 
environment within which IIGs develop.  It helps to frame the context that shows how 
IIGs become politically active and can identify how a state’s legal system may bias 
certain social groups.  In addition, ambiguities in a state’s legal system can lead to social 
conflicts and loopholes, making an understanding of legal parameter relevant for analysis. 
                                                        
 
33 Statist research defines institutional capacity as the “ability of the bureaucratic state to execute its 
actions,” (Bashevkin, 1996, p. 148) this entails concentrating, coordinating, and exploiting state resources.   
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 Looking at the preferences of state officials explores the state’s elite executives 
and/or legislators who are appropriate to the case study based on their policy agendas, 
political platforms, and campaigns.  These preferences can either counteract IIG policy 
agendas or can be the result of IIG influence, making them valuable aspects to 
discovering how IIGs are influenced by a state’s policies or how IIGs affect state policies.  
This variable is important because the scholarly work of E. E. Schattschneider, and more 
contemporary scholars such as Stephen Krasner (1978), Evans et al. (1985), John 
Ikenberry et al. (1988), and Peter Katzenstein (1985) have found that state actors have the 
capacity to intervene in group competition and are not impartial actors. 
 Evaluating autonomy gauges the degree of political independence (from other 
state institutions and social actors) that state executives enjoy while governing.  Studying 
autonomy builds an understanding of a leader’s political maneuverability, which can, in 
turn, directly affect an understanding of the nature of a leader’s coalitions, negotiations, 
deal-making options, and willingness to compromise.  Autonomy as a variable is 
different from state capacity because autonomy measures the degree of independence that 
state actors have from societal groups for making decisions.  When state actors are more 
autonomous they will be less concerned about societal group opinion, and consequently, 
state actors will be more apt to act on their own. Once an executive has the autonomy to 
act, state capacity is the ability of a leader to act on his/her will.  The level of a state 
leader’s autonomy also has a large influence on the potential power of an IIG, and vice-
versa, so is an insightful area of research. 
 State capacity is an evaluation of the state’s ability to function effectively; 
meaning its ability (or inability) to efficiently monopolize the use of force and collect 
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taxes.  More specifically, state capacity is the aptitude of government elites to manage the 
state apparatus so that policies can be implemented through state institutions.  Exploring 
the variable is valuable because, Joel Migdal in his work Strong Societies and Weak 
States (Migdal, 1988) found that countries with an ineffective state capacity to collect 
taxes, enforce laws, or distribute resources, are overshadowed by social actors. The 
capacity of social actors to surpass the state is important to note, because having an 
ineffective state capacity can create a political environment with a higher propensity for 
the development of IIGs. In Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Juan 
Linz and Alfred Stepan also found that a functioning state is a necessary condition for the 
consolidation of democratic regime (Linz et al., 1996, p. 7).  If the state is not able to 
effectively establish rule of law, then democratic institutions will be vulnerable. This 
observation is important to the study of illicit interest groups because groups thrive in 
areas that cannot be regulated.  Linz and Stepan refer to this as the “problem of stateness” 
(Linz et al., 1996, p. 18) where a state’s institutions are unable to “effectively exercise 
[their] claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory, could not 
collect taxes, and could not implement a judicial system” (Linz et al., 1996, p. 18).  The 
“problem of stateness” is an obstacle for consolidating democracies such as Colombia’s 
democracy, because a weak state is unable to protect the rights of its citizens due to the 
lack of state capacity throughout its territory.  The “problem of stateness” for many 
countries becomes cyclical because the lack of state capacity, in turn, leads actors to 
resolve more conflicts through the use of violence and corruption, instead of a state’s 
legal institutions, which in turn, continue to weaken a state’s institutions. 
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Micro-model Variables 
Micro-model variables drawn from a pluralist approach look at the internal factors 
of a group.  Macro-model seeks to understand the development and institutionalization of 
a group by examining descriptive elements such as a group’s membership characteristics, 
resources, cohesion, expertise, and representativeness.  These attributes focus mainly on 
aggregate qualities rather than on the individual preferences and incentives of a group’s 
members. Pluralists hypothesize that, the group that excels in all of these internal 
characteristics will be the most successful at influencing policy. 
Exploring membership characteristics includes investigating the socioeconomic 
status and education of the group’s executive or elite members compared to the 
remaining membership population.   
Examining resources means identifying the financial and human forces leveraged 
by the group.  This includes studying a group’s financial and human resources to see how 
these are used to influence policy.     
Cohesion is the degree of organizational control, discipline, and ideological unity 
present in a group.  In particular, this study focuses on describing the level of economic 
and political cohesion evidenced in efforts to move agendas forward.  Economically 
speaking, this means looking at how effectively groups gather, manage, and pool 
financial resources.  Politically, it means analyzing how coordinated and structured the 
group’s efforts are in their effort to achieve a policy objective.   
Expertise refers to a group’s policy and administrative knowledge that yields a 
discussion about a group’s internal operations, such as how effective and developed its 
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communications network, technological know-how, security apparatus, legal 
representation, and public relations capacity may be. 
Representativeness is a measure of the group’s policy position relative to society 
(Bashevkin, 1996).  Representativeness can be evaluated by studying how a group is able 
to sell its particularistic policy agenda to the rest of society by shaping public opinion. 
This variable can also explore how groups approach politicians with the effort to present 
their policy agenda. In the case of Colombia the presentation of interests is usually done 
through campaign donations, but also through the use of clientelist networks. Clientelism 
is generally defined as a patron-client relationship that takes place between people of 
unequal status, which is characterized by an unequal exchange of favors, and that relies 
heavily on face-to-face contact (Martz, 1997:10). The role of DTO leaders within 
clientelist networks to obtain their policy objectives will be explored. Also, it is expected 
that IIGs that have aspects of their agenda successfully conveyed and supported (even if 
they are only partially supported) by a larger population have an easier path for social 
acceptance and development than groups who do not.   
The hybrid interest group model used in the study at hand derives variables from 
the institutionalist approach to examine the internal structure of an organization by 
focusing on factors such as selective incentives, group size, and the nature of the group’s 
high- and low-demanders.  These attributes mostly concentrate on the individual 
characteristics of interest group members and are useful in analyzing the state-group 
dynamic by studying actor interests, preferences, and strategies. 
 Selective incentives, as referred to in Mancur Olson’s Rise and Decline of 
Nations (1984), are benefits or deterrents that are determined by a group’s leadership and 
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are applied to the membership of an organization to induce the appropriate collective 
action.  Olson’s incentives help explain what motivates members to join a cause, what 
keeps them involved, and to what degree they will remain in an organization to 
accomplish a collective goal.  By looking at selective incentives in an IIG, an 
understanding of the group’s potential motivations and commitment at the member-level 
can be revealed.  Selective incentives can prevent group deterioration by attempting to 
keep the membership satisfied and united.  As Olson describes, these incentives can be 
positive or negative.   
 Positive selective incentives yield benefits that reward individuals for belonging 
to the group.  Though members may perceive a larger, more long-term collective goal, 
they may need short-term positive selective incentives to inspire continued support.  
Collaterally, these incentives may help members identify more strongly with the larger 
cause and commit their support further, which in turn allows for the unification and 
survival of the group.   
 Selective incentives can also be negative.  A particular group may find it 
necessary to coerce its membership or impose a negative incentive in order to achieve its 
central goals.  Negative incentives can range from collecting monthly dues to resorting to 
violence, punishment, or fear. 
 In the case study analyzed in this dissertation, it is valuable to be aware of certain 
types of selective incentives: material, expressive, and solidary (Ainsworth, 2002)—all of 
which aim at building cooperation, but which employ distinct and different methods.  
Material incentives are tangible goods received or levied in exchange for a person’s 
allegiance.  An example of a positive incentive could be cash or a paycheck, while its 
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negative counterpart could be a fine.  Both use objective value as a method for asserting 
compliance.  On the contrary, an expressive incentive is an intangible, ideological benefit 
received from participating in the purposive attainment of a clear cause: the individual 
receives psychological reward by feeling that they are part of a solution or movement.  In 
some cases, while the attainment of the larger ideological mission of the group may 
remain farther off (or even unattainable), providing certain opportunities that allow 
individuals to express their participation or support toward a future goal can yield a 
rewarding benefit that leads to group compliance and teamwork.  A solidary incentive, as 
James Q. Wilson describes, is a motivation that yields “rewards arising out of the act of 
associating that can be given or withheld from individuals” (Wilson, 1995).  Examples of 
this type of incentive, such as social recognition, honors, or deference toward a member 
of a group, can result in positive benefits to an individual by the mere fact that it signals 
favor or special treatment.  When referring to groups, solidary selective incentives are 
used to inspire positive group interactions that strengthen the ideals of membership, focus 
the overall mission, and bolster the group’s identity.  Members receive a benefit from the 
psychological feeling of exclusivity and through convivial interaction with other 
members.  These types of selective incentives are also intangible.   
 Conclusions can be drawn about the precision with which leadership 
organizations, within a group, control their individual members by evaluating intangible 
selective incentives and discovering them within IIGs studied—selective incentives are 
what drive a group’s cohesion.  Different incentives signal different strategies of 
motivation, each with their own strengths and weaknesses.  While material selective 
incentives can be used efficiently to direct individual actions in most situations, it is often 
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a less useful method for inspiring the desired outcome when motivating larger groups.  
On the other hand, expressive incentives can be more motivational and self-inspiring for 
a group, making certain incentives more valuable for certain purposes. It is expected that 
in this study on IIGs selective incentives will enhance the cohesion and discipline of a 
group. 
 Group size is another important measure worth considering when analyzing IIG 
behavior.  According to Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, in small organizations 
members can voluntarily34 do the work necessary to obtain a collective good because it is 
more likely that the benefit will exceed the costs of doing the work.  Olson refers to a 
“collective good” as a good that cannot be excluded or kept from being consumed by the 
rest of the group.  In democracies, an example of a collective good could be a state’s 
military defense or law enforcement, in which case even those who are not forced to pay 
taxes may still gain benefits.  Olson’s theory establishes that garnering collective goods 
are easier to develop and maintain in smaller groups because the benefits will not have to 
be divided to the same degree.  The size of the group allows the membership to 
coordinate their actions quickly and small groups are able to keep their members more 
accountable.  The close relation among members of an association allows a mechanism of  
“social sanctions” as Olson terms it (Olson, 1971, p. 60-65) —a type of peer pressure, to 
make members increase efforts and hold each other accountable. 
 In contrast to small groups, Olson argues that large groups have a more difficult 
time achieving a collective good.  This problem occurs because the brunt of the work is 
                                                        
34 By voluntarily it is meant that individual members will provide a good without the use of incentives or of 
coercion. 
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done by a small number of people in larger organizations, and a majority of the people 
benefit from the efforts of the small, active core.  The inequity in the amount of work 
done by the membership is the central challenge to the survival of organizations.  
Although the members of a group may support the idea of obtaining a collective good, 
they may not have the incentives available to motivate action at that larger, broader scale.  
The discrepancy between the belief in obtaining a collective good or benefit and the 
actual work required is termed the problem of collective action:   
 Though all of the members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining 
this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing a 
collective good.  Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily 
would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not.  (Olson, 
1971, p. 21) 
 
 The demise of larger groups can usually be attributed to the collective action 
problem.  The disparity in the workload, be it physical or mental, may discourage 
members because, for some, the costs may become greater than the benefits.  A collective 
action problem is minimized by providing or increasing selective incentives.   
 Olson’s theory provides a backdrop from which a comparison can be made to the 
IIGs in this study.  The question of how group size affects an IIGs ability to deal with the 
problem of collective action can test and also enlighten the analysis with another angle 
explaining the potential threats to a group’s ability to affect domestic and international 
policy.   
 The third internally focused institutional variable that will be used in analyzing 
IIGs in this study is measuring the presence and quality of high- and low-demanders.  In 
Ainsworth’s Analyzing Interest Groups, high- and low-demanders are depicted as 
individuals who place a different value on a particular good.  In relation to the collective 
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good, high-demanders are viewed by Ainsworth as members who value a good to a point 
where they are willing to dedicate most or all of the effort required for achievement, 
which is then enjoyed by low-demanders, who enjoy a free ride on the efforts of others.  
In this relationship, there is little collective effort between the two types. 
 In a larger organizations, Olson believes that the benefits are distributed among a 
larger number of members and that the work done is more costly: “the larger the group, 
the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any person acting in the group interest 
receives…the smaller the share of the total benefit going to any individual… and the 
larger the costs” (Olson, 1971, p. 48).  High-demanders in larger organizations may have 
to spend more time and money communicating and coordinating strategies toward the 
achievement of a collective good.  According to Olson, large organizations also have 
more members who are low-demanders as a result of the wider distribution of selective 
incentives.  So, the larger the group, the more difficult it is to counter-balance the effect 
of low demanders, and the more difficult it is to achieve a common good. In contrast a 
smaller group has an easier time in achieving collective good because it was a greater 
number of high-demanders. The smaller the size of a group, the more efficient it is in 
attaining a collective good.  
 Though high demanders need less incentive to produce a collective good, they 
may have more at stake and so may act due to personal interest, which is an interesting 
point when studying IIGs.  For example, Pablo Escobar’s efforts, which will be discussed 
in more detail in a future chapter, show that he had a large personal stake in attempting to 
derail the extradition policy between Colombia and the United States, although the 
collective good, from his effort to invalidate the Extradition Treaty, would have affected 
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all individuals in the society who prospectively could be extradited.  Escobar acted as a 
high-demander, while others who potentially would have benefited from his actions could 
be depicted as low-demanders.  This example points out the positive aspect of evaluating 
the qualities of high- and low-demanders within IIGs—to explain the development, 
nature, and strategy of collective action within a group. 
Analysis  
Using a hybrid interest group model with micro- and macro- viewpoints that pulls 
together variables from both institutional and pluralist interest group studies and applies 
them to organizations often deemed as criminal provides a new vantage point for 
evaluating: how structural conditions influence the formation of a political actor, how a 
group develops an internal organization, and what the dynamics are between a group and 
its environment.  In the chapters that follow, I will illustrate how the interest group model 
described in this chapter is a valid method for identifying how these groups operate 
politically.  By focusing on both the institutional and pluralist elements that effect illegal 
groups, and by framing the description with an understanding of societal groups from the 
bottom up, a clearer picture can be made of illegal groups that affect domestic and 
international policy.   
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CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING 1980s-ERA MEDELLIN DRUG TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATIONS USING AN INTEREST GROUP MODEL: EXTERNAL 
VARIABLES 
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As described in the last chapter, a hybrid Macro-Micro-Modelhas been 
formulated to help analyze illicit interest groups consisting of an investigation of the 
"macro" (external environmental) variables and "micro" (internal organizational) 
variables relative to a given group.  This chapter will examine aspects of the Macro-
model's external variables that influenced the rise, development, and transformation of 
1980s-era Colombian drug trafficking organizations.   
As shown in Table 2 below, the external variables are only part of the entire 
picture crafted by the model.  In this chapter I will focus on the characteristics in the left 
column classified as Macro-model variables that fuse pluralist and institutionalist 
approaches.  External factors include: political events, economic events, social events, 
technological events, a state's legal parameters, individual preferences of state officials, 
autonomy, and a state's capacity. 
Table 2: The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Model Employing Pluralist and Institutionalist 
Approaches 
 
 Macro-model variables 
(external variables) 
Micro-model variables 
(internal variables) 
Pluralist approach • Political events 
• Economic events 
• Social events 
• Technological events 
• Membership 
characteristics 
• Resources 
• Cohesion 
• Expertise 
• Representativeness 
Institutionalist 
approach 
• A state’s legal 
parameters 
• Individual preferences 
of state officials 
• Autonomy 
• A state’s capacity 
• Selective incentives 
• Group size 
• Existence of high- and 
low-demanders 
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Political Events 
At the start of the 20th century, the United States government’s international 
counternarcotics campaign consisted of a series of international agreements and laws that 
sought to reduce the international psychoactive drug trade.  In particular, the U.S. 
government was concerned with stopping the opium trade.  The series of early 
international agreements provided the legal precedent by which the U.S. government 
would seek international cooperation in curtailing the traffic of other psychoactive drugs.  
For the purposes of this discussion the most significant political event, which influenced 
the rise of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia, was the declaration of the “War on 
Drugs” by the Richard Nixon administration.   
The U.S. government became concerned about the effects of psychoactive drugs 
because of a rise in consumption among domestic youths (Nixon, 1969a) and troops 
abroad in Vietnam. Following his campaign promises, President Nixon established 
several Task Forces and implemented Operation Intercept to stop marijuana imports from 
Mexico in 1969. In particular, the war focused its efforts on marijuana and heroin.  
Marijuana was considered a “Liberal hippie drug” and heroin had become popularly used 
among U.S. troops stationed in Vietnam. United States officials argued that the control of 
drug traffic was a vital interest that needed to be addressed because of an increase in the 
costs of crime, public health, and worker productivity.  In 1970 Nixon launched the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act and in 1971 he declared, “America’s public enemy 
number one was drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to 
wage a new, all-out offensive” (Nixon, 1971). For symbolic justification, and to enhance 
political acceptance, policy makers utilized a “Tough on Crime” approach, to promote the 
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idea that psychoactive drugs were a threat at the social, economic, and military levels.  
Drugs were depicted as “exogenous” to American society, which needed to be prevented 
from permeating U.S. borders (Tokatlian, 1988).  In a 1972 speech addressed to athletes 
attending a White House conference on drug abuse, Nixon explained why the drug war 
needed to be fought abroad: 
We are attempting to wage a battle against drug abuse… it is what we might describe as total 
warfare against drug abuse in the United States and in the world… we want to try to stop drugs 
coming into this country at the source.  We don’t produce heroin, for example, in the United States.  
They do produce it—the poppy that grows heroin-- in Turkey.  They produce it in some parts of 
Southeast Asia… (Nixon, 1972). 
 
Nixon’s speeches not only revealed the international strategy for combating the heroin 
trade, but that it had domestic implications, since he believed that by targeting drugs in 
source countries he could reduce addiction and crime in the United States: 
Evidence has continued to build up during 1973 indicating that we are now on the way to winning 
the battle against this grave problem.  International sources of heroin supply are being pinched off, 
narcotics prices are up while the quality of narcotics supply is down, and the capabilities for drug 
enforcement and treatment have been upgraded at all levels of government (Nixon, 1973). 
 
By 1974, President Nixon concluded that his administration had resolved the heroin 
problem: 
Drug abuse is a problem that we are resolving in America.  We have already turned the corner on 
heroin.  But the task ahead will be long and difficult, and the closer we come to success the more 
difficult the task will be… Drug traffickers must be dealt with harshly, and where the law is not 
sufficient to the task, we must provide new laws, and we must do so rapidly (Nixon, 1974). 
 
And in line with his “Tough on Crime” approach, throughout Nixon’s presidency 
counternarcotics efforts strategy consisted of stopping drugs abroad and at home by 
targeting U.S. mafias and small time dealers, and rehabilitating drug users.  His efforts 
continued to follow the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, which was an original ten-
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step counternarcotics framework (Nixon, 1969a).35 The Act was revamped by the Reagan 
administration in 1980 to further reinforce counternarcotics efforts domestically and 
internationally.  The Reagan administration strengthened the implementation of the Act 
by allocating more economic resources.  However, one difference between the two 
administrations was that the Reagan administration dramatically increased law 
enforcement resources and did not allocate significant resources towards the 
rehabilitation of addicts.  Another difference was that Reagan’s efforts targeted the 
cocaine trade, whereas Nixon’s strategies and speeches do not mention cocaine; Nixon’s 
administration did not consider cocaine a problem. 
 Although the Reagan administration had already established a domestic agenda 
focused on crime reduction as a major priority, events such as the elevated homicide rate 
in South Florida and the 1986 cocaine-related death of professional basketball player Len 
Bias, catapulted the issue of drugs and drug abuse into mainstream culture and facilitated 
the implementation of a new “tough on crime” policy.   
According to the 1996 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1997), 
Americans changed their perception of the issue of drugs as “the most important problem 
facing the country” between 1986 and 1989.  In 1986, 8% of the American population 
believed the drug issue to be the most important social problem to address, but by 
                                                        
35 Some of the provisions included: correcting deficiencies in the Marijuana Tax Act, coordinating federal 
and state law, strengthening international cooperation to stop drugs at the source, suppressing of illegal 
imports by strengthening interdiction efforts, suppressing of national traffic by increasing law enforcement 
resources and organizing Task Forces, and funding education, research, rehabilitation, training programs, 
and law enforcement conferences.   
53 
 
November 1989 that number had reached nearly 38%, putting it above other fears such as 
nuclear war, international tensions, and unemployment.36   
To respond to the public’s worries and continue with his crime reduction agenda, 
When the Reagan administration formulated its anti-drug agenda it increased budgets for 
law enforcement agencies like the FBI and DEA (Crandall, 2002).  The administration 
also changed the mission of many departments that were not involved in counternarcotics 
efforts.  For example, the 1982 Posse Commitatus Act reformed institutions like the 
military, making them more involved in counternarcotics efforts.  Overall, the Reagan 
administration empowered all counternarcotics agencies to persecute the drug trade at 
home and abroad.  At home, Reagan-style drug enforcement concentrated on prosecuting 
drug users and dealers with Task Forces and other criminal justice methods such as 
minimum mandatory sentences.  The administration also sought to protect the U.S. 
borders through military surveillance.  To stop the flow of narcotics coming from abroad, 
the “1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances” was introduced as an effort to generate greater global 
cooperation from U.N. members to combat the drug trade.  In addition, the administration 
increased monetary aid given to producer countries for reducing the supply of drugs 
being produced or trafficked within producer countries.  Regardless of the increased 
funding, most of the responsibility and costs to combat drug traffic rested on producer 
countries usually with scant economic resources (Tokatlian, 1988; Bagley, 1988).   
                                                        
36 According to the 1996 sourcebook, by 1992 which was a presidential election year public opinion 
towards the issue of drugs dropped to 8% trailing behind the economy at 42% then unemployment, poverty, 
healthcare, respectively, and tied with education, government spending, and government dissatisfaction.    
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The strategy implemented by the Reagan administration was unilateral.  Although 
the United States was the biggest consumer of cocaine, the U.S. government largely 
passed the responsibility and blame of the drug problem onto foreign producing countries, 
which were pressured to implement tough counternarcotic efforts, even though these 
countries had weak law enforcement institutions and limited budgets.  In contrast, the 
policy of prohibiting the cocaine trade increased the price of the commodity and 
continued to increase profits for DTOs.   
Economic Events  
 Three major economic events influenced the rise of DTOs in Colombia.  The first 
is the establishment of an economic logic for counternarcotics, which for the last 40 years 
has continued to work under the philosophy of limiting supply to force an increase in the 
price of illicit drugs thereby lowering buyer demand.  The supply-side policy has resulted 
in the opposite effect: lower per kilo prices for cocaine and expanded participation 
involving a broader collection of producers.  The second event deals with economic 
developments in the Colombian market that have made illicit activity both more 
profitable.  The third event is the Colombian tradition37 of smuggling and its influence on 
the modern illicit drug trade.   
Since the 1970’s Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, the economic strategy of 
cocaine counternarcotics efforts has been to reduce supply in order to raise retail price so 
that it becomes unavailable and unaffordable in U.S. markets.  However, economists like 
                                                        
37 Because of high protectionist import tariffs placed by the Colombian government to protect the national 
industry, many Colombians have developed the practice of importing smuggled goods, which were sold in 
the black marked at lower prices, than products legally imported into the country. Also, Colombians have 
also been adept at exporting smuggled goods such as precious stones, like emeralds, pre-Columbian figures, 
and cattle, consequently, smuggling networks which pre-dated the drug trade became useful once the illicit 
drug trade was established in the 1960s and 70s.  
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Francisco Thoumi argue that this line of reasoning is flawed.  His research shows that the 
price of illicit drugs such as cocaine is not dependent on its supply, but on the risk 
involved in smuggling (Thoumi, 1994).  For this reason, the higher the regulation of the 
drug trade, the higher the risk involved and the higher the price and profit.  U.S. 
authorities and international drug control agencies believe that success in 
counternarcotics efforts can be measured through the retail price and purity of drugs in 
drug consuming countries and on the number of domestic seizures.  The 2010 report 
compiled by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) argues that the 
retail price of cocaine is rising and that the purity of cocaine is lowering because of a 
shortage of cocaine in the illicit market.  UNODC reported that this “success” is due to 
the efforts made by Andean countries in eradicating illicit crops and an increase in global 
cocaine seizures.  The same report registers the wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine 
at $12,500 in the United States (UNODC, 2010, p.79).  However, when the current price 
for a kilogram of cocaine calculated by UNODC, is compared to kilogram prices of 
wholesale cocaine over the past decades, the trend shows that prices have been actually 
falling down, not up.  In the 1970s, a kilogram was around $60,000, in the 1980s the 
price was $45,000, in the 1990s the price was around $18,000 (Gomez, 1990, p. 63).  The 
drop in prices is evidence that the number of actors involved in the drug trade, not only in 
Colombia, but also in most countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean has 
been increasing.  The decrease in the wholesale price of cocaine in the millennium does 
not discourage cocaine traffickers from the trade because it is estimated that Colombian 
traffickers still earn $2.1 billion per year, so the profit-margin is still higher and 
comparable to most legitimate and freely traded products (UNODC, 2010, p. 79).   
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When Medellin drug trafficking organizations began to smuggle cocaine in the 
1970s and 1980s, they were motivated by the astoundingly high profit margin.  Since 
there were fewer actors involved in cocaine and marijuana trafficking in the 1960s and 
1970s, the supply of drugs was also smaller which affected wholesale price.  Cocaine in 
the 1970s was smuggled mostly by “mules”—people smuggling cocaine in small 
amounts.  Once cocaine began to be smuggled in large-scale shipments, the supply of 
available cocaine in U.S. markets multiplied and supply became less of a factor in 
calculating wholesale price.   
The decreasing trend in wholesale cocaine prices across time suggests that more 
actors are becoming involved in drug trafficking, and this economic trend continues to 
support the observation that DTOs are not economic cartels.  During the 1970s and 1980s, 
pioneer cocaine traffickers were able to build full-service, vertically integrated drug 
trafficking organizations, where a trafficker could own every aspect of the supply chain 
in the production of cocaine.  The creation of full-service DTOs led U.S. government 
officials to believe that they were working together to control the price as an economic 
cartel would operate.  Following this logic, DTOs, it was assumed, would profit from the 
high demand for a commodity that was in short supply.  However, full service DTOs 
based in Medellin never operated like economic cartels.   
The first reason is that the illegal status of cocaine drove the market price, not the 
supply.  Second, cocaine was easily produced and is not a commodity like oil that is in a 
specific geographical location requiring a high-degree of technology to extract.  Third, 
the barriers for entry into the cocaine business are low, so it is difficult to control the 
number of actors that supply cocaine (Thoumi, 1994, p.149-150).  Finally, the supply 
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method of Colombian drug organizations has been to flood the market with cocaine in 
order to reduce risk and make profit.  Even if 80% of shipments of cocaine are lost, the 
traffickers can still make a significant profit from the remainder 20%.   
Drug trafficking organizations were initially called cartels by the U.S. State 
Department for political reasons, to present these organizations in the same negative light 
as the economic cartel known as Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.38  By associating Medellin DTOs with a foreign 
organization, that already had a negative image among the U.S. public, departments and 
agencies in the U.S. executive branch were able to more easily manage expectations and 
shape public opinion.   
 The second economic event that influenced the rise of Colombian DTOs was the 
inability of the Colombian market economy to reduce unemployment, economic 
inequality, and inflation. In the early 1980s, the foreign aid and domestic economic 
reforms that were made during the 1970s, placed the Colombian economy in a relatively 
favorable economic position during the regional recession of the 1980s, especially when 
compared with other countries in Latin America that were undergoing a debt crisis. To 
deal with the regional recession the government drew from its foreign exchange reserves 
to compensate for both trade and national account imbalances (The Library of Congress, 
1988).   
But despite good macro-economic indicators, individual social and economic 
indicators measuring quality of life suggested that Colombia was still a society with high 
inequalities. Per capita income in 1986 was approximately $1,330 dollars, which placed 
                                                        
38 In the 1970s OPEC caused two oil crises, which led to a worldwide inflation of prices in general.  
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Colombia tenth among the nineteen Latin American countries.  According to the Library 
of Congress’s macro-economic analysis of 1988, “real change in per capita GDP had 
consistently lagged behind change in aggregate GDP by two percentage points since 1982 
and was actually negative for 1982 and 1983” (Library of Congress, 1988).  Moreover, it 
was believed that the economy and government policies failed to distribute the gains of 
economic production any more equitably in 1986 than it had fifty years earlier. To boot, 
income inequality continued to be high and in the 1980s as much as 70 percent of income 
was earned by only 20 percent of the population (The Library of Congress, 1988).  Also, 
the Gini coefficient on average from 1960 to 2008 was around .52 (Conference Board of 
Canada, 2011; Economic Comission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2010), one of the highest levels of income inequality in Latin America—where the 
income ratio between the richest decile was 25 times richer than the poorest (ECLAC, 
2010).   
In the 1970s and 1980s the economy also suffered from unemployment and 
inflation. Although manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors grew, the economy 
was unable to absorb enough labor to reduce unemployment below 10%. By the 1990s, 
the informal labor sector comprised about 46 percent of the workforce (Ffrench-Davis & 
Machinea et al., 2007, p.226). The economy also suffered from unemployment and high 
inflation—persistent annual increases in the consumer price index of 20 to 25 percent had 
been evident since the mid-1970s (The Library of Congress, 1988). 
Economic problems like inequality, unemployment, and inflation, which took 
place in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as core external factors that nurtured the 
development of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. Lack of economic 
59 
 
opportunities and low wages led many Colombians to take advantage of the economic 
opportunities found in the smuggling of imported goods and later in the trafficking of 
illicit drugs like marijuana and cocaine.  High levels of income inequality, 
unemployment, and inflation were typical ailments of economies in Latin America,39 the 
reason why these macroeconomic factors can be seen as contributive causes to the rise of 
DTOs is because at the least, in Colombia people of low socioeconomic status could take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the illicit drug industry to avoid the limited 
economic opportunities offered by the licit economic sectors.  
During the 1980s economic areas associated with cocaine and marijuana 
trafficking exacerbated levels of inflation, because this informal sector generated an 
inflow of U.S. dollars. The inflow of dollar, changed the financial, real estate, 
construction, and agricultural industries disproportionately to other legal sectors, because 
of their capacity to absorb laundered money (Gomez, 1990, p. 75-81; Thoumi, 1994). The 
increased buying power of those associated with the illegal drug industry led to an 
increased demand and price for goods, which led to greater inflation.  The price of land 
also continued to rise and failed to correlate with median wages.  The Gini coefficient for 
land concentration since 1960 has been of .86, which is the sixth-highest in the world 
(Cardenas, 2002, p.6; UNDP, 2011, p.197).40 
                                                        
39 the 1980s, which is popularly known as the “lost decade” because of the debt crisis that afflicted the 
region. 
 
40 In 2011 the United Nations Development Programme reported that the concentration of land in Colombia 
is one of the highest in the world, where 52.2% of the arable land is in the hands of 1.15% of the population 
(UNDP, 2011, p.206) and that land concentration has increased from 2000-2009. The report also suggests 
that land concentration is due to historic legacies, market forces, revenues from illicit drug industry, and 
government policies.  
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Among the early Colombian traffickers, who reportedly arose from humble 
beginnings and may have seen trafficking as an economic issue rather than a moral one, 
include Jaime Builes.  Builes was from Fredonia, Antioquia, and was reportedly the son 
of a very poor peasant family who worked for a landowner.  Builes became known for 
trafficking marijuana and cocaine in the mid-1970s and bought the landowner’s estate 
where he and his family had worked. He also bought all large parcels of land surrounding 
the town.  He eventually owned most of the small businesses in the town and in doing so 
inflated the prices for real estate in the region (Castro Caycedo, 1996).  Years later, 
Builes was tortured and killed in Mexico by authorities in the early 1980s, and because he 
owned most of the properties in Fredonia, the economy of the region plummeted because 
family members were unable to manage the lands and businesses Builes had acquired. 
Jaime Builes’s case illustrates the economic opportunity taken by early trafficking 
pioneers and their incredible capacity to profit from drug prohibition policies. The new 
found wealth allowed Builes to acquiring lands and businesses that would not have been 
possible to acquire had he not been involved in the drug business, since the high degree 
of economic inequality in rural areas greatly reduces upward mobility.  
The third economic event that led to the development of DTOs is the 
specialization of smuggling that evolved in Colombia.  Francisco Thoumi notes in his 
seminal work, Economia Politica y Narcotrafico that having a tradition of exporting 
smuggled goods and networks of immigrants in consumer states can explain why the 
illicit drug business arose more readily in Colombia.  The availability of international 
networks necessary to market cocaine and launder money in the black market in the 
United States and Mexico created an economic advantage (Thoumi, 1994, p.178-179).  
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Many smugglers that started smuggling emeralds, coffee, and cattle during the 1950s, 
gradually became involved in the drug trade in the late 1960s and 1970s as the cocaine 
business became more lucrative.  According to Thoumi, the ability to export smuggled 
goods was the comparative advantage that Colombians had over other Andean countries 
and other Latin American countries.  Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers may not have had 
the networks to transport cocaine to other countries, and for a while Bolivia and Peru 
remained coca paste producers, whereas Colombian traffickers were first and foremost 
international traffickers before delving into the production of coca paste in the 1990s. 
Colombian traffickers began smuggling marijuana in the 1960s and 1970s 
especially after the implementation of 1969 Operation Intercept, which blocked the U.S.-
Mexico border.  In Medellin, Alfredo “el Padrino” Gomez Lopez headed one of the first 
organizations trafficking cocaine along with emeralds and other smuggled goods (Castillo, 
1987; Salazar, 2001).  His associates were Jesus Emilio Escobar Hernandez and Fabio 
Restrepo Ochoa.  The Ochoa brothers became powerful Medellin DTO leaders in the 
1970s and 1980s and were relatives of Fabio Restrepo Ochoa (Castillo, 1987, p.52).  
Gomez Lopez used his pre-existing contacts with Bogotá-based emerald traffickers to 
utilize their Mexican networks for the sale and distribution of cocaine.41 The Gomez 
Lopez/Escobar Hernandez/Restrepo Ochoa trafficking organization was dismantled in 
1976 after U.S. authorities disrupted its networks.  Gomez Lopez later left the business, 
but new traffickers took over the smuggling networks while he was detained for a year on 
a minor charge.   
                                                        
41 In the 1970s politically, Gomez Lopez was affiliated with the Conservative Party and contributed to its 
congressional campaigns.  In 1974 he is said to contribute to the unsuccessful political campaign of 
Conservative presidential candidate, Alvaro Gomez Hurtado (Salazar, 2001, p.53). 
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Social Events 
Two of the most influential social events that led to the rise of illicit drug 
trafficking organizations was Colombian immigration to the United States and the change 
in demand for cocaine among international consumers.   
During the 1960 and 1970s Colombians immigrated to the United States.  Some 
immigrants from Medellin or Cali formed hubs in cities like Miami, New York and Los 
Angeles, and became key personnel in receiving and distributing drugs in these cities.  
Dealing with fellow Colombian nationals reduced the risk that authorities could infiltrate 
trafficking networks (Thoumi, 1994). 
A change in demand for illicit drugs was another external social factor that 
influenced the rise of the illicit drug business in Colombia.  Because of the limited supply 
of cocaine in the 1970s, and its increased popularity in American society, the wholesale 
price of cocaine was more expensive than marijuana.  A 1977 Newsweek magazine article 
titled “The Cocaine Scene” depicts the early trends in the consumption of cocaine in the 
United States: 
Among hostesses in the smart sets of Los Angeles and New York, a little cocaine, like Dom 
Perignon and beluga caviar, is now de rigueur at dinners.  Some party-givers pass it around along 
with the canapés on silver trays; some fill ashtrays with cocaine and set them on the table.  Others 
dispense it more grudgingly.  "Hostesses say it ruins appetites," says one Hollywood partygoer, 
"and they get upset to see their guests playing with the beef Wellington" (Steele et al., 1977). 
 
The Newsweek article depicts how cocaine was a status drug of the rich and famous 
which consequently increased the demand.  In interviews conducted by the U.S. public 
television program, PBS’s Frontline, traffickers like the Ochoa brothers and George 
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Jung42 commented that the popularization of cocaine in Hollywood and among the rich, 
increased the marketability of the drug for them:  
Frontline: But did you ever sense that you were getting a lot of free advertising in the United 
States--in Hollywood movies, in magazines--in the way it was portrayed as a glamour drug?  
 
Juan David Ochoa: Yes, of course.  It was given publicity because it's consumed by people of 
high status in society, and that gives you publicity.  That made it actually sell more” (Frontline, 
2000b). 
 
George Jung: It became an accepted product, just like marijuana.  I mean Madison Avenue 
promoted cocaine.  The movie industry.  The record industry.  I mean, if you were well to do and 
you were a jet-setter, it was okay to snort cocaine.  I mean Studio 54 in New York, everybody was 
snorting cocaine, everybody was laughing and having a good time and snorting cocaine.  I don't 
think that the government of the United States had any idea what the hell was really happening 
until it was too late… Because there's a mindset in this country that it's okay for upper class white 
America to do drugs and it's okay and they shouldn't be punished severely for it.  If you're from 
the ghetto or what have you and you do drugs, then you should be punished severely.  The 
government allowed the media and the record industry and the movie industry to promote 
[cocaine] and nobody ever stood up.  Nobody ever said no to this” (Frontline, 2000c).   
 
As cocaine became a “status drug,” it became a highly desired commodity, because the 
“status label” led to an increase in its price, profitability, and production.  
Technological Events  
Overall technological innovations helped traffickers because technological 
innovations contributed to the development of drug trafficking in Colombia. Airplanes, 
cellular phones, radar equipment facilitated trade. Moreover, as DTOs became wealthier, 
they were able to use the latest technology to hide or transport illegal drugs, which 
continued increase their wealth.  
The technology to refine cocaine was not complicated or expensive; the barriers 
to entry into the business were low. The low barriers to entry allowed a number of actors 
to participate in the drug trade as it became more popularized.  In the beginning of 
cocaine trafficking the transportation and shipment of illicit drugs was not complex 
                                                        
42 George Jung was a close associate of Carlos Lehder and a pilot for Medellin-based DTOs. 
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because packages were small and only required hidden compartments in bags, pieces of 
luggage, or in clothing.  
As demand grew and traffickers became wealthier, DTO leaders were able to 
create industrial sized refineries in remote jungle areas of Colombia that were difficult to 
detect (Lee, 1989, p. 30; Clawson and Lee, 1996, p. 38-39). Once traffickers were 
capable of shipping larger quantities transportation and communication became more 
complex. Cocaine was often hidden in secret compartments or, with the aid of advanced 
technology, transformed into book pages, statues and foodstuffs. Initially, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, it was the use of small Cessna planes that allowed DTOs to 
increase their shipment capacity and dramatically increase their wealth. Some of the 
technological innovations that were used by traffickers, before they became more 
affordable and used by the general population, included cellular phones and radar 
equipment for planes and boats.  
Technology also was also useful for authorities in their surveillance of air traffic 
and coastal areas. Greater surveillance of the Caribbean in the mid to late 1980s led 
traffickers to move their routes to Central America. Greater surveillance at airports led 
DTOs to use more precautions when sending mules or small shipments in packages.  
Overall, technology enhanced cocaine traffic and allowed drug trafficking 
organizations to avoid authorities and increase their capacity to make profit, which in turn 
provided DTOs with economic and political power.  
State’s Legal Parameters  
The discussion on how a state’s legal parameters affects the growth of Colombian 
DTOs focuses on the issue of money laundering because lax laws allowed DTOs to 
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obtain great wealth. On the international side, the United States government, which had 
heralded a war on heroin in the 1960s, was not controlling the traffic of cocaine in the 
1970s, even though a prohibition on the trade and consumption of this drug was in place. 
Lax regulation on drug traffic transferred over to the financial sector. Since international 
counternarcotics efforts were centered on heroin instead of cocaine, authorities were 
unaware that millions of dollars were being filtered in the financial system, which 
allowed for the growth of DTOs in Colombia.   
In the 1960s, the absence of strong laws indirectly allowed for the creation of 
loopholes in banking procedures in Colombia and permitted monetary transactions 
without governmental regulation.  However, money-laundering laws were weak not only 
in Colombia but also internationally.  Traffickers were able to smuggle American dollars 
into Colombia through financial institutions, such as American banks, off-shore banks in 
the Caribbean, banks with secrecy laws in countries like Switzerland, Luxemburg, and 
Panama, and casas de cambio (money exchange/transfer stores).43  Most of these 
institutions were not prepared in the late 1970s and early 1980s to prevent drug 
traffickers from using their services to launder money, and many bankers did not want to 
prevent these funds from being deposited.   
Carlos Toro, who worked with trafficker Carlos Lehder, said he would often meet 
with legal bank representatives to discuss narco-dollar deposits (Frontline 2000).  The 
money would be easily wired to Colombian accounts where it was further laundered 
(Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 90).  The Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela brothers of the Cali DTO and 
                                                        
43 Money laundering through money exchange stores is still a problem.  In April 2008, Wachovia refused to 
do business with these stores because they sent a lot of unaccounted money to Mexico. The money is 
believed the proceeds from Mexican DTOs, which are using stores to laundering money. 
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Jorge Ochoa bought the First Interamericas Bank in Panama with the objective of 
laundering drug proceeds.  Manuel Noriega, Panama’s military leader, would take a 
percentage for every dollar laundered throughout the country’s banking system (Castillo, 
1991, p. 115; Lee, 1990, p. 181).   
Not until 1980, after the launch of Operation Swordfish, a DEA money laundering 
operation, did the U.S. government place restrictions on the amount of money that could 
be declared when sending or receiving wires, and when depositing money in U.S. bank 
accounts (Castillo, 1987, p. 171).  After December 1980, amounts greater than $10,000 
had to be declared.  The owner of proceeds greater than $10,000 dollars had to justify 
how he/she earned the money and also had to justify these funds to a baking institution 
and the government through Currency Transaction Receipts (CTRs).  Such regulation 
was done to prevent money laundering in banks, and it reduced large deposits from 
entering the financial system, which in turn left traffickers with the problem of legalizing 
and being able to actually receive their profits.44 However, traffickers devised ways to 
circumvent restrictions by using different mechanisms such as what is popularly known 
as the “smurf system45” (Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 90).  In the “smurf system” a number of 
people were hired in the United States and in Colombia to deposit, send, and eventually 
withdraw small quantities of money that would be less than $10,000 dollars.   
Money laundering was also facilitated through the use of monetary policies.  In 
Colombia, presidential administrations with the objective of strengthening Colombia’s 
                                                        
44 Yet, this declaration in the end became a way to launder $10,000 dollars at a time.  The customs form 
used to declare the proceeds could be used to legalize small amounts of cash.  If the person was ever 
audited he/she could show that these small $10,000 dollar amounts were declared so they were legal.   
 
45 The “smurf system” is how the system is popularly known, as it refers to the popular 1980s cartoon “The 
Smurfs,” which were essentially a community of blue little characters with different roles.   
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international monetary reserves have unintentionally facilitated the laundering of illicit 
money by implementing economic policies that would allow citizens to exchange large 
amounts of dollars for pesos.  Tax amnesties were a type of economic policy was 
popularly known in Colombia as la ventanilla siniestra (sinister window) and it legalized 
large proceeds without the need to report their origin.  Throughout the years, various 
presidential administrations have used similar techniques regardless of political party 
affiliation.  For example, during the Belsario Betancur Presidency, Law 9 of 1983 
implemented a big dollar exchange amnesty due to an economic crisis, which needed 
foreign exchange reserves; Law 75 of 1986 Article 50 and Law 49 of 1990 during the 
presidencies of Virgilio Barco’s and Cesar Gaviria’s respectively, gave exchange 
amnesties.  Law 49 of 1990 allowed Colombians abroad to deposit money in Colombia 
without much control, so in trying to prevent capital flight the government encouraged 
the laundering of drug proceeds.  In 2008, during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, the increase 
in oil prices and the international devaluation of the U.S. dollar, led the Colombian 
central bank to buy dollars with the intent of stabilizing its price vis-à-vis the Colombian 
peso, which was becoming overvalued.  The use of this monetary strategy was 
implemented so that Colombian exports would not become expensive in the international 
market.  However, buying dollars unintentionally benefited traffickers, because it allowed 
their profits to enter the market with relative ease.   
Law enforcement, during the “Golden Era” of drug trafficking from 1969 to 
1984,46 was practically non-existent in Colombia and abroad.  In many cases police 
                                                        
46 The time period of this so-called “golden era” starts with Operation Intercept that moved the marijuana 
traffic from Mexico to Colombia. The “golden era” ends with the assassination of Minister of Justice 
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who is assassinated in April 1984, and which started the persecution of DTO leaders.  
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forces knew who the traffickers were, where they lived, and where they operated, but 
there was little enforcement of laws to stop nascent drug trafficking organizations.47 The 
high concentration of wealth obtained by the illicit drug business, gave traffickers the 
power to bribe judicial and enforcement agencies.  Newspapers reported the arrest of 
traffickers, but they were released either on legal technicalities or because they escaped 
from jail (Castillo, 1987).  Therefore, even when select representatives of the judicial 
system were able to obtain prosecutions for drug traffickers, other more powerful 
elements would use bribes to pay off politicians, judges, and the police to look the other 
way.   
 International enforcement was also weak.  According to George Jung,48 a pilot 
who worked with Carlos Lehder and who was a pioneer in the marijuana and cocaine 
drug traffic in the 1970s and 1980s, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was not 
informed and/or had little funding to stop cocaine traffic in its early years:  
At that time you have to remember also that DEA was really not on top of what was going on in 
the Caribbean.  I mean, they were offloading huge motherships constantly out there off the 
Bahamas and off the coast of Florida day and night and as far as aircraft coming and going they 
really didn't have the equipment or the manpower to do anything… I think that they knew about it 
but they didn't think it was that much of a really major problem and they just couldn't get the 
funding anyway because nobody believed it and nobody really cared (Frontline, 2000). 
 
The lax enforcement of anti-narcotic laws in the 1970s and early 1980s allowed the 
cocaine business to grow and develop.  Law enforcement officials corroborate George 
Jung’s opinion of law enforcement at the time.  In an interview with journalist Ron 
Chepesiuk, Ken Robinson an ex-member of the New York Enforcement Task Force 
                                                        
47 Fabio Castillo’s journalistic work in Los Jinetes de la Cocaina has an appendix which he obtained from 
the Colombian police in 1987 with the names, profession, and addresses of known drug traffickers, their 
boats, airplanes, and air strips, yet little was done in the 1970s and early 1980s to confiscate trafficker 
assets.   
 
48 The movie “Blow” starrs Johnny Depp and is a biography of George Jung’s life.   
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(NYDETF) asserts that the DEA efforts in the 1970s concentrated on combating heroin 
because cocaine was thought of as a “small time” drug.  Moreover, government policy 
documents in the 1970s during the Gerald Ford Presidency believed that cocaine was not 
a problem, because it did not result in crime or hospital emergency room admissions.  
Instead a Task Force organized by the Ford Administration concluded that the focus 
should be on heroin, amphetamines, and mixed barbiturates (Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 31).   
The weak legal system in Colombia and abroad contributed to the rise of DTOs 
because it created an opportunity for them to do business.  Lack of regulation in the 
different aspects of the business from the acquisition of drugs, the transportation, and 
finally the laundering of drug proceeds, allowed traffickers to become wealthy and 
politically powerful, primarily because it was easy for them to remain in business. 
Individual Preferences of State Officials 
On a social level, at the beginning of the drug trade, most of Colombian society 
was unaware of or indifferent to the level of economic and political power that was being 
amassed by trafficking organizations.  Colombian society did not foresee that the drug 
trade had negative consequences such as violence, corruption, and addiction.  The society 
focused more on the economic benefits of the drug trade such as the influx of dollars to 
the economy.  Although society enjoyed the monetary benefits of the trade, drug 
traffickers were frowned upon by elites largely because of the differences in social class 
and education.   
The writer Gonzalo Guillen, a journalist who met with then congressman Pablo 
Escobar, while traveling to Spain to cover Felipe Gonzalez’s inauguration as Prime 
Minister, pejoratively refers to Pablo Escobar’s physical appearance: 
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I spoke of generalities with a funny speaking antioqueño49 man, who had a sneaky look in his 
eyes, wore sneakers, jeans and a silk shirt with prints that were annoyingly flashy.  It was 
extravagant that this common individual who looked like a crook would travel representing an 
official committee… I did not see the man again until three days later… I recognized Escobar 
because of his black, greasy, and curly hair, which would fall on the right side of his face and 
because of his primitive mustache...  (Guillén, 2007).   
 
Such disdain for traffickers was expressed by traditional elites throughout Colombia, 
because traffickers although wealthy, were not considered to have the socially ascribed 
status, education, manners, or taste. A popular anecdote involving Jose Santacruz 
Londoño, a Cali based trafficker, relates how Santacruz was denied entrance to a Cali 
social club called El Club Campestre.  Although Santacruz had enough money to buy a 
membership, he did not have the pedigree.50 In response, Santacruz constructed an exact 
replica of the social club’s building for himself and his friends just to mock the Club 
Campestre’s directors (Castillo, 1987; Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 68; Rodriguez, 2007, p. 165).    
On a political level, elites saw drug trafficking at this time as a problem of 
consumer nations such as the United States and Europe.  President Belisario Betancur 
was very vocal on this issue and towards the beginning of his term in 1982, he refused to 
extradite nationals for trafficking based on a nationalist argument (Kavass, 1990, p. 157).  
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs who served during the mid-1980s in an 
interview with PBS’s Frontline comments on Colombian society’s perception of the drug 
trade: 
The Colombians felt that it was not a Colombian problem.  First of all, is that they didn't use it 
and, basically, it was going to the consumers in the United States.  They were making money.  
                                                        
49 An antioqueño is a man from the department of Antioquia, of which the capital is Medellin.   
 
50 The Rodriguez Orejuela brother’s in Cali and the Ochoa brothers in Medellin were also socially 
discriminated against. The Rodriguez Orejuela brothers entered a few social clubs, but their membership at 
the Club Riviera and Club Campestre were revoked once Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela was arrested for 
trafficking in Spain (Rodriguez, 2007, p. 165).  The Ochoa brothers were not able to enroll their children in 
prestigious schools in Medellin, so they opted to construct a bilingual school for their children (This 
author’s interview with the wife of a trafficker, 2005). 
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And it was a U.S. problem, not a Colombian problem… the fact is, if our people did not consume 
this, they would not produce it.  That's just the reality of the equations of the free market, right?” 
(Frontline, 1995). 
 
When Juan David Ochoa a member of Medellin-based DTOs is asked whether the 
cocaine trade was accepted in Colombia he replies, “It wasn't properly accepted, but 
nobody ever said anything about it” (Frontline, 2000).  Due to this indifference, many 
politicians in Colombia turned a “blind eye” to the drug trade and in some cases 
politicians collaborated with members of drug trafficking organizations to influence 
policy in favor of trafficker interests. 
As time passed, society became aware of the dangers associated with drug traffic 
such as drug addiction, crime, narco-terrorism, and paramilitarism. However, society and 
politicians tacitly accepted traffickers because of the legal and illegal business DTOs 
generated, primarily because DTOs became an industry that provided employment for 
many people.  
State Autonomy 
 The Two-level Game Model devised by Robert Putnam in his article “Diplomacy 
and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” is useful because of its focus on 
a government’s executive branch. The focus on the executive branch allows the 
researcher to examine both, international and domestic, influences that affect the 
executive’s ability to reach an agreement and/or carry out a policy linked to an agreement. 
Specifically, a two-level game model argues that, in democracies, state autonomy plays a 
role in determining whether an international agreement will be reached or implemented. 
The less social constraints a chief of government has at a domestic level, the greater the 
autonomy enjoyed and the easier it is for the executive branch to reach an agreement with 
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an international actor. Alternatively, if an executive is able to acquire more autonomy 
from international pressures, then it is easier for the chief of government to enact policies 
that appease the demands of domestic groups.   
 In the case of counternarcotics efforts, Latin American presidencies have to 
negotiate how counternarcotics treaties and efforts will be implemented at an 
international level, but also at a domestic level. At international levels, Latin American 
presidencies negotiate with the government of the United States to reach agreements on 
issues such as: economic aid, military aid, extradition, fumigation of illegal crops, 
maritime space and surveillance, and immigration, among others. When negotiating an 
international agreement, Latin American presidencies also have to consider domestic 
pressures from institutions or social actors. Some of the domestic actors that can be 
involved in the negotiation of an international agreement can include the business 
community, environmentalists, military and police personnel, other branches of 
government, and illegal interest groups such as drug trafficking organizations. 
 A two-level game analysis has been used in studying counternarcotics efforts in 
Colombia. Tatiana Matthiesen, in The Political Art of Conciliatio,n analyzed the Virgilio 
Barco and the Cesar Gaviria presidencies. She compared the implementation of Barco’s 
confrontational counternarcotics policies against DTOs to Gaviria’s conciliatory 
counternarcotics policies with DTOs. Matthiesen’s main argument highlighted the ability 
of the Cesar Gaviria government to create a turning point in Colombian counternarcotics 
efforts, as his presidency sought more independence from U.S. government pressure to 
implement a conciliatory policy with DTOs, which would establish negotiations with this 
illegal sector in an effort to reduce violence.  
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Specifically, during Gaviria’s tenure, Government-DTO negotiations were 
centered on agreeing to waive DTO leader extradition to the United States and 
compromising on the terms of surrender, if DTO leaders would agree to turn themselves 
over to authorities. Matthiesen’s analysis focuses on Cesar Gaviria’s role as a great 
conciliator of international and domestic pressures, because Gaviria created a domestic 
solution to the problem of urban violence in Colombia. Gaviria believed that whereas 
narco-trafficking was an international problem that the international community had to 
resolve, narco-terrorism was a Colombian problem that could be resolved through 
negotiation. In Matthiesen’s view, Gaviria adeptly sold the negotiation process to the 
George H. W. Bush Administration by riding the coattails of Virgilio Barco’s 
confrontational policy with DTOs and promising to continue to disrupt the illicit drug 
trade, implementing a series of early and successful anti-drug efforts (such as arresting 
traffickers, intercepting shipments, grounding airplanes, confiscating properties, and 
reforming the justice system), and by gradually changing from a policy of confrontation 
to a policy of conciliation (Matthiesen, 2000, p. 264-267). Within a month of taking 
office, Cesar Gaviria was able to obtain the necessary trust from U.S. authorities to 
confidently implement his policy of conciliation. 
 Matthiesen’s research is an in-depth historical analysis, which presents the 
dynamics between U.S.-Colombian relations on the implementation of counternarcotics 
efforts. However, Matthiesen’s two-level game analysis has some limitations related to 
the model and the period of time chosen for the study. First, since the model’s focus is 
the executive branch, it highlights the decision making power of the executive branch in 
its handling of international and domestic influences, but at the same time minimizes the 
74 
 
impact of very powerful international and domestic actors, which were more powerful 
than Gaviria’s government—the U.S. presidency of George H.W. Bush and Medellin-
based DTOs. The power of these two actors greatly reduced President Gaviria’s political 
autonomy on the issue of extradition, because while the Bush Administration was 
pursuing a policy of escalating the “Drug War,” Medellin-based DTOs were pressuring 
for a ban on extradition and favorable terms of surrender.  
 Even though Matthiesen showed that Gaviria obtained more political 
maneuverability from U.S. government officials in the implementation of 
counternarcotics policies, the two-level game model assumes that Presidents Gaviria and 
Bush can negotiate on equal terms, when in fact the leaders have great economic and 
political power disparities. The disparities always favored the more powerful country. 
Starting in 1989, during President Virgilio Barco’s tenure, newly elected President 
George H. W. Bush had already created a more cooperative agenda, which escalated the 
drug war by increasing funding to Andean countries. Whereas in 1987 Colombia received 
$11.55 million dollars towards counternarcotics efforts, the Bush administration 
increased counternarcotics aid by giving $75 million dollars in 1989, which included a 
$65 million dollar emergency aid contribution,51 given right after the August 1989 
assassination of Presidential Candidate Luis Carlos Galan (Walker, 1996, p. 209; 
Crandall, 2000, p. 32). Historian, William O. Walker, shows that by the February 1990 
                                                        
51 This aid package was a symbolic gesture because in reality the gist of the emergency aid was aimed at 
helping the military and was composed of conventional military equipment. The aid was not geared to the 
police and did not include munitions to pursue DTOs such as surveillance equipment, weapons, bulletproof 
vests, armored vehicles, and the like (Walker, 1996, p. 209). The military aid reflects that the Bush 
Administration, although sympathetic to President Barco’s plight, was still in a Cold War mentality. The 
Administration was sending funds to militarily protect U.S. companies in Colombia from left wing 
insurgents, rather than sending funds to the police for counternarcotics efforts.  
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Cartagena Drug Summit, George H.W. Bush had reached a more broadminded 
appreciation of the illicit drug trade in which he acknowledged and shared responsibility 
on the issue. The policy required the United States to work on consumer demand and for 
Andean countries to work on the supply-side of cocaine production (Walker, 1996).52  
 During the Gaviria government, bilateral relations between the United States and 
Colombia centered first on counternarcotics efforts and second on economic issues, since 
the Cold War era was over, and at the time, counter insurgent efforts were not as 
imperative. President Bush increased economic aid and continued to increase military and 
counternarcotics aid as laid out by the Cartagena Summit, thus increasing funding in 
1991 to $126 million dollars (Crandall, 2000, p. 32). By increasing its support to Andean 
countries, the Bush Administration sought to implement a more efficient anti-drug policy 
than that implemented by Ronald Reagan’s administration,53 which provided little 
funding and failed to recognize the human toll accrued by Colombian society as a 
consequence of a policy of confrontation with DTOs. The interaction between the Gaviria 
and Bush Presidencies was cordial and U.S. government officials acknowledge that Bush 
personally liked Cesar Gaviria, so the Bush Administration was tolerant of Gaviria’s 
policy of conciliation with DTOs:  “George Bush loved him so we had to work with him 
even though we thought he was soft on drugs” (Crandall, 2000, p. 146). Gaviria’s 
adeptness in pursuing a policy of conciliation relied in reassuring the Bush administration 
                                                        
52 At the Cartagena Summit, Bush established the Andean Regional Initiative to open U.S. markets for 
Andean goods to increase revenue for these countries, so they could fund their counternarcotics efforts. 
 
53 The Reagan Administration placed the issue of extradition and counternarcotics efforts atop of its agenda 
with Colombia. When Jorge Luis Ochoa was released by a judge in 1987, the Reagan Administration 
criticized Virgilo Barco’s counternarcotics efforts and reprimanded the Barco Administration (the first to 
administer harsh anti-narcotics efforts amidst great DTO leader resistance) by refusing to grant Colombia’s 
entrance into General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by denying visas to Colombian citizens 
among other measures (Matthiesen, 2000).  
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that he would continue to implement counternarcotics efforts, despite of government-
DTO leader negotiations that his government was going to undertake.  
Although Gaviria was able to obtain George H.W. Bush’s trust, the problem with 
Gaviria’s conciliation policy was that he lacked the necessary political autonomy to 
broker a negotiation that would be favorable for the Colombian government. DTO 
leaders had the capacity to fund political campaigns for the 1991 constitutional assembly, 
to use violence to coerce a negotiation process, and to mold public opinion. Even 
Gaviria’s decrees, written to establish a legal parameter for the surrender of DTO leaders, 
were written in response to DTO offensives. For example, Gaviria created Decree 2040 
of September 5, 1990 in reaction to the August 30th kidnapping of journalist Diana 
Turbay, ex-president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala’s daughter, by the group Los 
Extraditables—a group led and funded by DTO leaders. The Diana Turbay kidnapping 
was the start of a campaign54 (referred to as the Liberal kidnapping campaign) that led to 
backdoor negotiations with DTO leaders plans for their surrender to authorities.  The 
hostage situation reduced Gaviria’s political autonomy because he was unable to oppose 
DTO negotiation terms without fear for the safety of hostages. Consequently, by the end 
of the process, the Treaty on Extradition was constitutionally invalidated. Pablo Escobar, 
who was allowed to construct his own prison La Catedral, and choose his own prison 
guards, “surrendered” the same day. As news of Escobar’s prison lifestyle and of 
executions within the prison surfaced, Gaviria ordered Escobar’s transfer but Pablo 
Escobar escaped. Retrospectively, Cesar Gaviria has acknowledged that the government 
                                                        
54 The Liberal kidnapping campaign resulted in a ten-person hostage situation whose victims were relatives 
of President Gaviria’s and colleagues within the Liberal party 
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should not have given so many concessions to Pablo Escobar, “we made a huge mistake 
(La Catedral), we underestimated the capacity of Escobar for corruption and intimidation” 
(Keane, 2003).  
 The other slight limitation of Matthiesen’s research with regards to the issue of 
political autonomy is the time span of the study. Although her research on 
counternarcotics policy is an extensive in depth analysis of the dynamics of foreign 
policy and its domestic constraints, an analysis of two presidencies does not provide a 
historical trend regarding the Colombian presidency’s political autonomy in the 
implementation of extraditions. Matthiesen argues that Gaviria was successful because he 
conciliated international and domestic demands to reduce narco-terrorism. However, 
even though Gaviria was able to convince U.S. authorities that his presidency would 
continue to combat the illicit drug industry, while simultaneously establishing 
negotiations with DTO leaders, his success in implementing two incompatible policies 
was short lived. Gaviria’s policy of conciliation only lasted for about a year and ten 
months from September 1990, when negotiations with DTO leaders began, to July 1992 
when Pablo Escobar escaped from his own prison. The policy of conciliation, as 
implemented by Gaviria’s administration, instantly became a policy of confrontation with 
DTOs, which became a year and a half long manhunt for Pablo Escobar. Immediately 
after the La Catedral fiasco, President Gaviria returned to a policy of total 
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, which was the policy that Presidents 
before Gaviria practiced, and that Presidents who followed Gaviria continued; thus 
leading to a permanent re-institutionalizing of counternarcotics policies including the 
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Treaty on Extradition, which was officially reinstated in 1997 with Ernesto Samper’s 
presidency.  
 A comprehensive historical approach of the impact of presidential political 
autonomy on DTOs would have to look at presidencies in the period from at least 1979-
2010. The starting point would be 1979, which was the year that the Treaty on 
Extradition was established between the United States and Colombia. This was also the 
first major counternarcotics agreement between the two countries. The existing power 
disparity between the United States and Colombia has to be considered because of the 
capacity of the United States government to set the agenda in bilateral relations. As the 
policy has developed, certain counternarcotics elements have become standard parts of 
each presidency’s policy. The Colombian executive has little power to sway away from 
U.S. counternarcotics demands, because if they do, the United States government has 
many diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal to sanction Colombian governments, 
such as the annual counternarcotics cooperation certification process. Consequently, 
Colombian presidencies enjoy little to no political autonomy to oppose U.S. government 
counternarcotics demands. Political autonomy, in this case, examines the ability of 
Colombian presidents to follow U.S. counternarcotics efforts independent of domestic 
opposition. A high degree of autonomy would indicate that the president enjoys enough 
independence or support from domestic actors where he or she is able to carry out a 
policy or make an international agreement without domestic constraints. A moderate 
level of autonomy indicates that the president has some independence or support from 
some domestic actors, but not enough to implement a policy. A low degree of autonomy 
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indicates that the president has little to no autonomy to carry out a policy because of great 
domestic opposition. 
 Of the seven Colombian presidents between 1979-2010 that have had to 
implement counternarcotics efforts and enforce the Treaty on Extradition, most have 
enjoyed high to moderate levels of autonomy on the issue of extradition. With regards to 
the issue of extradition, five of seven presidents Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Belisario 
Betancur, Ernesto Samper, Andres Pastrana, and Alvaro Uribe Velez have all enjoyed 
high levels of political autonomy on extradition because they faced little to no opposition 
on the implementation of extradition from domestic groups. In contrast, Presidents 
Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria experienced moderate to low levels of political 
autonomy on the issue of extradition because they faced higher levels of domestic 
opposition, which was illustrated by public opinion polls, newspaper editorials, public 
official statements, and by violent DTO attacks on political elites, government 
institutions, and on civilians.55 Moreover, only three presidents: Belisario Betancur, Cesar 
Gaviria, and Alvaro Uribe Velez have tried to sway away from U.S. counternarcotics 
efforts by opposing extradition or using extradition as a discretionary negotiation tool. 
All failed in their efforts and eventually returned to a policy of complet alignment with 
U.S. counternarcotics policy. Betancur opposed the treaty on nationalist grounds. He had 
some leeway to refrain from enforcing the Treaty on Extradition because the Cold War 
was still the more important issue in the region so the U.S. government did not impose 
sanctions. However, when Betancur’s Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was 
assassinated, his policy on extradition changed and he implemented the Treaty without 
                                                        
55 this evidence will become evident in the section on cohesion and representativeness. 
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strong domestic opposition. Gaviria and Uribe obtained tentative support from U.S. 
Administrations in the use of extradition as a discretionary tool, coincidentally, from the 
father and son presidencies of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. But both, Gaviria 
and Uribe, eventually aligned with U.S. policy. President Gaviria completely aligned 
with U.S. policy after Escobar escaped  La Catedral. President Uribe tried using the 
extradition policy as a discretionary policy to negotiate the demobilization of paramilitary 
leaders of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, but quickly extradited the paramilitary 
heads once they were publicly divulging their relationship with politicians who belonged 
to his political coalition. Uribe extradited these leaders without domestic opposition. 
 Political autonomy is the strongest tool at the disposal of Colombian governments 
to implement counternarcotics efforts and attack DTO leaders and their organizations.  
This is especially true while Colombia’s legal institutions remain weak.  
 From this observation, it can be hypothesized that when state autonomy is high, 
DTOs find it difficult to mobilize politically against the government. They may 
participate in politics by funding political campaigns, but it is unlikely that they will use 
violence to challenge state institutions. On the other hand, when state autonomy is low, 
DTOs find it easier to challenge state authority, including the use of violence to challenge 
the state on issues that they seek to affect. As it will be discussed in this project’s section 
on group cohesion and representativeness, Medellin-based DTOs were actually able to 
lower presidential autonomy by shaping the public debate on extradition through the use 
of violence.  
 Finally, although the political autonomy of a president does not affect the 
formation of drug trafficking organizations, it does affect the longevity of organizations 
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once their leaders become known and established, because once they are known, they can 
be persecuted and potentially extradited. Over the years, the high political autonomy that 
Colombian presidents have enjoyed with regards to the issue of extradition, has led this 
policy to become institutionalized by subsequent governments. Its practice has not been 
challenged, since Pablo Escobar’s escape from prison in 1992, because this event 
epitomized the weakness of legal institutions to enforce laws on wealthy and powerful 
traffickers. In cases where legal institutions are weak, and as long as public opinion 
continues to believe that legal institutions are weak, it is likely that the autonomy of the 
presidency to extradite nationals will continue to be high, because the only authority that 
can effectively be enforced, is that of the international authority requesting the traffickers. 
State Capacity 
The Colombian state has been unable to enforce the rule of law throughout its 
territory especially in rural areas where there is little state presence in the form of police 
stations, education facilities, hospitals, or courts (Garcia, 2008). Reduced state presence 
creates a “problem of stateness” (Linz and Stepan, 1996), where state institutions are not 
able to prevent people from using violence to resolve conflicts.  Because the state is 
unable to permeate the entire Colombian territory it is not able to impose and enforce 
stricter laws to drastically reduce high levels of impunity and violence.56 The “problem 
of stateness” is one of the main and direct causes for the rise of illicit interest groups 
                                                        
56 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Colombia had a homicide rate of around 70 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants (UNODC, 2011).  By 2008 the homicide rate was reduced to 33 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants, which was the same homicide rate as in 1988 (Desde Inicio, 2009).  To put these numbers into 
perspective, in 2010 Honduras peaked the homicide list with 88 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants and 
Mexico’s homicide rate was 18 per 100,000 the highest since the government started implementing 
counternarcotics efforts in 2004 under President Felipe Calderon (UNODC, 2011).   
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(IIGs) such as the Medellin-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), because the 
lack of law enforcement allows non-state actors to rise and operate without constraints.  
When the marijuana traffic moved to Colombia from Mexico in the 1970s, the 
areas were the traffic established was suitable for growing and smuggling marijuana, 
because areas in Northern Colombia had a reduced state supervision, and geographically 
Colombia’s coastline was close enough to the American market via smuggling routes 
throughout the Caribbean; the proximity of Colombia to the United States’ coastline 
allowed small planes packed with drugs to travel across the Caribbean (Frontline, 2000).  
The unsupervised marijuana smuggling networks became useful once cocaine traffic was 
established in the mid 1970s.   
Colombia’s rugged geography also exacerbated the “problem of stateness,” and 
contributed to the rise of drug smuggling in the country.  The mountainous terrain and the 
Amazon canopy of this large country kept many rural areas isolated, making it difficult 
for local and national governments to monitor (Thoumi, 1994:179-178). Consequently, it 
was easy for DTOs to construct airstrips, foster coca crop cultivation, and build refineries 
in isolated areas.  The terrains were virtual “no man’s land” with little to no state 
authority and where non-state actors like paramiliaries and guerrillas were able to 
establish their own rule of law, while benefiting from different aspects of the drug trade.  
The tradition of using violence to resolve conflicts, as established by the civil 
conflict known as La Violencia in the 1950s, led Colombian traffickers to be ruthless in 
the manner that they conducted business especially in cities (Thoumi, 1994).  Many rural 
émigrés to urban centers like Medellin used violence instead of courts to resolve social 
conflicts in poor neighborhoods.  The neighborhoods lacked police posts, and eventually 
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became hotbeds for traffickers and hit men known as sicarios, when the cocaine trade 
became established in the 1970s and 1980s.  Hit men usually belonged to gangs, which 
controlled entire neighborhoods oversaw different aspects of the illicit drug business. 
Some gangs or bandas enforced their style of security on the population of the 
neighborhood and delimited the entrance of authorities, people, and vehicles into the 
gang’s neighborhood (Salazar, 1990). To establish neighborhood security, gangs 
developed the practice of extortion and charged businesses, public transportation, and 
commercial vehicles a fee for operating in their neighborhood.  
Moreover, while doing fieldwork for this project I was able to observe how gang 
leaders in their early twenties function like city managers, within their neighborhood. 
Their role as neighborhood leaders evolves from the fact that gang leaders become 
authority figures as a consequence of their power over the control of violence within their 
geographical area. So even though street gangs are involved in a high degree of illegal 
activity, as “neighborhood leaders,” gang members also engage in legal activities such as 
arranging that public utility companies service a neighborhood.  In the case of the Pablo 
Escobar neighborhood, the gang leader arranged with the local water company for the 
necessary tubing to service the neighborhood’s water supply.   
In sum, since the whole process of establishing city settlements took place 
without state supervision, state law enforcement institutions unintentionally ceded the 
monopoly over the use of force to gangs. The process of re-establishing rule of law in 
these neighborhoods has been cyclical and has depended on the power struggles that take 
place among DTO leaders and on the haphazard incursions of law enforcement into gang 
controlled neighborhoods to put down flare ups of violence. 
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In sum, the geographical closeness to the U.S. market, the lack of state presence 
in rural and urban areas in terms of law enforcement allowed the non-state actors to 
establish their own areas of power. Drug trafficking organizations took advantage of lax 
law enforcement to plant illegal crop, create industrial-size refineries, to fund 
paramilitary organizations, and to use urban gangs for the settling of trafficking disputes 
and other DTO related activities.  
Analysis 
A central question this project set out to answer was under what conditions do 
illicit interest groups, such as DTOs, flourish/develop? For this purpose this Hypothesis 1 
was developed to explain the relationship between the external environment and the 
development of DTOs. It hypothesized that, 
The presence of favorable external variables (occurring within a larger political environment) is 
more likely to influence the formation and development of illicit interest groups, and a group’s 
formation and development should follow external events. 
 
Overall, the analysis of external variables provides evidence supporting the above 
hypothesis. Political, social, economic, technological, factors led to development of 
DTOs. The indifference of government officials, the lack state capacity, and the reduced 
states autonomy also influenced DTOs to flourish and become powerful.    
The implementation of the “War on Drugs” first in the 1960s and later in the 
1980s has attempted to curve illicit drugs at their source, to prevent drugs from reaching 
U.S. borders.  However, the unintended consequence of the U.S. counternarcotics policy 
since the 1960s has been the rise of Colombian DTOs and the spread of illicit drug traffic 
throughout Latin America.  Since cocaine became an illicit commodity in high demand, it 
transformed into a high priced commodity not because of its lack of supply, but because 
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of the risk involved in smuggling the drug to major markets like the United States and 
Europe.  The high profit margin gained from smuggling cocaine opened a profitable 
opportunity for traffickers who had experience with underground smuggling networks.  
Many of the environmental and institutional conditions that led to the rise of the illicit 
drug business in Colombia were factors that reduced the risk of conducting business.  
According to Thoumi, Colombians were not culturally more violent or corrupt than other 
citizens of the world; Colombia simply had the “best package of incentives to lower risks,” 
(Thoumi, 1994) which led to the growth of the illicit drug industry (Reuter, 2004).   
Of the seven factors described above, six lower the risk of apprehension by 
authorities, which inevitably stimulated the economic development of DTOs. A weak 
legal system allowed traffickers to do business without the fear of being investigated or 
apprehended.  Colombia’s geography lowered the capacity of government monitoring, 
and this factor decreased horizontal accountability of government officials to the central 
government, especially in remote areas.  Colombia’s rugged geography coupled with the 
absence of state presence decreased state supervision, and increased the likelihood of 
corruption.  Having a heritage of exporting smuggled goods such as emeralds decreased 
the risk of doing business because trustworthy business contacts were already established 
to smuggle cocaine through secure routes.  A network of Colombian immigrants in the 
United States also helped reduce risks, because immigrants could be trusted to receive 
drugs, distribute them, and send money back to Colombia without fear that the 
connections would be infiltrated by U.S. law enforcement.  A change in U.S. demand for 
cocaine as compared to marijuana became a better venture for drug traffickers because 
cocaine had a lower risk of being detected by anti-narcotics agents since it was less bulky.  
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Finally, the simple technology for refining cocaine also reduced the risk of being caught 
by authorities, since the refining process was cheap and easily emulated.  Technological 
innovations also allowed traffickers to transport and hide cocaine from authorities. 
 Finally, external factor such as the indifference of Colombian elites to the power 
of the illicit drug trafficking organizations, and the lack of international focus on money 
laundering or even on cocaine as a “problem drug,” facilitated the growth of the cocaine 
industry in Colombia, because DTOs flourished under the radar for about 15 years during 
the “golden era” of drug traffic between 1969-1984.  The economic power acquired 
during this period allowed traffickers to gradually increase their power vis-à-vis the 
government and eventually led to a decline in state autonomy, which led to 
destabilization of the political system and a temporal invalidation of the Extradition 
Treaty with the United States. 
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CHAPTER 4: EVALUATING 1980s-ERA MEDELLIN DRUG TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATIONS USING AN INTEREST GROUP MODEL: INTERNAL 
VARIABLES 
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  As described in chapter 2, a hybrid Macro-Micro-Model has been formulated to 
help analyze illicit interest groups by investigating the "macro" (external environmental) 
variables and "micro" (internal organizational) variables relative to a given group.  
Chapter IV will examine aspects of the Micro-model's internal variables that influence 
the rise, development, and transformation of 1980s-era Medellin drug trafficking 
organizations.   
As diagrammed in Table 3 below, the internal variables are only part of the entire 
picture crafted by the model.  In this chapter, we are concerned with the characteristics in 
the right column classified as either a pluralist or institutionalist approach.  Internal 
factors include: membership characteristics, economic resources, group cohesion, group 
expertise, group size, high and low-demanders, selective incentives, and 
representativeness. 
Table 3: The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Model Employing Pluralist and Institutionalist 
Approaches 
 
 Macro-model variables 
(external variables) 
Micro-model variables 
(internal variables) 
Pluralist approach • Political events 
• Economic events 
• Social events 
• Technological events 
• Membership 
characteristics 
• Resources 
• Cohesion 
• Expertise 
• Representativeness 
Institutionalist 
approach 
• A state’s legal 
parameters 
• Individual preferences 
of state officials 
• Autonomy 
• A state’s capacity 
• Selective incentives 
• Group size 
• Existence of high- and 
low-demanders 
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  For the purposes of the case study, discussion of the association of Medellin-
based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) centers on a few key leaders, even though 
the association was known to encompass trafficking organizations all over Colombia.  
The leaders of the Medellin-based DTOs are:  Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa Brothers, 
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder Rivas. 
Membership Characteristics 
A discussion of the socioeconomic status and education of group members allows 
the measurement of homogeneity and/or specialization of an organization’s membership.  
It is also a descriptive variable that provides a general survey of a membership’s 
composition, historical context, and ability to influence policy.  This section introduces 
the characteristics of major Medellin DTO leaders and employees.  
Leadership: Pablo Escobar 
In 1949 Pablo Escobar was born in Rionegro, Antioquia, a town on the outskirts 
of Medellin.  His maternal grandfather was involved in the business of smuggling whisky.  
His father was a peasant and his mother a public school teacher.  The family was 
economically disadvantaged and in the 1950s would move often because of La 
Violencia—a ten-year period of civil conflict in Colombia (1948-1958).  In 1961 the 
family relocated in Envigado, a town south of Medellin, and settled in government 
housing.  Escobar finished high school and after graduation attended college at the 
Universidad Autónoma where he took some accounting classes but never obtained a 
degree (Salazar, 2001:32-44).  In his youth he also worked with his cousin Gustavo 
Gaviria stealing and reselling tombstones.  He also stole cars and later became involved 
in two smuggling organizations.  The first smuggling organization was run by Don 
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Alberto and the second was run by Alfredo “el Padrino” Gomez Lopez’s organization 
where Escobar was a gunman (Castillo, 1991, p. 50; Castro, 1996, p. 283; Salazar, 2001, 
p. 55).  Gomez Lopez’s organization specialized in importing American cigarettes and 
appliances into Colombia and also had contacts with emerald smugglers in Bogotá, who 
exported to markets in Mexico (Castro, 1996).  In an interview granted to journalist 
German Castro Caycedo (1987), Pablo Escobar recounted how he became involved with 
the cocaine business: 
Pablo Escobar: In this country one is bred in war, I was brought up in the war, a very violent war, 
which was the war of Malboro (cigarettes).  I swear that not even the paisas, unless they were 
bandits of that time, knew about that fight.  Let’s say that is what existed before coca began, 
(which was the war) where the first drug traffickers came from and which created the first sicarios 
(hit men)…  
 
It is true that Don Alfredo always was a smuggler of cigarettes, whisky, watches, and second hand 
pianos.  He would buy these up there in the United States, then he would bring it by boat, and 
would smuggle it through Turbo or through Tolú.  Once he brought in thirty-eight trucks.  I 
remember the scandal that broke… That was the part of history when smugglers started going into 
the drug business.  At that time I was working for another smuggler, Don Alberto, who was my 
mentor, because he was a warrior, intelligent, and resourceful… 
 
I had just graduated from high school.  Look, I have started to think about those things and it 
becomes clearer for me that those examples (set by the first smugglers) determined the future of 
my life and the life of other kids who started to live with many illusions, but who did not want to 
work at a factory or a store.  What we saw (in those smugglers) was the opulence, plus adventure, 
plus the power that money brings.  Or are you going to tell me that money does not provide power 
and fame.  And you cannot tell me that there exists one single human being in this world who 
doesn’t like money, fame, and power, especially at that age (Castro, 1996, p. 283). 
 
According to Pablo Escobar in this 1987 interview it was the wealth of early smugglers 
that motivated him to become a smuggler in spite of the violence practiced within this 
sector.  It was through these smugglers that he learned about the profitable drug trade by 
working as a cargo escort and gunman.  As an armed escort for smuggled cargo, Escobar 
became familiar with smuggling routes and as a gunman he regularly used violence to 
intimidate.  Early smugglers taught Escobar how to manage the underground economic 
structure for smuggling goods.  It was through Don Alberto and Gomez Lopez that he 
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learned to payoff customs, police, and military officers as well as the use of small town 
politicians to transport illegal cargos through Colombian highways (Castro, 1996).  Aside 
from economic incentives to gain favor amongst authorities, the violent wars Escobar 
refers to as the “Malboro wars” taught him how to intimidate competitors.  An interview I 
conducted in 2005 with a 1970-1980s DTO worker reveals that Pablo Escobar only rose 
to power because he was violent:  
DSS0040: Escobar would terminate the small “kitchens,” (popular name for coca paste refineries) 
because he wanted to be the sole provider of refined cocaine.  And he finished with (production in) 
Casquilla and Caldas.  At first he would offer to buy production at a low cost, but if they wouldn’t 
agree to the price, he would finish their production of refined cocaine.  He would finish with their 
owners, their workers, and the refinery itself… Pablo surpassed the Ochoas, well every trafficker 
had to go through him (to buy cocaine to send), so they kept their head low (Interview DSS040, 
2005). 
 
Early smugglers earned the respect of many in society because they brought in 
affordable imported goods desired by all social circles of society, but especially by 
affluent and middle class sectors that could easily afford them.  Moreover, the capacity to 
earn absurdly large amounts of money, sufficient enough to bribe authorities, gave 
smugglers an untouchable aura because they provided a service to high-end clients.  At 
the same time, state authorities were easily persuaded because smugglers provided them 
with alternate sources of income.  Recalling how his mentor Don Alberto smuggled 32 
trucks full of merchandise, Escobar described how authorities reacted when they found 
out: 
 In that ride, all of the police along the way (From Turbo to Medellin) received money.  Man, at 
that time even the Communal Action Juntas came out and asked for money and so did the police 
inspectors of the surrounding villages because the shipment became general gossip the moment 
the cargo was unloaded from the ship, to the bongos, and loaded into the trucks…  (Castro, 1996). 
 
Respect and economic power gave Colombian smugglers a special status within the very 
rigid class system in which they operated.  Smugglers had the ability to create jobs and 
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provide normally unaffordable goods at affordable prices by undermining the 
government’s import tariffs.  Finally, because of the profitability of their trade, smugglers 
provided an avenue for upward mobility to many Colombian’s of humble origins like that 
of Escobar himself.   
The Gomez Lopez smuggling organization based many of its operations in the 
Santisima Trinidad57 neighborhood of Medellin, considered a warehouse and prostitution 
district (Salazar, 2001, p. 55).  In the Santisima Trinidad neighborhood Pablo Escobar, 
and his cousin Gustavo Gaviria, became acquainted with early entry-level and mid-level 
cocaine traffickers like Carlos Lehder and Griselda Blanco.   
When Carlos Lehder was released from Connecticut’s Danbury prison in 1975 he 
contacted Pablo Escobar who at the time was smuggling a few kilos of cocaine through 
drug mules (Streatfeild, 2000).  After the Escobar/Lehder meeting, Escobar became 
Lehder’s cocaine provider and this connection allowed Lehder to become a key player in 
the transportation and selling of cocaine in the U.S. market.   
Another mid-level cocaine trafficker who Escobar became acquainted with was 
Griselda Blanco, who was better known by U.S. law enforcement circles as the 
“Godmother,” “the Queen of Cocaine,” or the “Black Widow of Cocaine.”58 By 1975 
                                                        
57 This neighborhood is also known as Barrio Antioquia, and is located in the wharehouse district right next 
to the Olaya Herrera International Airport, which was a central point for the import and export of smuggled 
goods.   
 
58 See Gugliotta and Leen (1989), Merlmestein, Max (1990), Eddy et al.  (1988), Smitten (1990) and the 
documentaries “Cocaine Cowboys” and “Cocaine Cowboys Two” for more information on Griselda Blanco 
and South Florida’s involvement in the illicit drug trade in general.  Griselda Blanco became a mayor 
distributor of cocaine in Miami during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  She became known as the “Black 
Widow of Cocaine” in the United States because she reportedly bragged that she killed one of her three 
husbands.  Before becoming a cocaine distributor, she was a young prostitute until she married Jose Dario 
Trujillo who had criminal connections to organized crime (La Viuda Negra, 1994).  During the early 1960s 
she had three children with Trujillo and became acquainted with the members of the drug business.  
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Griselda Blanco had already been a major cocaine distributor in New York, and in the 
late 1970s Blanco became a distribution leader in the Miami cocaine market.  The contact 
between Escobar, other Medellin-based DTO leaders, and Griselda Blanco contributed to 
the cocaine market takeover of Miami by Medellin-based DTOs.  It was in 1979 that 
Time Magazine described Miami as “Trouble in Paradise” (South Florida, 1981) because 
of the crime wave typified by the “Dadeland Mall massacre” where rival drug dealers 
opened machine gun fire on each other (Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 10). 
Once Pablo Escobar and Gustavo Gaviria became fulltime cocaine traffickers in 
the mid to late-1970s, they developed a business strategy that involved procuring coca 
paste in Peru and Ecuador, and refining and shipping it through 20-30 routes (Mollison et 
al., 2007, p. 56) to their distributors in the United States.  By 1977, Escobar was twenty-
eight, a millionaire property owner, and one of Medellin’s up-and-coming drug 
traffickers (Salazar, 2001).  Although Escobar became rich while young, his rise within 
the drug business was not accidental, it was due to: learning the trade from trafficking 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Trujillo died in the late 1960s in Queens and shortly after Blanco married Alberto Bravo her second 
husband—a pioneer in the cocaine business, with whom she lived with in Queens, New York in 1971.  By 
1972 she and Bravo became wealthy distributing cocaine for “El Padrino” in Medellin (Castillo, 1987, p. 
53).  In 1975 U.S. authorities indicted Blanco and Bravo for smuggling cocaine to the United States and 
arrested members of her distribution ring (Castillo, 1987, p. 53; Lubasch, 1976).  It is believed Griselda 
Blanco moved to Miami and Carlos Bravo returned to Colombia to avoid U.S. authorities.  Soon after the 
U.S. government indictment, Griselda Blanco and Alberto Bravo had a personal standoff, and Blanco 
reportedly killed her second husband in Bogotá (Corben, 2006).  In the mid to late 1970s Blanco married 
Dario Sepulveda her third husband, with whom she had a fourth son named Michael Corleone Sepulveda 
around 1977.  Pablo Escobar worked for El Padrino’s organization in the early 1970s at the same time 
Griselda Blanco and Alberto Bravo were leaders of cocaine distribution in Queens, New York (Salazar, 
2001, p. 47-49).  Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers became suppliers of cocaine for Blanco once she 
established herself in Miami.  However, her dealings with Escobar and the Ochoas would end around 1985 
because of her use of violence.  She not only reportedly had her husband Dario Sepulveda killed over a 
child custody battle, but she also killed a first cousin of the Ochoas, Marta Ochoa Saldarriaga who was 
supplying Blanco with cocaine in Miami (Mermelstein, 1990; Guggliota et al., 1989, p. 214; Smitten, 1989).  
These murders led major traffickers to cut Griselda Blanco out from the cocaine supply chain and Medellin 
DTO leaders placed a bounty on her (Mermelstein, 1990; Corben, 2006).  U.S. authorities finally arrested 
Griselda Blanco in 1985 and she spent 20 years in prison for drug trafficking and murder until her release 
in 2005.   
94 
 
pioneers Don Alberto and Lopez Gomez, using the ruthlessness he learned as a 
professional hit man, forging valuable business contacts that allowed him to reach U.S. 
markets, leveraging the high profit margin for trafficking cocaine, and taking advantage 
of the weak law enforcement in Colombia and abroad. 
Leadership: The Ochoa Brothers 
The next important leaders of Medellin-based DTOs were the Ochoa brothers—
Jorge Luis, Juan David, and Fabio Ochoa.  The Ochoa brothers were born into a family 
known for breeding and training Paso Fino horses in Colombia.  Their great-grandfather 
won awards for his horses and their father was a recognized horse breeder and the owner 
of the famous restaurant Las Margaritas, a place frequented by horse aficionados and 
traffickers.  Journalistic accounts suggest that Hernando Restrepo Ochoa and Fabio 
Restrepo Ochoa, uncles to the Ochoa brothers and themselves pioneers of the marijuana 
drug business of the 1960s and early 1970s, introduced the Ochoa brothers to the drug 
trafficking business (Salazar, 2001; Castillo, 1987, p.65; Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 26).  
Juan David and Jorge Luis Ochoa officially claim that a friend introduced them to the 
business (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 2000; Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000), but it is 
believed that Fabio Restrepo Ochoa ceded his business to the Ochoa brothers around 
1976, and shortly after –in 1978, Fabio Restrepo Ochoa was murdered (Castillo, 1987, p. 
65; Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 27).   
The Ochoa brothers claim that their ranching family was wealthy so they did not 
enter the drug business because of economic need (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 2000; 
Salazar, 2001, p. 73-74; Castillo, 1987), but some biographical accounts suggest that 
Jorge Luis Ochoa, the eldest brother, went to Miami to work off debts (Salazar, 2001, p. 
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74).  While in Miami, it is believed that Jorge Luis Ochoa discovered the profitability of 
the cocaine trade versus the marijuana trade.  Regardless of the Ochoa brothers’ 
economic standing, the illicit drug business provided them with an opportunity to profit.  
By 1978, Jorge Luis Ochoa was sending cocaine from Colombia to his youngest brother 
Fabio, who was stationed in Miami (Gugliotta et al., 1989; Eddy et al., 1988).  Fabio 
Ochoa worked with Miami-based distributors Rafael Cardona and Max Mermelstein; 
together, the three men were in charge of managing pilots, receiving and selling cocaine 
shipments to distributors like Griselda Blanco, and laundering and/or sending money 
back to traffickers in Colombia (Mermelstein, 1990, Castillo, 1987).   
During the early 1980s, the Ochoa brothers worked with Pablo Escobar, Jose 
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Carlos Lehder to try to consolidate the upstream and 
downstream stages of the cocaine trade.  Rodriguez Gacha would manage the acquisition 
of cocaine paste and Escobar would control cocaine refinement.  In the downstream 
stages of the cocaine trade during this period, the Ochoas and Lehder would organize the 
transportation of cocaine to the Caribbean and into the United States (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 
290).  The mutual cooperation between these traffickers allowed them to send large 
shipments of cocaine into U.S. markets by plane or boat, which marked a clear 
progression between the cocaine traffic of the 1980s when compared to the marijuana 
traffic of the 1970s that relied on the use of mules.  Whereas mules could only traffic a 
couple of kilos, the transportation of cocaine via airplanes and boats from the late 1970s 
onward could transport tons of cocaine.   
Little to no information exists on the level of the Ochoa others. Aside from their 
experience in the illicit drug business, they had managerial skills because they supervised 
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a range of other legal businesses throughout Colombia.  In Jorge Ochoa’s words, the 
cocaine business was a great part-time job,  
Frontline: I still don't quite understand what you did on a day-to-day basis?  
 
Jorge Ochoa: One doesn't dedicate all one's time to that… I also dealt with horses.  I had a lot of 
activities.  I wasn't solely dedicated to the business; it doesn't take all of your time. 
 
Frontline: So drug trafficking was a lucrative part-time job?  
 
Jorge Ochoa: Part-time, yes (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 2000).   
 
From biographical accounts on the Ochoa brothers, it is known that they had a more 
comfortable upbringing than that of Pablo Escobar.  The Ochoa brothers were influenced 
by their familial connections to the drug trade and the family restaurant allowed them to 
absorb information on trade routes and to make connections with members of the 
smuggling world (Interviews - Juan David, 2000; Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 26-28).  It is 
reported that the Ochoas were among the echelon of DTO leaders because of their 
transportation links to the United States since they were able to use their Hacienda 
Veracruz in the outskirts of Barranquilla, Colombia as a transshipment point because the 
property had a large airstrip to send off planes full of cocaine across the Caribbean (Eddy 
et al., 1988, p. 296; Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 127).  According to pilot George Jung, the 
Ochoas also became important because they had political connections that could provide 
for the protection of trafficking routes (Interviews – George Jung, 2000; Streatfeild, 
2000).  Moreover, in 1981 they were involved in the formation of the group Muerte A 
Secuestradores (MAS), to stop guerrilla and common criminals from kidnapping the 
relatives of traffickers.59 
                                                        
59 The guerrilla group M-19 had kidnapped their sister Martha Nieves Ochoa.   
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Leadership: Jose Gonzalo “el Mejicano” Rodriguez Gacha 
The third important DTO leader was Jose Gonzalo ‘el Mejicano’ Rodriguez 
Gacha.  Little information exists on the upbringing of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha.  
He was born in Pacho, Cundinamarca in 1946, a small town located in between Bogotá 
and the emerald mines of Muzo, Boyacá.  At the beginning of his career he worked as a 
gunman for Alfonso Caballero, an emerald smuggler who would sell his clandestine 
merchandise in Mexico and Miami.  Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha became very 
important to Medellin-based traffickers because of his international trade connections via 
Mexico.60  
According to journalistic accounts, Rodriguez Gacha did not have registered 
identification with the Colombian state (Castillo, 1987).  He was called “the Mexican” 
because of his reported love for all things Mexican.  Most of his properties were named 
after Mexican ranchera music that depicts stories of macho hustlers and heartbreak.  In 
1976, police records began to register Rodriguez Gacha’s involvement in the drug 
business.  Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers worked with Rodriguez Gacha in 
upstream and downstream aspects of drug trafficking.  In the early 1980s Rodriguez 
Gacha already had amassed many properties and was a pioneer in the cultivation and 
refinement of coca in the jungle regions of southern Colombia.  Some of the most well-
known industrial-sized refinement complexes were in the jungles of the Caqueta 
department and the complexes were known as Villa Coca, Coquilandia, and the infamous 
                                                        
60 Other traffickers that benefited from the Mexican smuggling routes were the brothers Builes in particular 
Jaime Builes from Fredonia, Antioquia who exported cocaine through Mexico to California, Louisiana, and 
Florida (Castro, 1994).   
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Tranquilandia.  These complexes were constructed around 1982 and destroyed in 1984 
by Colombian authorities. 
Rodriguez Gacha created a security apparatus that would protect trafficker 
properties in rural areas, such as the El Magdalena Medio region of Colombia where 
large tracts of land were bought cheap because armed guerrillas, specifically the FARC, 
had a sphere of influence.  Politically, Rodriguez Gacha became important because he 
was instrumental in creating counter-insurgent paramilitary groups in the 1980s, which 
later evolved into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which were a powerful 
force from around 1994 to 2004. 
 Overall, Rodriguez Gacha, like Escobar and the Ochoa brothers, learned about the 
smuggling trade from mentors.  Rodriguez Gacha’s learned trafficking from 1960s 
emerald smugglers, but he surpassed his mentors because he industrialized the production 
and smuggling of cocaine.  Specifically, Rodriguez Gacha adopted the Mexican trade 
routes established by the illegal emerald trade.  The Mexican routes were forged in two 
ways.  The first way consisted of selling the smuggled product to Mexican traffickers 
who would transport it into the U.S. market.  The second way the routes were created was 
by paying off local Mexican authorities (politicians, state police, or federal police) to 
transport merchandise through Mexico and into the U.S. border (Castro, 1994).  The 
“Mexican connection” allowed Rodriguez Gacha to own the Mexican routes and become 
a cocaine intermediary between Medellin-based DTO leaders who wished to send 
shipments through Mexico.  Many of the Mexican smuggling routes and/or contacts used 
by Colombian smugglers in the mid-20th century would continue to be in use in the early 
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2000s, as the Mexican drug trafficking organizations increased their capacity to control 
vast amounts of territory and smuggle cocaine through the U.S./Mexican border.   
Leadership: Carlos Lehder Rivas  
The final leader of significance in this discussion is Carlos Lehder Rivas.  Lehder 
Rivas was born in 1950 in the small city of Armenia, Quindio.  He was born into an 
upper middle-class home.  His father Guillermo Lehder was a German citizen who settled 
in Colombia after World War II and married Helena Rivas Gutierrez, a former beauty 
queen with whom he had four children (Orozco, 1987, Streatfeild, 2000).  Lehder’s father 
was known in Armenia because he established a German restaurant.  According to 
George Jung, an associate of Lehder and a former DTO pilot, Lehder’s father and mother 
separated.  She moved to New York City and brought Carlos Lehder with her when he 
was in his teens (Streatfeild, 2000).  When Carlos Lehder was about 25 years old in 1974, 
he was convicted for dealing marijuana and stealing cars61 in New York and spent 16 
months in prison.  Once out of prison, Lehder bought properties in the Bahamian Island 
called Norman’s Cay, which he reportedly bought for a little more than $150,000 dollars.  
The properties included a house, a marina, a yacht club, a hotel, and more importantly: an 
airstrip.  To acquire properties and smuggle cocaine, he allegedly paid Bahamian Prime 
Minister Sir Lynden Pindling an amount between $4,000 and $8,000 dollars to prevent 
surveillance by Bahamian authorities.62 On September 1979, fleeing from a possible 
                                                        
61 According to an interview with George Jung (Streatfeild, 2000; Eddy et al., 1988), Carlos Lehder would 
steal cars in the United States and ship them to Colombia where they would be sold.  Cars in Colombia 
during most of the 20th century were expensive items comparable in value to a real estate investment such 
as an apartment.  The high value of cars was due to exchange rates and the import tariffs placed by the 
Colombian government on imported goods, which made smuggling profitable.   
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arrest for trafficking cocaine to the United States, Lehder returned to his hometown of 
Armenia, Quindio a multi-millionaire (Orozco, 1987).   
Fellow traffickers suggest that Carlos Lehder was an adventurer, which possibly 
explains why he became involved in the illicit business (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 
2000).  It is unknown how Lehder became initially involved in criminal activities.  An 
interview with George Jung, who was Lehder’s cellmate at Danbury U.S. Federal Prison, 
suggests that one of his older brothers was involved in importing stolen cars from the 
United States and selling them in Colombia (Streatfeild, 2000; Eddy et al., 1988).  
However Jung explains that much of Lehder’s education occurred while imprisoned, that 
he was a methodical apprentice, and that he made many connections:  
It was basically a school.  My bunkmate was Carlos Lehder, he said he was from Colombia and he 
spoke excellent English, well mannered and his clothes were pretty neat… he asked me if I knew 
anything about cocaine…  
 
He said, "Did you know it sells for $60,000.00 a kilo in the United States?" And I said, "No.  I had 
no idea.  How much does it cost down in Colombia?" and he said, "$4,000 to $5,000." 
 
 Carlos and I spent close to a year together, working and planning everyday… But Carlos never 
ceased, never stopped.  He was like a student is, constantly pumping people's brains about money 
laundering, about this, about that, about automobiles, about airplanes, about boats.  In fact there 
was a guy in there for smuggling with boats and he spent hours and hours with him learning 
navigation, and there was a president of a bank in there and he pumped him constantly about the 
banking system in America and how one can launder money, and he kept files and files on 
everything.  He kept notes constantly.  He never stopped.  He was obsessed with it (Interviews - 
George Jung, 2000). 
 
Although his middle class upbringing may not clearly explain why Carlos Lehder 
became a cocaine trafficker, the connections and knowledge acquired while imprisoned 
allowed Lehder to become a valuable link for DTOs operating in the Caribbean.  
According to Jung, when Lehder was imprisoned in Danbury he did not know Pablo 
                                                                                                                                                                     
62 Lehder boasted about his Bahamian connections in Colombia, and his statements were the basis of an 
investigative report on Lynden Pindling’s involvement with drug traffickers by the U.S.  television network 
NBC.  Moreover the Bahamian authorities organized an investigative commission, which found that Sir 
Lynden Pindling and his wife were spending more than they earned, but Bahamian authorities were unable 
to prove that Prime Minister Pindling’s wealth was tied to drug trafficking (Eddy et al., 1988).   
101 
 
Escobar (Streatfeild, 2000).  Once Lehder returned to Colombia in 1976, he made contact 
with Pablo Escobar and George Jung began flying planes and selling larger quantities of 
cocaine for Escobar and Lehder.  When Lehder bought property in Norman’s Cay, 
Bahamas, in 1978, he used the island as a transshipment station for planes carrying drugs 
and money.   
Politically, Lehder was one of the most extravagant actors involved in the drug 
trafficking sector, and he was a one of the most vocal critics of the U.S.-Colombian 
Extradition Treaty.  Lehder’s political rhetoric borrowed from fascism, populism, and 
1960s liberal ideas on drug use.   
Lehder’s rise within the international cocaine trafficking sector was directly 
influenced by four external factors: the shift in demand from marijuana to cocaine, the 
established smuggling networks left by the marijuana trade that were used for cocaine 
distribution, the lack of enforced counter-narcotics laws in the Western Hemisphere, and 
the lack of money laundering controls in the United States.  These external factors 
provided an economic incentive for Carlos Lehder to enter the cocaine trade.  Carlos 
Lehders rise to political power, especially in Quindio’s local politics, was due to the 
tolerance of political elites with drug traffickers and the lack of controls on how 
politicians financed their political campaigns at national and local levels.   
Around 1986, once disagreements split Colombian cocaine traffickers into two 
groups—those traffickers based in Cali and those based in Medellin, the main actors in 
the Medellin DTO association became Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder.  It should be stressed that these individuals 
managed their own DTOs, but many times worked together to pursue common economic 
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and political interests.  This cooperation can be found in the creation of MAS and Los 
Extraditables.   
Leadership Analysis 
The characteristics of the leadership of Medellin-based DTOs suggest that they 
were all entrepreneurs who had an ambition to become wealthy without much formal 
education.  All of them were contemporaries, born in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
Their training was mainly practical experience, learning their trade at an early age.  By 
the time they were in their thirties all Medellin-based DTOs were multi-millionaires.  
Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) leaders initially became millionaires because there 
were few traffickers in the business.63  
With the exception of Carlos Lehder, all of them had a clear link (sometimes even 
a family link) to illegal activities early in life.  Once these Medellin-based traffickers 
became leaders in their own right they started “industrializing” their cocaine smuggling 
operations.  Instead of using mules to carry drugs, they created huge refineries and used 
small airplanes.   
One difference found among DTO leader backgrounds, which influenced their 
different attitudes towards the use of violence, was the nature of their initial experiences 
in the business.  Because Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were originally 
trained as gunmen in smuggling organizations, their use of violence was more regular.  
Carlos Lehder and the Ochoa brothers had been known to use violence, but mostly within 
                                                        
63 The price of cocaine in the late 1970s and early-1980s was approximately $60,000 per kilo.   
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trafficking circles to resolve business disputes.64 Their socio-economic backgrounds and 
attitude towards the use of violence had implications for their operations and efforts to 
influence the political agenda.  For example, the Ochoas were very discreet and more 
concerned with co-opting the political establishment.  They had no ambition to obtain 
direct political power.  Though Lehder was in charge of MAS65 political propaganda, he 
never targeted Colombia’s traditional political establishment.  Lehder, a white 
supremacist, saw himself an elite due to his German heritage and also because of his 
success as an entrepreneur.  Rodriguez Gacha was not as ruthless as Pablo Escobar in 
warring with the political elites, but he was ruthless with leftist guerrillas and was 
responsible for the decimation of the Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union), the FARC’s 
legal political party.  Rodriguez Gacha became a sworn counterinsurgent and allied 
himself with cattle ranchers who ruthlessly opposed guerrilla harassment in the Middle 
Magdalena region.  In contrast to most Medellin-based DTOs, Pablo Escobar’s overnight 
success as an entrepreneur led him to believe that he deserved a role in the political and 
economic establishment.  Escobar used violence on political elites and innocent people to 
obtain results. 
Membership Characteristics and Selective Incentives: Lower-level DTO Members 
A discussion of the people who worked for Medellin-based DTO leaders is 
important because it provides insights about the internal structure of the cocaine industry 
in Colombia.  It also provides an explanation of why individuals join such organizations.  
                                                        
64 The Ochoas for example were accused of sending an assassin to kill cocaine pilot-turned-DEA informant 
Barry Seal in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
 
65 An organization created by traffickers to kill guerrillas who kidnapped traffickers.  This organization will 
be discussed in the Organizational Cohesion section. 
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Analytically, it is futile to discuss the membership characteristics of workers such as their 
socio-economic status and education without considering the effect of selective 
incentives.  This section will delve into membership characteristics and the incentives 
that drive workers to join DTOs. 
The socio-economic status and educational levels of workers of Medellin-based 
DTOs depended on the type of work.  Based on first-person interviews I conducted with 
former, non-elite DTO workers, most participants were very carefully hired based on a 
family, friendship, or neighborhood connection –not necessarily on skill.   
Patricia Micolta: Was it easy to get people to work in the organization? 
 
DSS0031: It was not easy, but once a really good friend or family member saw you make money, then 
it was easier to get someone to work for you or get them in the business.  But it had to be someone that 
you could back up or they could back you up, but you wouldn’t do this with some one that you didn’t 
know.  The person had to be very recommended….  (Interview DSS0031, 2005). 
 
DSS0040: Pablo did not like vitrinas (show-offs).  The quieter you were the longer the relationship 
you would have in the organization”  (Interview DSS0040, 2005). 
 
Close familial relationships created the necessary trust to reduce the infiltration of police 
informants, but it also was a way to enforce discipline within the organization.  
Employees who made a mistake might have to pay with his/her life or the life of relatives 
and friends.  For the most part, because many DTO employees were related, the majority 
of employees had similar backgrounds usually coming from poor socio-economic and 
educational levels.   
The objective of individual trafficking organizations was to make profit, reduce 
risks, and avoid authorities.  Drug trafficking businesses employed coca farmers, drivers, 
pilots, cocaine refiners, mules, people to ship out and receive merchandise, 
gunmen/bodyguards, and professionals such as accountants and lawyers.  Although it is 
difficult to determine the socio-economic, educational status, and familial linkage that all 
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DTO employees had with total certainty, the overall trend among DTO workers was that 
the socio-economic status and educational levels of non-professional employees was very 
low.  Most workers did not have an elementary level education and worked with DTOs 
out of economic necessity.   
One agrarian DTO worker who was interviewed indicated he earned about 20,000 
pesos66 per day on legal crops whereas a coca farmer can earn about 100,000 pesos per 
day and are given room and board (Interview raspachin, 2008).  Considering that the 
minimum monthly salary in Colombia in 2008 was about $461,500 pesos, which equaled 
approximately $256.39 dollars, coca farmers could make in one week what they would 
otherwise have made in a month.   
The reason why many people do not become coca farmers, even if they are 
unemployed, is because coca crops are located in isolated regions of Colombia far from 
their families and of course there is a risk of getting caught by authorities.  Farmers get 
paid once the coca paste is sold to cocaine processing labs in cities, so there is a risk that 
if authorities confiscate the coca paste or intercept a cocaine processing organization, 
peasants may not get paid for three months worth of work.  The job of a coca farmer (or 
raspachin), is ideal for single peasant young men or women who do not have children.  
Yet many peasants in need of money who have families also work in coca plantations 
because cocaine paste dealers pay well and have a constant demand for unskilled labor.   
Coca paste refiners are also composed of unskilled laborers whose salaries are 
similar to coca farmers.  Coca paste refiners in 1982, when Tranquilandia, the industrial-
                                                        
66 $20,000 pesos was about $11 dollars a day in 2012, and $100,000 pesos was about $55 dollars, at an 
exchange rate of $1,800 pesos per dollar. 
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sized cocaine lab was made, were paid around 100 pesos per month, which was around 
three times the minimum wage of the time (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 290).  If these amounts 
are compared to the wages of a coca farmer in 2008, the salary changes of these workers 
through time have matched mainstream inflation rates.   
Once U.S. drug enforcement agencies became more fully aware of the cocaine 
trade at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, mules started “body-packing” cocaine.  
On average, a person can carry 65 cocaine pellets in their intestines.  Women are known 
to carry more cocaine in their sexual organs as well. 
The demographics of drug mules can vary.  In the 1970s, U.S. citizens and airline 
workers were commonly hired to transport drugs and money.  With time Colombians 
increasingly participated in the drug trade as mules and were usually recruited from poor 
neighborhoods or small rural towns.  In the last decade, research suggests that mules are 
paid about $100 dollars per pellet or as much as approximately $6,500 dollars per round-
trip.  This is substantial when compared to the $256.39 per month that constitutes a 
minimum monthly wage in Colombia.67  
Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) gunmen or bodyguards (depending on the 
job at hand) usually came from marginal urban sectors, had little to no education, and 
often started as minors.  While they risked their lives, they received very little 
compensation for their work at least $100 for a job, but compensation depended on the 
importance of the target68 (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 30; Las Fachadas, 1999).  In a country 
                                                        
67 For more information on Colombian drug mules see the director’s commentary in the DVD Maria Full of 
Grace. 
 
68 During the late 1980s in particular around 1989 the Extraditables ordered the killing of police officers.  
During this time hit men were paid around $2,500 dollars for policemen, $2 million dollars for military 
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like Colombia, with high unemployment among the unskilled labor force, being hired as 
a gunman or sicario was an opportunity to have a job that paid more than the minimum 
wage.  I conducted interviews with ex-sicarios in Medellin, which revealed that these 
men often entered this line of work because of money, but also because they wanted to be 
thought of as “tough,” because an older brother was already a sicario, or because they 
wanted to get back at someone as an act of revenge: 
DSS0040: My older brother was the first to go down the path of the sicariato69 this was in 1970, 
when I was 13 years old I ran away from home… I went to another city I dedicated myself to 
living a “low-life” to attack, to rob, and I became part of a combo (a gang) and we would kill… 
From 13 to 16 I did “low-life” jobs and then at 16 I wanted to do more “finer” work… I dedicated 
myself to the sicariato (became a professional hit-man).  I became a leader and managed 63 
sicarios.  We did the dirty work and would receive jobs from the different organizations.  We 
would receive contracts we would be sent a picture and address and we would do a job” (Interview 
DSS040, 2005) 
 
Jair Bedoya community leader of Casa Mia70: When I was in school the Magnificos (the 
popular name for traffickers because they became rich overnight as if through a magic act) would 
provide us with school supplies.  So they were our heroes.  We started to join bandas (gangs) and 
do jobs, buy a motorcycle wear name brand clothes.  Parents couldn’t provide with such things 
                                                                                                                                                                     
officers (Mollison et al., 2007, p. 150).  Government numbers suggest that between 1989-1993, 1000 police 
officers died. However, for every 1 police officer that died, 10 gang members were killed in retaliation.  
The conflict skyrocketed the homicide rates specifically in Medellin and in 1991, at the peak of the 
violence, 7,081 people were murdered and the homicide rate was of 296 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.  
To give a comparison the Latin American homicide rate is of 25 per 100,000 and the most recent homicide 
rate for Medellin in 2010 was at 60 homicides per 100,000 (UNODC, 2011b:79).  
 
69 The career of a hit-man is popularly referred to as an institutional career like that of the clergy, academia, 
the bureaucracy, and in the streets of many towns in Colombia an in Latin America sadly enough being a 
hit-man is a career path. 
 
70 Jair became a sicario as a teenager in the 1980s and in the mid-1990s. He and others in the neighborhood 
of Sandander in Northwest Medellin formed Casa Mia a non-profit organization to create peace in marginal 
neighborhoods.  The power vacuum that overtook Medellin after Pablo Escobar was killed, and other DTOs 
were dismantled, raised the level of violence in marginal neighborhoods in the mid-1990s.  Gangs and 
emerging DTOs vied for power to control Medellin’s neighborhoods and the drug traffic (wholesale coca 
paste, cocaine refinement, and retail sale of cocaine and other drugs).  Eventually, Casa Mia through its 
effort to forge peace was recognized internationally and obtained funding from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP).  Casa Mia implemented programs like Restorative Justice—the 
creation of justice by implementing conflict resolution strategies.  Grass roots organizations like Casa Mia 
became mediators of peace and justice in societies where state institutions are often unable to establish 
justice.  However, this society-based mechanism for peace has had limitations as funding by the UNDP for 
the organization was pulled and Jair died on 2008.  When I interviewed Jair he was armed because he had 
recently suffered a severe knife wound caused by a juvenile gang member in his neighborhood.  Casa Mia 
still exists as a community organization led by Marta Macias, who has been very vocal about the 2009 
increase in homicide rates at the Comuna 6, where the neighborhood Santader is located.   
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because people here are very poor.  So in the 1980s our motto was who could be the first to kill, 
and in the 1990s the motto was who could do a bigger job like robbing an Exito (supermarket)… 
Things began deteriorating because kids started killing people just because they were seen as weak, 
because they were easy pray, so people began banding together and forming militias” (Interview 
Jair Bedoya, 2004).   
 
Accounts by members of DTOs, such as Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, who dealt 
with providing security or organizing assassinations for Pablo Escobar, show the 
relational closeness of these workers.  Many hit men operated in gangs composed of 
entire families.  For example, the well-known gang, the Muñoz Mosqueras, consisted of 
15 children from the same family.  Five of the children were eventually killed and three 
were jailed as a result of their drug-related activities (Salazar, 2001, p. 172).  If gangs of 
gunmen were not family related, they belonged to the same neighborhood such as the 
infamous gang Los Priscos who worked for Escobar and lived in the Aranjuez 
neighborhood in the northeast hills of Medellin.  The northeast hills of Medellin have 
become notorious for its gang wars, especially during the late 1980s and throughout the 
1990s.  Excluding the hilly neighborhood of El Poblado located in the southeast hills 
where middle and high-income individuals live, in the new millennium Medellin still 
remains a city surrounded with hills composed of hundreds of poor neighborhoods 
controlled by gangs whose leaders rarely reach 25 years of age. 
The socio-economic and educational level of more trained workers like pilots, 
accountants, and lawyers was substantially higher than those who did unskilled labor, and 
at this level, the DTOs also used an international labor force. Many of these employees 
came from middle-income origins, which allowed them to pay for educational training. 
At professional levels of training and status, the increased earnings were much more 
attractive than what could be earned in comparable licit jobs, for example, pilots in the 
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1980s could get paid a percentage of every kilo transported; a pilot transporting cocaine 
could make thousands of dollars in one shipment. George Jung, who flew for 1980s 
Medellin DTOs, (it is estimated) made close to $100 million U.S. dollars (Interviews - 
George Jung, 2000), yet the risk of getting detained by authorities, or being extradited to 
the United States due to their status in the organization was high.  For example, the two 
well-known American pilots who flew cocaine for Medellin-based DTOS, George Jung 
and Mickey Munday, were both apprehended and convicted by U.S. authorities. Both 
pilots were given sentences of 30 and 9 years respectively (Streatfeild, 2000; Hunter, 
2006). 
Analysis 
The membership characteristics of Medellin-based DTO members have been 
mainly influenced by external variables.  Prohibitionist anti-narcotics policies as 
established by the United States government, for example, helped maintain the 
international price of cocaine at high levels and these prices translated into high profit 
margins.  These high profit margins motivated many established imported goods 
smugglers or emerald exporters to become marijuana or cocaine traffickers in the early to 
mid-1970s. 
In this analysis of Medellin DTO leaders, many of the brief biographies suggest 
that DTO leaders became leaders because of three factors: they learned their trade from a 
mentor or family member, they built international networks, and they used their skills to 
profit from the cocaine trade.  These member characteristics are not unique.  With every 
generation, leaders emerge who learn their trade from veteran traffickers and new 
organizations are created.  In many cases the unknown understudy becomes a leader until 
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he/she retires, is apprehended, or is killed.  In 1987, Pablo Escobar was already aware of 
generational changes within the industry before he became a DTO leader: 
Pablo Escobar: The war of Malboro (smuggled cigarettes) was the… 
 
German Castro Caycedo:The prelude? 
 
Pablo Escobar: Yes that’s it.  The prelude to all the wars that later took place.  I think if we were 
going to remember and do history, you would have to break this (period) in three.  Let’s say that 
until 1973 you have smuggled goods and smugglers.  From 1973, until 1979, the first two 
generations of cocaine traffickers, and from 1980 until now (1987), the last group (of years) is the 
one the gringos apparently refer to as “the cartel”… (Castro, 1996). 
 
The continuous training of traffickers from generation to generation fueled by the 
profitability of the cocaine trade explains the rise of drug traffickers not only in Colombia, 
but also in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
An interesting aspect of the illicit drug industry is that it provided unskilled 
laborers hailing from lower socioeconomic sectors with upward social mobility.  The 
profitability of the international cocaine trade allowed individuals in these sectors to 
bypass the strict class structure and the high-income inequality that has existed in 
Colombia’s economy.  The economic stimulus of the illicit drug industry continually 
feeds the illusions of many underprivileged Colombians who believe that a sicario from a 
poor neighborhood can become rich.  The illusion is fed by the exceptional real-life cases 
in which obscure hit men became millionaires. Whereas Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Gacha both exemplify the illusion of the 1980s, after their deaths, other 
leaders have emerged, like the case of  “Don Berna,” who in the 1990s rose to become a 
leader of the cocaine trade and the subsequent paramilitary organizations of the 2000s 
(Quien Es, 2003).   
 The economic success of this industry was the main driving force that motivated 
unskilled workers to become part of the industry and of DTO organizations.  While 
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skilled/professional workers may have had better opportunities in finding work in legal 
industries, unskilled workers had more limited and less lucrative options.  The economic 
success of the illicit drug industry, versus the low economic status of unskilled workers, 
has distorted any cost-benefit analysis, thus skewing the analysis towards the benefits 
associated with having a job and an above average salary.  In contrast, the costs such as, 
jail time and death, which are often associated with becoming a mule, a hired gunman, or 
a coca farmer, are often ignored.  The motivations to have a well-paid job, coupled with 
lax laws and a weak economy, led many individuals belonging to low socio-economic 
sectors to choose jobs associated with the illicit drug industry.   
In creating an industry, Medellin-based DTOs economically benefited its direct 
membership by creating jobs, and it also benefited spin-off economic sectors in the 
Colombian economy.  However, the major problem with this business has been its illicit 
nature.  Since DTOs trade with an illicit commodity, DTO leaders created conflict for 
Colombian society because they have to protect all organizational divisions from 
authorities and from rivals.  So even though DTOs may provide economic opportunities 
to a variety of social sectors, the illegality of the business creates violence and corruption, 
and weakens democratic institutions, which leads to a greater cost to society because 
problems generated by this industry permeates many social sectors.  The following 
discussion explores the economic resources of Medellin-based DTOs and the use of these 
resources to gain political influence.   
Economic Resources 
Studies on the illicit drug business have had difficulty establishing the exact 
earnings of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia.  Since the business is illegal, 
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there is no certainty on how many kilograms of cocaine were produced each year and 
exactly how much was sold in the international market.  It is also difficult to establish 
exact upstream costs to produce a kilogram of cocaine and exact downstream costs to 
ship a kilogram of cocaine and to launder money.  But some economists have attempted 
to calculate the net earnings from the cocaine industry in the 1980s and 1990s; estimates 
range from as low as $170 million to as high as $5 billion per year (Clawson et al., 1996; 
Thoumi, 1994).  In comparison, in 1994 towards the end of the Medellin DTO’s lifespan, 
the oil industry’s earnings were about $3 billion a year or 5.7 percent of Colombia’s GDP.   
It is estimated that the Medellin-based DTO leaders were billionaires by the mid-
1980s.  Some conservative estimates indicate that Pablo Escobar was worth $3 billion, 
while other estimates such as the one calculated by Forbes magazine in 1989 declared 
that Escobar was the seventh-richest man in the world with an estimated fortune of $25 
billion (Gibbs, 2009).  Rodriguez Gacha’s worth was also estimated in the billions at $1.3 
billion (Lee, 1990).  When PBS’s Frontline asked the Ochoa brothers how much money 
they had made from drug trafficking, Juan David Ochoa said he probably made about $26 
million from drug traffic (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).  Regardless of this 
discrepancy in trafficker earnings, the money fueled support for the businesses that 
became an additional sources of income and employment in Colombia.   
Lehder and Escobar owned newspapers that spread their political propaganda.  
Escobar sponsored a television program on issues that affected the Department of 
Antioquia.  Lehder also bought a bank (El Banco de Caldas) to launder money, which 
was managed by his uncle.  Because security was a prime objective for traffickers, they 
established private security firms with the permission of the Ministry of Justice.  For 
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example, Escobar owned a security firm called Seguridad Nutibara.  The establishment 
of private security firms allowed for unlimited access to personal bodyguards.  Other 
investments included the establishment of two executive airlines by the Ochoas and a 
fleet of fumigation planes owned by Rodriguez Gacha.  Types of businesses established 
to launder money or to invest DTO earnings included hotels, football clubs, bus fleets, 
cycling teams, cattle and horse ranches and businesses that could be used both, legally 
and for the transportation of cocaine, such as a fleet of buses. 
Although the exact earnings of the industry are incalculable, what is known is that 
DTO leaders made millions of dollars. Earnings allowed them to run their operations, 
provide jobs, and influence policy. Their impact on society can be observed by the 
number of economic investments they made in 1980s Colombia with little to no 
governmental or social oversight (Gomez, 1990). Given that hindsight is twenty-twenty, 
it was difficult for authorities of the time to know that the emerging cocaine industry 
would become a long-term institution. However, Colombia’s weak legal system allowed 
DTO leaders to easily obtain permits for airplane and bus fleets and private security 
companies. The ease in which DTO leaders were able to hide their assets through the use 
of “straw owners” also made it difficult for authorities to know exactly who owned the 
companies that applied for permits. The weakness in the legal system may have stemmed 
from having weak money laundering laws, but weaknesses also stemmed from the great 
ability of DTO leaders to use their millionaire assets to bribe public workers and 
politicians.  The use violence and the limited government protection for public workers 
also increased corruption because, in the face of violence, bribes became more attractive 
proposals for workers facing the dilemma of granting or prohibiting public favors to a 
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DTO leader. The intent of this analysis is not to excuse public officials for failing to 
strengthen the legal system or for being unethical; however, given the enormous 
economic resources available to traffickers in the 1980s and 1990s, it was easy for DTO 
leaders to override the very weak legal mechanisms that existed to stop the political 
influence of the cocaine industry.  
Group Cohesion  
Group cohesion is the degree of organizational control and discipline that a group 
when implementing an agenda. Many journalistic accounts narrate events that suggest 
that DTOs had some degree of cohesion because DTO leaders organized business 
meetings, were vocal anti-extradition advocates, and contributed to the same political 
campaigns (Castillo, 1987; Orozco, 1987; Gugliotta et al., 1989; Salazar, 2001; Legarda, 
2005). To assess the degree of cohesion, this section will first discuss the development of 
early DTO associations such as MAS, then it will focus on the economic and political 
cohesion of DTO leaders based in Medellin, and finally the section will examine the 
development and cohesion of Los Extraditables (The Extraditables Ones). Overall, the 
discussion on cohesion will show that the economic and political organizational cohesion 
of DTO leaders was gradual and that it peaked with the formation of the group Los 
Extraditables, which was formed to overturn the 1979 Extradition Treaty.   
Development of Early Trafficking Cooperatives and MAS 
Initially Medellin-based DTOs worked with traffickers throughout Colombia to 
ship drugs to the United States. From the early 1970s until 1988, Cali based traffickers, 
such as the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, had cordial business relations with the Medellin 
organization and worked to reduce risks involved with the traffic of drugs. For example, 
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Colombian trafficking organizations cooperated in laundering money through a bank 
called El Banco de Trabajadores owned by the Rodriguez Orejuelas. Another example of 
cooperation between Cali and Medellin DTOs was their joint investment in Spain’s 
financial sector and the sharing of legal teams to prevent their extradition to the United 
States (Castillo, 1991; Rodriguez, 2007, p. 105-110). DTOs also cooperated in security 
and political matters; for example, on December of 1981 traffickers organized to form the 
group Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS, Death to Kidnappers). Muerte A Sucuestradores 
(MAS) was created in reaction to the November 12th 1981 kidnapping of Martha Nieves 
Ochoa, a sister of the Ochoa brothers who was abducted by the M-19 guerrilla group. 
Whereas MAS’s official71 paramilitary operations ended around 1982 once the Ochoa 
sister had been returned to her family, its economic networks ended around 1988 when 
Medellin and Cali based DTO leaders engaged in a war for the control of the 
international cocaine market. 
The formation of MAS to avenge a kidnapping is evidence of the inability of the 
Colombian state to be able to monopolize the use of force throughout its territory to the 
degree that the state may control the development and activities of violent non-state 
actors like paramilitary groups such as MAS or guerrillas like the M-19. Given that DTO 
leaders were involved in the illegal drug trade, they could not resolve conflicts through 
legal institutions by turning to Colombian authorities for help. The incapacity of the 
Colombian state to provide security allowed non-state actors to arm themselves and 
resolve conflicts through the use of violence.  
                                                        
71 This project defines “official MAS operations” as those anti-kidnapping operations, which MAS 
members publically sought to implement through communiqués and which resulted in the truce between 
MAS and the M-19 guerrilla group. Other killings and paramilitary operations were attributed to MAS after 
1983, but were implemented by other criminal or paramilitary groups. 
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Traffickers have not been the first to use violent conflict resolution, because other 
legal actors throughout Colombia’s conflictive history of civil conflict have used this 
tradition of resolving conflicts.  For most of Colombia’s history, landowners have 
provided for their own security, to protect their lands and families and to combat 
common crime and for protection during periods of civil strife. The period of La 
Violencia during the 1950s was the last major conflict, before the 1980s, where 
landowners armed themselves to resolve rural disputes over land. As traffickers began to 
accumulate wealth from the illicit drug trade they became landowners and bought large 
tracts of land, some of which were located in areas controlled by guerrilla groups.  
Traffickers like other landowning elites, who sought to protect their property and family, 
created Muerte A Secuestradores.  
As a predecessor paramilitary organization, MAS sought to punish guerrillas who 
kidnapped and practiced extortion by collecting “taxes” (popularly known as vacunas) 
from rural landowners. The M-19 and most importantly the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were two guerrilla groups that mainly contributed 
to the political mobilization of traffickers via the formation of paramilitary groups such 
as MAS and later the Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena 
Medio (ACDEGAM). ACDEGAM became the organizational precursor to the group the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, the United Self-Defenses of Colombia), which 
demobilized from 2004-2008. ACDEGAM was composed of cattle ranchers and 
traffickers, like Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, who was one of its founding members and 
who helped create it to combat FARC influence primarily in the Middle Magdalena 
region (Reyes, 1990).   
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Different accounts reveal how MAS formed. Some say that it was the Ochoa 
brothers that invited 20 of Colombia’s major traffickers to their famous restaurant/club 
called Las Margaritas in Medellin (Castillo, 1987), yet other accounts believe the 
meeting was composed of 223 traffickers and held in the city of Cali (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 
287; Gugliotta and Leen, 1989, p.92-93).  Other reports reveal that 100-200 traffickers 
met, but instead, they were invited to Pablo Escobar’s Hacienda Napoles (Salazar, 2001). 
Though the number of traffickers and the location is disputed in all accounts (Castillo, 
1987; Salazar, 2001; Eddy et al., 1988, p. 287, Gugliotta and Leen 1989), all of them 
suggest that this meeting or series of meetings were significant because the illicit drug 
industry’s leadership gathered to pool money for a security apparatus to counter guerrilla 
harassment and discuss business matters. The purpose of MAS, as a loose coalition of 
DTO leaders, was to monitor guerrillas in their regions and alert each other on the actions 
and whereabouts of kidnapped victims. At the time, besides kidnapping the Ochoa sister, 
the M-19 guerrillas had kidnapped the children of another trafficker and attempted to 
kidnap Carlos Lehder. The summit or series of summit allowed some traffickers to meet 
and discuss business matters such as creating insurance companies, making connections 
to finance shipments, renting or sharing routes, offering courier services within the 
United States, designating colors for identifying shipments, and the distribution of the 
U.S. market and their areas of operation in Colombia (Castillo, 1987, p. 114-115; Castillo, 
1991, p. 202-204). It is also probable that the creation of Tranquilandia, an industrial-
sized coca paste-processing lab in the Colombian Amazons, which was owned by a 
cooperative of several traffickers, was also discussed during the MAS meetings (Eddy et 
al., 1988, p. 290-291). In the 1980s between 60% and 80% of the U.S. market was 
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divided between the Medellin and Cali groups; the Medellin DTOs operated mostly in 
Miami and the Cali DTOs mostly in New York (Castillo, 1991, p. 19; Thoumi, 1994, p. 
151). Although this functional division may have occurred prior to the development of 
MAS, the group’s economic networks allowed a loose association of traffickers to 
cooperate not only in business interests, but also in political concerns, such as 
establishing death squads to counter guerrilla harassment. 
Muerte A Secuestradores engaged in a media campaign to denounce guerrillas. Its 
formation showed the ideological differences between these emergent economic groups 
and guerrillas. Although both traffickers and guerrillas often came from similarly 
marginal sectors of society, the trafficker political agenda was capitalist while that of 
guerrillas was communist.  Through the use of airplanes, MAS pamphlets were dispersed 
over soccer stadiums in major Colombian cities to spread their anti-guerrilla sentiment 
(Terrorismo, 1982; Eddy et al., 1988:288). An 11-point communiqué dropped from a 
helicopter into a soccer stadium announced the creation of MAS and its purpose, 
…2. Kidnappings have been carried out both by common criminals and subversive elements, with 
the latter trying to finance their activities by targeting people like us, whose hard-earned money 
has brought progress and employment to this country, and much needed schools, hospitals and 
etc.; 
3. At said meeting, the 223 mafia bosses, representing every region of the country, agreed to 
finance this endeavor through personal contributions of $2 million pesos each [approximately 
$20,000 dollars], which, put together, add up to $446 million pesos [approximately $4.4 million 
dollars]. In our effort to fight the practice of kidnapping, these resources will be used to pay for 
rewards, execution of perpetrators, and equipment… (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 288).    
 
The MAS communiqué was written in a matter-of-fact style and detailed all the money 
and manpower to be used to combat kidnapping and guerrillas.  
It is widely believed that Carlos Lehder was in charge of MAS propaganda (El 
Destape, 1983; Castillo, 1987, p. 113) because another leaflet, which was dispersed and 
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printed in 1982 in the newspaper El Mundo in Medellin, was signed by Lehder and had 
the following message:  
“What I (Carlos Lehder) propose is an anti-kidnapping project, similar to the Peace Commission, 
but it is paramilitary.  That this commission… use two forces: a team of judges and prosecutors; 
and the other force will be tactical and will be made up of the best ex-military and ex-agents, the 
most expert paramilitary civilians, civil defense, foreign mercenaries… A force of two thousand 
men would be sufficient. A force that we Los Secuestrables (the potentially kidnapped ones) 
would help finance, because we prefer to spend our fortunes defending our families and towns 
than have them taken away from us… MAS is a movement… that should be of worry exclusively 
to common kidnappers and subversives ” (Salazar, 2001, p. 84). 
 
Unlike the succinct MAS communiqué, this leaflet was a confused train of though, which 
likens a “peace commission” to a “paramilitary manhunt.” The only similarity between 
the two flyers was that both propose to combat kidnapping with funds and a force of 
about 2000 men (the communiqué mentions a force of 2,230 men (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 
288)). A reason why this second flyer is interesting is because in it its author, Lehder, 
considers himself part of a traditional commercial and landed elite. In an earlier 
paragraph Lehder states:  
“When you kidnap the entrepreneurs and managers, our economy crumbles… In the last ten years 
hundreds of prestigious families have had to leave the country in fear. The industrialists and 
constructors sold and left. And kidnappers shot at me… but miraculously, I escaped” (Salazar, 
2001, p. 83).  
 
The flyer is interesting because in his mind Lehder is not a smuggler but rather an 
entrepreneur and a leader, who proposes that elites –like him– and the government should 
unite to fight kidnapers.  
Soon after the distribution of MAS propaganda, M-19 guerrilla members were 
chained together and placed in front of newspaper buildings with signs that read, “I am 
from the M-19 and I am a kidnapper” (Orozco, 1987; Castillo, 1987).  Other actions 
taken by MAS included kidnapping and killing several M-19 members in the department 
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of Antioquia, and turning M-19 members to the Colombian military. Due to these actions, 
the M-19 returned the kidnapped Ochoa sister and stopped harassing traffickers.  
The creation of MAS also allowed for an increase in economic partnerships. 
Cocaine trafficking in time became a sophisticated business that insured shipments to 
spread-out risks and reduce loses. The level of organizational formation can only occur 
when individuals form associations or cooperatives. Max Mermelstein, a shipment 
receiver for Medellin-based DTOs in Miami, explains in an interview for PBS’s 
Frontline, “We would bring in 400, 450, sometimes 500 kilos on a shipment and if it all 
belonged to one person and we did take a loss, it would be a bad hit. It would hurt” (Cran, 
1997). So to reduce losses, a shipment would bring cocaine from several traffickers to 
spread the risk. Insurance companies for illicit drugs would pay for 100 percent of a 
trafficker’s shipment at Colombian prices if a shipment was confiscated, but if the 
shipment reached its destination the insurance would take a percentage (about 10%) from 
the shipment’s gains (Castillo, 1987, p. 114; Thoumi, 1994, p. 148; Clawon et al., 1996, p. 
38). Many insurance companies were established by seasoned traffickers to make profit 
on the shipments of smaller traffickers who wanted to send cocaine, but did not have 
routes or planes to transport drugs (Clawson et al., 1996). If traffickers needed money to 
send a drug shipment, they could ask a financier to invest some money on the shipment, 
and once the shipment reached its destination the investor would get a large return for 
financing the shipment. This type of financing was popularly known as la apuntada72  
(Thoumi, 1994; Clawson et al., 1996). When cocaine wholesale prices dropped in the 
mid-1980s and traffickers disputed ownership of routes they previously rented or shared, 
                                                        
72 Literally translated as the sign-up, as in “sign me up to send a shipment.” 
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insurers like Escobar or Ochoa became powerful figures because most traffickers had to 
pay them to transport drugs. 
To conclude, the formation of MAS allowed independent trafficking 
organizations to network and establish business and security ties. The benefits of 
associating separate DTOs resulted in the co-ownership of the Tranquilandia lab and the 
sharing of money laundering mechanisms through the First Inter-Americas Bank co-
owned by Jorge Luis Ochoa and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela. Other functional ties, such 
as mutual insurance and the sharing of routes, allowed DTOs all over Colombia to reduce 
risks. Politically, the creation of MAS to counter-balance guerrilla influence led groups 
like the M-19 guerrilla to stop harassing DTO leaders.  
Trafficker networks established through MAS more or less continued to function, 
but they definitely ended on January 13, 1988 when the Cali and Medellin-based DTOs 
fought each other for the ownership of trafficking routes and the U.S. markets. After the 
M-19 and MAS leaders negotiated a truce, the group’s reason for being seized to exist. 
However, political cooperation and economic ties among traffickers based in Cali and 
Medellin continued until January 13, 1988.  At national levels, political cooperation 
among traffickers centered on invalidating the 1979 Treaty on Extradition and on funding 
the political campaigns of anti-extradition candidates. No evidence exists that MAS 
directly coordinated the efforts of Medellin and Cali based groups to invalidate the 
extradition treaty, but traffickers based with both cities influenced the same political 
process.  
The economic ties that were enhanced by MAS leadership meetings continued, 
until economic tensions began to flourish resulting from a decline in the international 
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wholesale price of cocaine in the mid to late 1980s. Price decline occurred because 
Medellin and Cali based DTOs shifted from shipping small quantities of cocaine to 
shipping tons of cocaine in cargos via ships and airplanes. As tons of cocaine was being 
produced and shipped, the cocaine market became saturated, and conseqently caused the 
price of a wholesale kilo to drop from US$60,000 to about US$22,000 dollars (Lee, 
1990:18-19). The decrease in price also reveals that DTOs are not economic cartels, 
because if they were, DTO leaders would have successfully colluded to rig wholesale 
prices so that prices remained high. As the cocaine market became more saturated and 
profits decreased, divisions among traffickers began to develop and the subtle 
cooperation established during MAS trafficker summits dwindled.73   
Wars between drug trafficking organizations were not new events among 
Colombian traffickers. Pablo Escobar’s explanation of why cigarette smugglers in the 
1970s fought each other, is very reminiscent of the late 1980s wars between the Medellin 
and Cali DTOs 
(The Marlboro cigarette war) It started because Don Alfredo would bring in so many trucks, Don 
Alberto would bring in other trucks, and Jaime Cardona would bring in some other trucks.  The 
cigarettes would be placed in the market and because the saturation of product everyday was 
higher, the competition increased, the price would go down and everyone would lose money. So, 
the first bullets started flying. As a consequence, the business started heating up…(Castro, 1996, p. 
289).  
 
The cigarette war led many traffickers who had startled to dabble in the cocaine trade to 
become full-time cocaine traffickers because more money was to be made in the cocaine 
trade as compared to the importation of smuggled cigarettes. Ironically, Pablo Escobar’s 
explanation for the cause of the cigarette war, that market saturation caused “the 
                                                        
73 It should also be mentioned that the explanation mainly offered here is the political-economic version of 
the rupture between Colombian DTOs. Other more sociological reasons for the break-up suggest that the 
disagreements over women and conflicts among lesser dealers (ajuste de cuentas) resulted in the violent 
conflict between Medellin and Cali DTO leaders  (Legarda, 2004, p. 99-101; Chaparro, 2005, p. 212). 
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Marlboro War,” he and other traffickers essentially repeated the very same economic 
missteps with the cocaine market. Cocaine traffickers in the 1980s flooded the market by 
sending cocaine in large shipments, which in turn, eventually led to a drop in the price of 
wholesale cocaine as the drug became more readily available in U.S. markets. Instead of 
dealing with the fact that the cocaine market had saturated, DTO leaders based in 
Medellin and Cali started fighting over market share. Also, in similar fashion, some 
traffickers sought to expand into opium poppy and heroin production, as an alternative to 
the cocaine trade. Because of plummeting wholesale prices, it is believed that Pablo 
Escobar tried to collude prices with Cali based traffickers to attempt to increase profits; 
however, the Rodriguez Orejuelas did not agree that Escobar should become the sole 
leader of the mafia group (Chaparro, 2005, p. 213). Since they did not come to an 
economic agreement, a war between DTOs ensued. 
The economic explanation for the divisions between Medellin and Cali based 
DTO leaders can be easily measured because of the negative change in the price of 
wholesale cocaine as a result of market saturation. Other explanations of the rift between 
the two organizations rely on the personal characteristics of DTO leaders. Most accounts 
suggest that Pablo Escobar was not as tolerant with Cali based DTO leaders, as the Ochoa 
brothers were, mainly because Escobar had a different philosophy on the use of political 
violence than the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, who were the major players among Cali 
DTOs (Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 336-337; Castillo, 1991, p. 27; Giraldo, 2005, p. 44; 
Chaparro, 2005, p. 215). Most information on Medellin and Cali DTOs suggest that the 
Ochoa brothers and the Rodriguez Orejuelas shared a similar philosophy towards politics 
and authorities, which consisted on minimizing the use of violence and maximizing the 
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use of campaign contributions to politicians and bribes to public officials in order to 
benefit their business interests. Evidence of business and personal affinities between the 
Ochoa brothers and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers is their co-ownership of the First 
Inter-America’s Bank, their investments and vacationing in Spain, and their legal 
cooperation (they were simultaneously apprehended in Spain and the U.S. government 
asked for their extradition for drug trafficking). In addition to their joint business ventures, 
the Ochoas and the Rodriguez Orejuelas had the same philosophy on politics and 
violence. They never ran for political office like other Medellin-based DTO leaders did, 
and tried to distance themselves from any use of political violence on government 
officials. The use of violence, by the Ochoas and the Rodriguez Orejuelas, was mostly 
limited to the drug business. The Ochoa brothers did use political violence and formed 
paramilitary groups like MAS, but the violence was applied to non-governmental actors 
like the M-19 guerrillas, when this group kidnapped their sister.   
Escobar’s ambition to dominate the U.S. market and his unilateral and 
incremental use of violence against government officials—starting with the 1983 
assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Colombia’s Minister of Justice—soured relations 
between him and other Colombian DTO leaders. According to journalist Camilo 
Chaparro, while both, Jorge Ochoa and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela were jailed in Spain, 
Pablo Escobar had taken over some of the Rodriguez Orejuelas’ routes, imposed a system 
of taxes onto other traffickers, and charged for the use of routes. Whereas traffickers such 
as Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Carlos Lehder agreed to Escobar’s terms, traffickers 
based in Cali were not pleased with Escobar’s demands and fought him (Chaparro, 
2005:211-212).  
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Philosophical disagreements between Medellin and Cali DTOs over markets and 
the use of violence escalated to such a degree that violent confrontations erupted 
throughout Colombia. The escalation resulted in the January 13th 1988 bombing of the 
apartment building, Edificio Monaco, where Escobar’s family lived. In retaliation, Pablo 
Escobar bombed a chain of pharmacies called Drogas La Rebaja owned by the 
Rodriguez Orejuelas throughout Colombia. The Ochoa brothers and Jose Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Gacha tried to mediate between Escobar and the Rodriguez Orejuelas to no 
avail (Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 337; Castillo, 1991, p. 257; Interviews - Juan David 
Ochoa, 2000; Chaparro, 2005, p. 214), until a truce was finally negotiated during 1990 
and 1991 in preparation for the 1990 elections of assemblypersons to the National 
Constitutional Assembly. Traffickers believed that their biggest concern that year was to 
concentrate resources to obtain a legal ban on the extradition of nationals in the new 
constitution, so DTO leaders in Cali and Medellin negotiated a truce (Castillo, 1991, p. 
253-258; Rodriguez, 2007, p. 201). The eventual death of Pablo Escobar in 1993 put an 
end to the DTO market dispute, for obvious reasons. However, Cali DTO leaders only 
dominated the U.S. cocaine market for two years until 1995, when Colombian authorities 
apprehended them. Their capture led other up-and-coming DTOs, such as the traffickers 
based in the Norte del Valle,74 to emerge and challenge Cali DTO leaders’ control over 
market share (Castillo, 1997; Chaparro, 2005, p. 212). 
In sum, the creation of MAS is politically and economically significant because it 
shows the ability of traffickers to network and emulate business strategies, but its break-
up would provide early clues for the later demise of the loose association of Medellin-
                                                        
74 North of Valley, Valle del Cauca is the department where they operate. 
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based DTOs. External variables such as: the problem of stateness, reflected in the weak 
law enforcement capacity in Colombia and abroad; policymaker indifference to drug 
traffic; and high profit incentives found in cocaine traffic due to prohibitionist economic 
policies, created a favorable environment for an organization like MAS. As an 
organization, MAS was created when major cocaine traffickers were at the peak of their 
wealth, during a period, which could be termed as the “Golden Era of Cocaine Traffic” in 
Colombia. This era started in 1971 when the “Drug War” was officially created in the 
United States, and ended in 1983, when Pablo Escobar was forced to resign from a 
congressional post, at which point Escobar waged a war against Colombian political 
elites. During this era, and specifically in 1981 when MAS was created, most Colombian 
DTO leaders, such as: Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and the Rodriguez Orejuela 
brothers based in Cali, were relatively unknown and worked and lived in Colombia 
without fear of being apprehended by authorities because none had pending 
investigations or charges against them.  
Two major factors that led to the demise of MAS are: the drop in price of 
wholesale cocaine and different philosophies in the use of violence. The drop in 
international prices for cocaine reduced the profit margin for traffickers, which in turn led 
to rivalries between DTO leaders as they scrambled to obtain greater international market 
share. The proposal to unite all cocaine traffickers under Pablo Escobar to collude prices 
was not well received by Cali DTO leaders who wanted to maintain their business 
autonomy. Differing philosophies on the use of violence also led to MAS demise. Pablo 
Escobar’s ruthlessness in the use of political violence gradually distanced him not only 
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from Cali DTO leaders, but also from other traffickers based in Medellin like the Ochoas 
–whom preferred managing a business to waging war against the state.   
The creation of MAS enhanced economic cooperation between fellow DTO 
leaders, and it became an organizational model for coordinating political goals—
primarily for uniting DTO leaders to counteract guerrilla harassment. In the case of MAS, 
its creation supports this study’s Hypothesis 1, which states: 
 Hypothesis 1: Developments in the internal organization of an illicit interest group should follow 
changes to its role within a larger political environment. 
 
MAS formation was influenced by external variables: a high profit margin derived from 
the illegal cocaine traffic, weak law enforcement in Colombia, and the inability of the 
United States to curtail drug traffic.  The high earnings derived from prohibitionist 
economic policies increased the international price of cocaine and allowed Colombian 
traffickers to amass millions of dollars.  The high profit margin, derived from cocaine, 
allowed traffickers to form and finance militias and print propaganda for MAS.   
The formation of MAS also supports Hypothesis 1a, which states: 
Hypothesis 1a: Changes to the internal organization and structure of an illicit interest group should 
be related and deal with the environmental events that influenced the group, and the changes made 
should be collective goods, because they benefit the organization as a whole. 
 
When DTO leaders throughout Colombia decided to create MAS as a counterweight to 
guerrilla harassment, DTO leaders create an organization to mitigate environmental 
issues that affected their newly acquired lands, their lives, and those of their relatives.  
The issue of security became a collective good that the organization wanted to achieve 
for the benefit of its membership.  Through the formation of MAS, DTO leaders sought 
increased security as a collective good that they would enjoy if they employed their 
resources in similar fashion to a “crime watch association,” but which had much deadlier 
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implications. The MAS pamphlets dispersed in soccer stadiums illustrate the resources in 
terms of men and money, which were invested to crackdown on kidnappers and 
subversive groups like the Movimiento-19 de Abril (M-19).   
The creation of MAS also supports this study’s Hypothesis 2, which tests micro 
model.  Hypothesis 2 states:   
Hypothesis 2a: If members of an illicit interest group need to deal with a particular issue.  
Members will work together to solve the issue, and the political achievements obtained by the 
group will benefit all members.   
 
The issue of insecurity led DTO leaders to unite resources to stop guerrillas from 
kidnapping family members and extorting vacunas.  Once MAS united and suppressed 
the M-19 guerrilla who had kidnapped Martha Nieves Ochoa, the M-19 leadership 
returned the Ochoa sister.  Although M-19 submission directly benefited the Ochoa 
brothers, the M-19 submission to and eventual truce with traffickers increased security 
for all traffickers because they would no longer be harassed by the M-19—the political 
objectives of counteracting guerrillas were achieved and benefited all traffickers.   
Hypotheses 2c and 2d, which deal with the demise of a group, explain the 
unraveling of MAS as an economic and political agreement among DTO leaders. The 
demise of MAS supports this study’s Hypothesis 2c, which relates to the leadership of a 
group and its influence on the capacity of a group to impact policy.  Hypothesis 2c states: 
Hypothesis 2c: When a group has no clear leadership or is unable to impact policy, there will be 
little incentive for a group’s leaders to organize and discipline their members.   
 
Since MAS was a loose association of DTO leaders who voluntarily pulled their 
resources together, members were not forced to contribute specific amounts of men, 
money, or weapons.  As a voluntary organization, it did not have a clear leadership or 
rules to enforce cooperation from traffickers.  Consequently, without intra-organizational 
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enforcement mechanisms, MAS can only be considered a moderately cohesive 
organization.  However, after the return of the Ochoa sister, the organization became 
weak and less cohesive.  Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) did not create another political 
goal, DTO leaders became divided on the use of political violence, and even if the 
economic networks that were obtained through MAS continued to exist, the networks 
existed until the international wholesale cocaine prices declined and trafficker rivalries 
erupted in 1988.  Lacking leadership and enforcement mechanisms, once the primary 
objectives of the organization were met, MAS gradually lost cohesion.   
 Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) definitely disbanded when disagreements among 
DTO leaders led to wars among Medellin and Cali based DTOs for the control of 
domestic and international markets.  Hypothesis 2d states: 
Hypothesis 2d: When a group has realized a common goal, in periods of transition, consensus 
among a group’s membership will decrease and the membership will pursue individual goals, 
which may deteriorate the development of a group.   
 
After Colombia’s leading traffickers united through MAS to obtain increased security the 
group gradually disbanded. Events like the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo 
Lara Bonilla exacerbated differences among traffickers and startled those that would have 
preferred to avoid the use violence to influence the political system.  Although MAS 
increased economic networks among cocaine traffickers, after accomplishing the goal of 
suppressing the activities of subversive groups like the M-19, economic cooperation 
dwindled.  Gradually the economic cooperation deteriorated because increased cocaine 
production saturated U.S. cocaine markets and resulted in a decrease in wholesale 
cocaine prices.  Once the objective of counteracting guerrillas like the M-19 was 
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achieved, traffickers concentrated on managing their own businesses and on increasing 
their profit margins.   
The following discussion on the economic and political cohesion of Medellin-
based traffickers will show that the creation of the group Los Extraditables, to ban the 
extradition of nationals to the United States, corrected MAS’ weaknesses.   
Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 
Medellin-based DTO leaders actively participated in MAS as a national 
organization that enhanced economic networks among traffickers and operated as a 
paramilitary organization to stop guerrilla harassment.  Whereas MAS operated 
politically between the years 1981 to 1982, individual DTO leaders engaged in 
mainstream political pursuits especially during the years 1981-1983.  The following 
section on economic and political cohesion will explain how individual DTOs influence 
mainstream politics and why the group Los Extraditables emerged.   
Economic Cohesion 
The economic cohesion of individual DTOs based in Medellin not only allowed 
DTOs to function as profit making organizations, but also allowed DTO leaders to 
become economically influential actors in politics.  The discussion will analyze the 
cohesion of DTOs as profit making businesses. 
As business entities designed to make profit, the different Medellin DTOs had at 
least six main divisions.  It was possible for one organization to take care of all the levels 
of the process, but based on trafficker accounts, the beginning of cocaine trade in 
Colombia involved a high degree of specialization where different organizations 
specialized only in one aspect of the business.  When Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and 
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Rodriguez Gacha started in the drug trade each participant would specialize in one aspect 
of the business, but as these entrepreneurs became wealthy they created organizations 
that encompassed all levels of the business.  On the basis of the criminal diagrams of 
Medellin DTOs (Castillo, 1987) and economic studies like that of Francisco Thoumi’s 
(Thoumi, 1994, p. 140-150), all-encompassing organizations like that of Pablo Escobar 
occasionally outsourced stages of production from smaller more specialized 
organizations.  Thoumi suggests that because traffickers needed to avoid authorities, the 
need for secrecy was a major factor that created business specialization.  For major 
traffickers, it was convenient to have different divisions be unaware of the rest of the 
business.  As such, if authorities discovered one part of the business, the other parts 
would not be affected.  Juan David Ochoa in an interview granted to PBS’s Frontline not 
only confirmed Thoumi’s belief, but also illustrated why Colombian DTOs were not 
economic cartels.  According to Juan David Ochoa three major methods existed to send a 
shipment.  The first method involved subcontracting the upstream aspect of the business.  
So once the processed cocaine was bought, the trafficker would only pay for the 
downstream aspect of the business—the shipment and selling of wholesale cocaine.  The 
second method consisted of outsourcing all of the stages, so the shipment would simply 
be an investment for the trafficker.  The third method avoided subcontracting, so the 
trafficker through his/her full service DTO paid for all costs involved in producing 
processed cocaine and in shipping the wholesale product: 
 I had several ways of doing this.  One was to buy the cocaine and to send it the way I explained, 
and my partner would sell it there.  The other way would be to have your own lab where you 
would process it.  You'd have your own way of transporting it, a plane or a boat or something like 
that.  You send it at your own cost.  Another way, you'd end up having to subcontract with other 
people to do the different stages, like processing, transport, and the transfer of sales to the person 
that you had contracted in the United States.  (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).   
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The statement implies that various organizations were involved in the production of 
wholesale cocaine, which confirms that experienced DTOs like that of Escobar, the 
Ochoa brothers, or Rodriguez Gacha could not control the supply cocaine like an 
economic cartel would.  In fact, if DTOs could not outsource certain aspects of the 
business it would be hard for them to stay in business, in the event that authorities were 
successful in confiscating their own downstream and/or upstream business divisions.  
Since DTOs needed flexibility to stay one step ahead of authorities, contingency plans 
and the use of subcontractors were ways to keep the business “on the move.”  A case in 
point was the seizure and destruction of the processing lab Tranquilandia in 1984.  The 
lab was a cooperative owned by several traffickers75 in the early 1980s.  When authorities 
took over, those same traffickers that lost their investment recovered loses by processing 
cocaine in other labs or buying processed cocaine from third parties and shipping it to 
salvage loses: 
Jorge Ochoa: A lot of people were part owners (of Tranquilandia).  Lots of people worked 
there… Everybody who wanted to buy a kilo or who had a kilo or who wanted to bring it from 
Bolivia, or from Ecuador--they would bring it to Tranquilandia and process it there.  .  .  .  But it 
wasn't like Tranquilandia had an owner.  Everybody who wanted something would have access to 
this supermarket.  So Tranquilandia was a sort of .  .  .  a cooperative among several people… 
 
Frontline: The DEA and the Colombian police had never seen such a laboratory.  How big of a 
blow was its loss to the cocaine business? Jorge Ochoa: I don't think it affected the traffic much.  
There were many other labs all over the country, in many places.  .  .  .  (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 
2000). 
  
Juan David Ochoa: The initial owner of Tranquilandia was Gonzalo Rodriguez [Gacha], the 
Mexican.  We had a part in that lab.  It was very important because it was a bridge between 
Bolivia, Peru and Colombia.  You could very easily process the cocaine there, because it was in 
the middle of a jungle where it was very difficult to go.  There was no other way to go but by 
plane… (Tranquilandia) became very popular, very well known, and so there came a moment 
when authorities destroyed it.  They confiscated it.  It was well known that it existed, that it was a 
very large lab through which a lot of coca paste entered.  You didn't just process coca there.  It 
                                                        
75 Tranquilandia is popularly known as having a single owner—Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, however, 
trafficker interviews like those conducted by Frontline reveal that Tranquilandia was actually a cooperative 
where several traffickers were part owners of this large-scale cocaine refinery.   
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was also a bridge for other coca that was processed in other labs; because the airstrip was very 
large and very good for the airplanes .  .  .  (After the destruction of Tranquilandia) Each of us on 
our own kept doing our own thing.  We never did anything together as a society again… to set 
something like this up, in the middle of the jungle, is incredibly expensive.  We might have lost 
around $5 million or $10 million, something like that...  But there were laboratories all over the 
place.  There were a lot of people who could sell the cocaine that was ready.  So we stopped 
processing the cocaine directly, and we had to buy the cocaine through third parties that were 
producing .  .  .  (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000). 
 
Although traffickers like the Ochoa brothers claim that there was no “official” 
association of traffickers, a good level of coordination by a group of traffickers had to 
exist to organize a shipment and to form networks that would “spread the word” around 
about business needs such as: shipment financing, getting raw material, information on 
authority operations, and especially about international routes, among other needs.  
According to the Ochoa brothers, “there was no group or association that was ‘the cartel 
of Medellin’… There were groups of people that were friends of course, but…  it wasn't 
an association or anything like that (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).” Business 
ventures like Tranquilandia were called a cooperative by Jorge Ochoa  (Interviews - 
Jorge Ochoa, 2000), but regardless the name chosen for DTO coordination, the comments 
by the Ochoa brothers on the illicit drug business suggests that DTO leaders had to have 
good networks of communication with other DTO leaders to help each other on business 
matters.   
“Full service” DTOs like those headed by Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa Brothers, and 
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha had six divisions of which 4 were business related and 2 
divisions dealt with politics.  The first division of a DTO was in charge of getting the raw 
material for making cocaine.  The second division refined the coca paste to cocaine.  The 
third division packed and transported the cocaine to the United States and Europe.  The 
fourth division of the business picked up the wholesale shipment and sold it to U.S. 
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retailers, and then returned the money directly to Colombian traffickers via airplanes or 
via international money laundering mechanisms.  The fifth division of the business dealt 
with security issues.  Finally, the sixth division was the legal and administrative division.   
Individual “full service” DTOs had to be cohesive enough to coordinate all the 
divisions of labor, but, again, in the event that authorities caught one or some of their 
divisions, DTO leaders could still have the flexibility to outsource a service.  The only 
divisions that were difficult to outsource were the security and the legal/administrative 
divisions.  These divisions required very loyal personnel due to the violent activities 
security providers had to engage in.  Loyalty was highly valued in the 
legal/administrative division because of the legal and economic importance of the 
information handled by the staff.   
When the cocaine business started, traffickers motivated by the opportunity to 
make an enormous profit tried to create economically cohesive organizations for 
exporting cocaine.  However, the different divisions of the illicit drug business had a 
logical orientation towards producing cocaine and collecting profit, but economically 
speaking this was a hard business to coordinate in a true cohesive manner because its 
illegal nature kept the business constantly moving and the profit margins constantly 
changed.  According to Francisco Thoumi, the drug business was unable to set profit 
margins or to market its drugs, through the creation of brands, to target key customers 
like legal businesses, because the business’s illegality kept the divisions ready for 
constant change.  The need to keep ahead of authorities was more important than creating 
marketing strategies, so DTOs were cohesive enough to make profit and ‘keep on the 
move,’ but had low marketing cohesion.  Compared to legal businesses, which could last 
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hundreds of years, the economic cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs only lasted at most 
10 years, without major disruptions to their trade.   
Economic organizational control can exist though discipline and selective 
incentives.  In a business organization the overall incentive is to make profit.  Former 
DTO employees interviewed for this project readily mentioned that profit was the major 
incentive for working in a DTO.  Members of a DTO, from the coca farmer to the mafia 
boss, were driven by economic incentives.  The desire to make money made the 
organization work.  For example, if a raspachin was contracted to work for 3 to 4 months 
planting and scraping coca leaves in a remote location, he expected that at the end of the 
job he would get paid.  The expectation of payment by all DTO employees drove their 
labor, so payment was a positive material incentive, especially when employees were 
paid higher than average wages for similar work in legal sectors. 
However, if one of the divisions did not work as it was intended in this illicit 
industry, negative selective incentives such as, intimidation and violence forced the 
system to work.  The reason familial, friendship, neighborhood, or community ties, were 
important qualifications for workers involved in this industry was because such ties were 
a basis of interpersonal trust, which were built on a system of reciprocity.  If the workers 
knew each other it was believed that they would not betray each other.  The logic in this 
relationship was that individuals in this labor force could be trusted to do their jobs, 
primarly because several people vouched for an individual’s behavior.  If an individual 
did not follow through, he/she would be punished, but since the DTO knew who the 
individual’s family was and where said family it lives, violent reprisals could also affect 
the individual’s family members and this threat theoretically kept the individual in check.   
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Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) insured economic cohesion through the 
use of intimidation, but the use of violence if not used cautiously could disturb business 
and draw the attention of authorities.  For this reason, if a DTO wanted to earn profit, it 
was in their economic benefit to cooperate, keep violence at a minimum, and to keep a 
low profile to avoid authorities.  Inter-personal trust was important because if all actors 
wanted to forge long lasting working relationships in the future, they created reciprocal 
working relationships of trust among employees.  Trust reduced the transaction costs of 
looking for new personnel every time a crop needs harvesting or of looking for new 
buyers when for example coca paste dealers want to sell products.  If a coca paste dealer 
did not pay his farmers, he/she would most likely forgo future earnings because farmers 
would not work for someone who steals wages.  If farmers failed to produce output, they 
would not be contracted in the future.  If a cocaine refiner did not pay paste dealers, aside 
from using violence to resolve the impasse, the paste dealers in all probability would not 
use that refiner in the future.   
Throughout the different stages of cocaine production armed personnel supervised 
transactions between the different divisions within a DTO to prevent divisions from 
cheating, since large amounts of money were involved.  As the cocaine business was not 
legal, courts did not resolve business disputes and conflicts were resolved through 
violence.  Again, the weakness in the Colombian government’s law enforcement 
capabilities allowed DTOs to use violence on a regular basis without fear of government 
persecution. Although a high level of intimidation has existed in the drug trade, it is in the 
economic benefit of all actors involved that transactions run smoothly so that authorities 
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are kept at bay and more durable as well as reliable trade relations among divisions can 
be achieved.  
In sum, the discussion on economic cohesion found that DTO leaders created for-
profit organizations that were flexible and well prepared for change.  A DTO’s ability to 
master different methods for exporting cocaine allows trafficking organizations to: avoid 
authorities, and recover loses in case authorities do happen to confiscate or discover a 
division in the trade network.  Also the flexibility of DTOs to outsource the different 
divisions of cocaine production shows: that a high degree of specialization exists, that 
many organizations are involved in the business, that these organizations communicate, 
and that it is difficult for one DTO to control other organizations.  The need of a DTO to 
be flexible by outsourcing production to avoid authorities counters the idea that DTOs are 
economic cartels that can control the supply of drugs.  Finally, the need for DTOs to 
constantly change to keep ahead of authorities leads to short-lived businesses, because 
these organizations cannot plan for constant profit margins or marketing strategies that 
could extend the business’s lifespan.  Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) can only 
hope to avoid authorities to continue profiting from the cocaine trade.   
Second, the discussion found that even though DTO employees are driven by 
profits, interpersonal trust and violence are tools that ensure discipline and organizational 
cohesion.  Employees are motivated to do their jobs in a DTO because they enjoy the 
material economic benefit from working in a DTO, more so than expressive or solidary 
benefits.  Though workers may know each other because of familial ties, illicit drug 
industry employees do not join a DTO to enjoy the expressive benefit of feeling 
satisfaction from refining cocaine.  But overall, interviews conducted with former DTO 
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employees sustain that money is the main incentive that drives the drug trafficking 
machinery.  Most members of a DTO do not join to receive solidary benefits, where they 
feel satisfied because they are forming relationships with other members of the group.  
Gang members living in marginal neighborhoods, who work as sicarios or bodyguards, 
are the most likely among DTO employees to receive solidary benefits from belonging to 
a gang because they feel part of a community.  Otherwise, DTO profits motivate 
individuals to join a group.   
Finally, this section on economic cohesion argues that interpersonal trust and the 
use of violence are necessary to ensure discipline and organizational cohesion.  
Employing family and friends in a DTO reduces the risk that employees will betray an 
organization by turning to authorities.  The employment of family and friends can also be 
used as a way to coerce a person into following orders, since a DTO employee knows 
that if they make a mistake his/her family is at risk.  Interpersonal trust reduces the need 
to use violence and ensures longer future relationships with employees and different 
DTOs.  Finally, if the desire to make profit and interpersonal trust fails to motivate a 
DTO employee to follow DTO rules, the use of violence functions as a coercive method 
to ensure discipline and group cohesion.   
Political Cohesion 
As business organizations, the ideological objective of individual Medellin-based 
DTOs was primarily capitalist—to make profit and reduce risks.  However, during the 
1980s traffickers like Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Gacha, and other traffickers associated with Medellin trafficking networks 
also had direct and indirect political ambitions.  The DTO leaders became interested in 
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politics because as they became extraordinarily wealthy they also desired to become 
political elites.  At first Medellin-based DTO leaders pursued individual political projects, 
but as time progressed the separate political projects converged and became focused on 
overturning the 1979 Treaty on Extradition.  The political cohesion of Medellin-based 
DTOs can be divided into three major periods.  The first period dates from the 1981 to 
1983 and it is marked by the direct participation of DTO leaders in electoral politics.  
During this period the political goals of traffickers differed in agenda and strategy, so it is 
a period with limited political cohesion.  The second period dates October 20th 1983, to 
June of 1991.  In this period Medellin-based DTO leaders increasingly unified their 
political agenda to nullify the Extradition Treaty.  DTO leaders continued to influence 
electoral politics, but indirectly, through their sponsorship of anti-extradition candidates.  
Overall during this second period, the strategy of Medellin-based DTOs increasingly 
became violent and the creation of the terrorist group Los Extraditables in late 1984 best 
expresses the increased degree of cohesion among most DTO leaders.  Finally, the period 
from 1991-1993 marks the organizational disintegration of Los Extraditables.  This final 
period was paradoxical, since DTO leaders reveled in the 1991 constitutional ban on 
extradition, but simultaneously the organizational cohesion of Medellin-based DTO 
leaders dwindled.  The following discussion details how the political cohesion of 
Medellin-based traffickers evolved as their need to overturn the 1979 U.S.-Colombian 
Treaty of Extradition increased.    
Political Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 1981-1983 
At the same time that Medellin-based DTO leaders were involved in the creation 
of paramilitary groups, like MAS to counterbalance the power of guerrillas, many DTO 
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leaders were participating in Colombia’s electoral process.  One could claim that 
Medellin-based DTO leaders were involved in electoral politics before 1981, however, 
most journalistic records only report the political involvement of Medellin DTO leaders 
from 1981 onward.  In preparation for the 1982 electoral year, traffickers based in 
Medellin began sponsoring politicians and in some cases launching their personal 
political campaigns.  Even though individual traffickers were active participants in 
elections, DTO leaders did not unite their political agendas nor focus solely on 
overturning the 1979 Extradition Treaty.  One concludes that each DTO leader had 
separate political objectives, although some political campaigns had similarities in 
agenda issues.   
Pablo Escobar’s strategy for the 1982 elections was to sponsor a few powerful 
local and national level candidates and to run for office.  His objective was to run as an 
alternate for a congressional seat headed by Jairo Ortega Ramirez while he also 
sponsored the senatorial candidacy of Alberto Santofimio Botero, who was already a 
major leader within the Liberal Party.  Escobar’s agenda was populist and vague, 
exemplified by a proposal to sponsor sports.  In 1982 Pablo Escobar succeeded in 
obtaining the votes for his candidates and became an elected congressional alternate, but 
his political career ended on October 20th 1983 when his congressional immunity was 
removed because he was accused of being a drug trafficker.  After this fiasco, Pablo 
Escobar’s strategy became focused on overturning the 1979 Extradition Treaty by waging 
a war against political elites.   
Carlos Lehder’s electoral strategy was similar to Pablo Escobar’s because he was 
public about his political aspirations.  Lehder sponsored politicians for the 1982 general 
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elections and for the 1984 local elections in the Department of Quindío.  For the 1982 
elections, Lehder, Escobar, Rodriguez Gacha, and the Ochoa brothers contributed funds 
to the campaigns of the presidential candidates representing the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and Belisario Betancur, respectively.  In contrast to 
Pablo Escobar’s vague campaign agenda, Carlos Lehder’s was very vocal about opposing 
the extradition of nationals.  In 1983 Lehder openly admitted in television and radio 
interviews that his wealth came from illicit businesses.  Later, during the 1986 general 
elections, Lehder continued to sponsor politicians and even ran for a congressional post, 
until he was arrested and extradited on February of that year.    
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha’s participation in electoral politics concentrated in 
sponsoring politicians with anti-extradition and anti-insurgent agendas, who were based 
in Colombian’s Magdalena Medio region.  Rodriguez Gacha was also outspoken against 
politicians who favored extradition and later in 1986 Gacha admitted his wealth came 
from drug trafficking while being interviewed for a television show with journalist 
German Castro Caycedo (Castillo, 1987, p. 89). 
The Ochoa brothers, Jorge, Juan David, and Fabio, were very discreet about their 
political activities.  According to George Jung, who was Carlos Lehder’s business 
associate, the Ochoa’s were important within trafficking circles because they knew many 
politicians (Streatfield, 2001).  During the Liberal Party Convention of 1982 it is widely 
reported that the Ochoa brothers, along with rest of the Medellin-based DTO leaders, met 
the Liberal presidential candidate, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, and bought raffle tickets to 
sponsor the candidacy (Salazar, 2001, p. 95; Lopez et al., 2001, p. 142). 
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On the basis of early electoral participation of the Medellin DTO leaders 
examined here, the early involvement of DTO leaders in electoral politics had little 
organizational cohesion.  The different DTO leaders had their own political agendas and 
sponsored politicians in their geographical areas of influence.  The only event during this 
period in which the participation of Medellin DTO leaders overlaps is in their 
sponsorship of the 1982 Lopez Michelsen and Belisario Betancur presidential campaigns.  
Before October 20th 1983, the date in which Pablo Escobar is forced to resign from his 
congressional post, most DTO leaders (with the exception of Carlos Lehder) hardly 
mention their opposition to the 1979 Treaty on Extradition.  It is only after Escobar is 
criminally investigated and the Congress lifts his congressional immunity that traffickers 
begin to publicly admit their involvement in the illicit drug industry, admit their 
opposition to extradition, and become more cohesive in sponsoring anti-extradition 
politicians.  From 1983 to 1991 DTO leaders located in Medellin would continue to use 
the electoral process as way to influence policy. However, instead of running direct 
personal campaigns, traffickers would fund the campaigns of politicians that would run 
with an anti-extradition platform.  The following section on representativeness will 
further discuss the electoral influence of Medellin-based DTO leaders. 
Political Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 1983-1991 
From 1983 to 1991 the organizational cohesion of DTO leaders increased.  
Traffickers used a combination of three major strategies to influence policymakers.  The 
first consisted of disputing the validity of the 1979 Treaty on Extradition through the 
judicial process.  The second strategy was a legislative strategy that consisted of 
sponsoring anti-extradition politicians to congress and the National Constitutional 
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Assembly (NCA).  Finally, the third and most dominant strategy consisted of resorting to 
violence as a way to coerce policymakers into overturning the extradition treaty and 
negotiating a legalization of their criminal status.  To accomplish this last strategy, 
leaders of Medellin-based DTOs created the group Los Extraditables.   
Judicial Strategy 
The first strategy pursued by Medellin-based DTO leaders was to block the 
implementation of the 1979 Treaty on Extradition by questioning its constitutional 
validity.  Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) leaders hired legal teams headed by 
Guido Parra and Humberto Buitrago for this purpose (Interviews – Juan David Ochoa, 
2000; Legarda, 2005, p. 79).  On July of 1985, a lawyer Javier Hernando Hernandez filed 
a suit questioning the constitutional validity of Law 27th of 1980, which integrated the 
1979 Extradition Treaty into Colombia’s legal code.  However, legal proceedings were 
interrupted because on November 6th 1985, the leftist M-19 guerrilla attacked the Palace 
of Justice, where Colombia’s Supreme Court was housed.  Eleven justices were killed as 
a result of the initial M-19 attack and the ensuing battle between guerrillas and the 
military.  After the debacle, Colombia’s Supreme Court proceedings were stunted for a 
year, since it was difficult to replace the Court’s 24 justices.  Moreover, many qualified 
judges and lawyers felt intimidated by the rise in violence and did not want to risk their 
lives and those of their families76 (Lee, 1990, p. 121-126).  In addition to the 1985 M-19 
attack, judges investigating trafficking related cases were threatened or assassinated.  All 
                                                        
76 During the period 1984 to 1986 several assassinations were geared at judges to intimidate the legal 
community.  Among the assassinated judges are: Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil on July 1985, Penal 
Customs Judge Carmencita Londoño Rojas on May 1986, the assassination of Hernán Baquero Borda, an 
Colombian Supreme Court Justice on July 1986, and Superior Court Judge Gustavo Zuluaga Bernal on 
October 1986 (Lee, 1990; Castillo, 1991; Escobar: Escobar: 17 años, 1993). 
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of these events played in to the hands of DTO leaders because the implementation of the 
Treaty on Extradition was blocked.   
By December of 1986, 24 new justices were selected and they had to oversee the 
year and a half old judicial case that questioned the constitutionality of the 1979 
Extradition Treaty between Colombia and the United States.  The Supreme Court of 
Colombia ruled that the Treaty was invalid because then President Julio Cesar Turbay 
Ayala, as Chief of Government and the ultimate authority regarding international matters, 
did not sign the treaty himself (Kavass, 1990, p. 158-162).  Instead, his Minister of 
Government, German Zea Hernandez, signed the Treaty into law as Law 27 of 1980.  
Consequently, the court ruled that Minister of Government German Zea Hernandez did 
not have the necessary international jurisdiction because this role was solely assigned to 
the President, so on the basis of the technicality, the 1979 Treaty on Extradition was 
invalidated on December 12th 1986.  
The DTO legal victory was spoiled when President Virgilio Barco, who had 
originally negotiated the Extradition Treaty with the United States as part of the Turbay 
Ayala administration, issued Decree Law 68 of 1986 on December 14th 1986 in order to 
continue extraditing drug traffickers to the United States.  Again, the Colombian Supreme 
Court had to decide the constitutional validity of the decree, and it took half a year for the 
court to make a decision.  In the meantime, Carlos Lehder was the only trafficker 
extradited through Decree Law 68 on February 4th 1987, the same day that he was 
captured by Colombian authorities.   
Once the Supreme Court was ready to decide on the validity of Decree Law 68 of 
1986, the justices were tied 12 to 12 and had to appoint a special justice to break the tie.  
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Once again, because of the high level of fear among the legal community, as a result of 
the ongoing assassination of judges, eligible judges did not want to serve as justices, so 
the first three individuals nominated for the interview process declined the nomination.  
Finally, a fourth nominee, Alfonso Suarez de Castro, accepted to serve as a special justice 
and broke the tie (Kavass, 1990, p. 162).  On June 25th 1987, the Supreme Court 
determined that even though the 1979 Extradition Treaty was still internationally viable, 
President Virgilio Barco had no ability to launch a decree based on the fact that no 
existing domestic law could allow him to implement extraditions.  If President Barco 
wanted to implement the Treaty he would have to start legislation through Colombian 
legislature and have it approved as a law.  Since it was believed that members of the 
legislature were not going to approve passing a law permitting the extradition of nationals, 
the Colombian presidency was unable to extradite drug traffickers to the United States 
from 1987 to 1989.77   
The judicial strategy was a victory for the Medellin-based DTOs because their 
intimidation of judges coupled with the proficiency of their legal experts enabled DTO 
leaders to invalidate an international treaty that threatened their safe heaven in Colombia.   
Legislative Strategy 
The second strategy used during 1983-1991 by Medellin-based DTO leaders 
involved participating in Colombia’s legislative process primarily as political campaign 
financiers.  After 1983 the issue of extradition became the central issue in the political 
agenda of Medellin-based DTO leaders and as a result they tried to influence politicians 
                                                        
77 In 1989 President Barco extradited four traffickers via decree law (Matthiesen, 2000, p. 221).  
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on two major policy options: to permanently overturn extradition and to agree to 
favorable terms of surrender.   
The DTO support for anti-extradition candidates after 1983 was given in secret, 
because of the public outrage against DTOs and as a consequence of their suspected 
involvement in the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla.  The 
secrecy made it difficult to link drug traffickers directly to politicians.  Also, since 
Medellin-based DTO leaders were never arrested or criminally processed for financing 
political campaigns, evidence of how much money was donated or which candidates 
received DTO support is weak.  The only record that exists on these campaign donations 
relies on the declarations made by close associates of Medellin-based DTO leaders, 
journalist investigations on the link between politicians and traffickers, and allegations 
made by U.S. government counter-narcotics officials (Yo acuso, 1994).   
It is necessary to make a caveat regarding the issue of extradition and also 
regarding whether a person/politician opposed the extradition of Colombians during this 
time period.  Having an anti-extradition stance did not mean being pro-Drug Trafficking 
Organization (DTO).  A politician or an individual could oppose the use of extradition on 
the desire to uphold Colombia’s sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States and still be 
opposed to the existence of drug trafficking organizations.  Many Colombians especially 
in the period between 1988-1991 were exhausted with the upsurge in overall violence, as 
a direct consequence of DTO opposition to the U.S.- Colombia 1979 Extradition Treaty 
and inter-DTO wars.  Instead of conceding to U.S. foreign policy demands, many 
Colombians believed that a domestic solution could be created primarily to solve the 
problem of violence by prohibiting extradition and jailing traffickers in Colombian 
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prisons.  Because of this nationalistic reasoning, it is impossible to say that all politicians 
who opposed extradition were DTO representatives and were being directly financed by 
DTOs.  The latter point was especially true when hard evidence showing DTO electoral 
influence was weak since the governments of the time headed by Virgilio Barco and 
Cesar Gaviria did not open up thorough official investigations on the corruption 
allegations being raised by journalists and U.S. officials (Castillo, 1991; Morales, 1990; 
Yo Acuso, 1994).  Regardless of whether DTOs funded the campaigns of some or all 
anti-extradition politicians of the time, DTOs benefited from the support of anti-
extradition nationalist politicians because these politicians furthered the DTO’s cause by 
placing the debate on the national stage. 
Medellin-based DTO legislative influence was made evident by two attempts to 
nullify the extradition policy.  The first attempt consisted of changing a 1989 legislative 
amnesty granted to left-wing guerrillas so that it would simultaneously benefit traffickers.  
The second attempt was done either through direct money donations or by financing the 
political campaigns of anti-extradition assemblypersons participating at the 1990 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).  These assemblypersons would be in charge of 
drafting the new 1991 constitution and DTO leaders wanted their representatives to 
permanently ban the extradition of Colombian nationals.   
The first attempt to abolish the 1979 Extradition Treaty was done during the 
1988-89 legislative year in an attempt to pass the 1988 Constitutional Reform.  The 
Colombian government was in the midst of attempting to demobilize leftist guerrillas by 
integrating them into democratic politics and for the purpose demobilizing leftist guerilas 
congresspersons created a legislative amnesty.  At that time the President of the House of 
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Representatives, Norberto Morales Ballesteros (Morales, 1990) and other representatives 
created a bill on November of 1989, which would change said political amnesty so that it 
would extend amnesty to traffickers.  The proposed bill changes would allow traffickers 
to negotiate as political actors without fear of being extradited (Castillo, 1991, p. 273; 
Salazar, 2001, p. 263-264).  These congresspersons proposed a referendum on extradition 
and an inclusion of more crimes in the political amnesty so that the amnesty would 
therefore apply to traffickers. 
Liberal politician, Horacio Serpa, during a speech on the issue of extradition, 
accused the 1988-89 legislature of being bribed and politically compromised: 
And when bribes (have not worked), it has been the terrible power of crime, the assassinations: 
Rodrigo Lara, Luis Carlos Galan, and now Low Murtha.  It is evident that there are no guarantees 
and that the push to modify this (extradition) law is evident by the pressures that exist and by the 
strange environment, which surrounds the Assembly… (Frenada la extradición, 1991).     
 
Serpa’s declarations were corroborated by testimony given by John Jairo Velasquez 
Vasquez, Pablo Escobar’s gunman and state witness against ex-Senator Alberto 
Santofimio Botero during the Luis Carlos Galan murder case.  According to Velasquez 
Vasquez, Santofimio Botero was the Medellin-based DTO leaders’ congressional point 
man during 1988-1989.  The ex-Senator was in charge of giving money to 
congresspersons and to constitutional assemblypersons, so that they would legally 
prohibit the extradition of nationals during the late 1980s (Legarda, 2005, p. 239).   
The organizational cohesion of Medellin DTO leaders was high as they attempted 
to influence the 1988-89 Congress into negotiating favorable terms for their surrender.  
However, the group’s high level of cohesion failed to provide an amnesty for traffickers, 
because pro-extradition congresspersons and the Government Minister Carlos Lemos 
Simmonds rejected the proposed legislation.  No institution exists in a vacuum and the 
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legislature was influenced by the high political violence affecting Colombian cities 
during the years 1988 and 1989.  Although political violence usually intimidated many 
pro-extradition legislators, the public assassination of Presidential Candidate Luis Carlos 
Galan on August 18th 1989 was still in the country’s memory and an outraged public 
opinion emboldened pro-extradition legislators against Drug Trafficking Organizations 
(DTOs).  The legislature’s negative vote against Norberto Morales Ballestero’s DTO 
Amnesty bill was a vote of protest against DTO violence.  Even though newspaper 
editorials reflected the public outrage with Morales Ballestero’s bill (Morales, 1990), no 
in-depth government investigation was pursued by President Virgilio Barco’s 
administration to find out whether DTO leaders bribed congresspersons.   
The second attempt at changing the policy on extradition through the use of 
legislative mechanisms took place at the 1990 National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).  
Once the NCA members were elected, ex-Senator Alberto Santofimio Botero reportedly 
distributed amounts ranging from  $50,000 to $100,000 dollars to 27 assemblypersons 
(Legarda, 2005, p. 239).  The pressure of the illicit drug business lobby was significant in 
the NCA because in addition to Medellin-based DTOs, many other traffickers especially 
those linked to the Cali based DTOs financed the NCA campaigns of assemblypersons so 
that they would raise the extradition issue at the NCA and subsequently pass a 
constitutional article abolishing extradition (Castillo, 1991).  In exchange for trafficker 
funds, assemblypersons argued to overturn the 1979 Treaty on Extradition in their 
respective NCA committees.  They did so by appealing to the nationalist sentiment of 
assemblypersons and appealing to Colombia’s public opinion.   
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Again, it is not possible to known with certainty whether all NCA 
assemblypersons that argued against extradition received DTO funds because President 
Cesar Gaviria’s government did not investigate the allegations made by journalist, pro-
extradition politicians, and U.S. government counter-narcotics officials.  Also, nationalist 
arguments against the use of extradition were valid in the sense that anti-extradition 
assemblypersons were attempting to uphold Colombia’s sovereignty.  Many 
assemblypersons like Fabio Villa and Oscar Hoyos for the Democratic Alliance M-19, or 
like Francisco Rojas Birry, the representative for indigenous peoples, believed that 
extradition was an imposition made against Colombian sovereignty by the United States’ 
government (Torres, 1991),  
Francisco Rojas Birry: “No country should renounce its sovereignty, this entails the execution of 
its own laws and permitting that its citizens not be judged by foreigners” (La no extradición, 1991) 
 
Characteristically, anti-extradition assemblypersons argued for the passage of an article 
to permanently overturn extradition based on three reasons: The first was that it was the 
right of a sovereign nation to ban the extradition of nationals.  The second reason was 
that such a constitutional article would be a positive step for reducing Colombia’s 
institutional system since the policy of extradition had had negative effects such as the 
increase in violence (Torres, 1991).  The final and third argument was that extradition 
would violate human rights because the hundred year prison sentences78 that existed in 
the United States would make it impossible for a person to become re-adjusted to normal 
society after being imprisoned for so long, even if they survived the sentence (Torres, 
1991).   
                                                        
78 Many legislators cited Carlos Lehder’s case because he was condemned to a life sentence without parole 
plus an additional 135 years in prison.   
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The second legislative attempt at abolishing the Treaty on Extradition was 
successful because on June 19th 1991, after months of debate, the National Constitutional 
Assembly permanently abolished the extradition of nationals by a secret vote of 51 to 13.  
The legislative strategy was successful because the organizational cohesion of Medellin 
DTO leaders not only distributed financial resources to ensure an anti-extradition vote, 
but they also pressured the NCA vote with the use of violence.  During the NCA debates 
the group Los Extraditables was holding journalists hostage and Medellin was suffering a 
terrible bout of violence with 1200 homicides and 500 policemen dead just in February of 
1991.  The malleable public opinion, which had been outraged by the assassination of 
Luis Carlos Galan at the end of 1989, was exhausted with violence and optimistic that a 
new Constitution would create greater avenues of representation and provide peace by 
June 1991.   
The legislative process of the NCA initially debated the issue of extradition in 
committees before it was brought to a vote in the assembly after almost four months of 
debate.  Key debate dates, April 18th, May 15th, and June 19th 1991 at the NCA matched 
the outcomes of backdoor negotiations that Pablo Escobar was undergoing with President 
Cesar Gaviria’s government officials.  On April 18th 1991, the first round of 
subcommittee discussions on extradition, the subcommittee drafted an anti-extradition 
article to be voted on and on April 22nd Pablo Escobar agreed to surrender to authorities 
and confess to a crime.  On May 15th 1991, the subcommittee on extradition voted to 
approve an anti-extradition constitutional article that would be sent to the general 
assembly (Frenada la extradición, 1991) and on May 24th Los Extraditables released 
Francisco Santos who was the last journalist to be held hostage.  Finally, on June 19th the 
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NCA voted to abolish the extradition of nationals and on the same date Pablo Escobar 
surrendered to authorities.   
Violent Strategy 
 The third concurrent strategy implemented by Medellin-based DTO leaders 
during 1983-1991 was the incremental use of violence to influence policy.  Medellin 
DTO leaders organized as Los Extraditables to coerce politicians into permanently 
overturning extradition and to legalize their status by negotiating favorable terms of 
surrender.   
The group Los Extraditables was first mentioned in Colombia’s major 
newsmagazine Semana on August 1st 1983 (El destape, 1983).  According to Semana, the 
group Los Extraditables signed anti-extradition messages that appeared as massive 
newspaper ads, bought during a 1983 media campaign against the 1979 Treaty of 
Extradition.  In the article, Semana attributed the authorship of the anti-extradition ads to 
Carlos Lehder for two reasons: First, because the ads matched the populist-fascist 
ideology prevalent in Lehder’s own political movement, Movimiento Civico Latino 
Nacional.  Second, because Semana editors also matched the 1981 pamphlets signed by 
Carlos Lehder for the group Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS).  On July 1983 Carlos 
Lehder revealed in a morning radio interview with journalist Juan Guillermo Rios that he 
was a “mafioso,” consequently Semana editors felt compelled to write a brief biography 
to explain Carlos Lehder’s bizarre ideology and his link to Los Extraditables and MAS, 
as he was a self-confessed trafficker:  
Juan Guillermo Rios: Mr.  Lehder in all reality, for some time now it is said throughout 
Colombia’s central region that… you are a ‘mafioso,’ please excuse that we ask you such a 
question in such a frontal manner, but we would like to know your position and that is why we are 
interviewing you… 
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Carlos Lehder: I don’t deny that I have participated in Colombia’s great bonanza, but I also don’t 
deny that we (the country) are enjoying a monetary amnesty, in which many “hot monies” may 
have entered (the economy) (El destape, 1983). 
 
In this radio interview Carlos Lehder accepted the journalist’s accusation and 
incriminated the government by being frank about the “double standard” held in society, 
where ‘mafiosos’ were considered pariahs while the government unintendedly enjoyed 
the dollar reserves that it received as a result of manipulating economic monetary 
policy.79 The Semana writers seemed astonished at Carlos Lehder’s blunt honesty and 
Semana’s first analysis on Los Extraditables explained the group’s anti-extradition 
message and linked the issue of extradition to drug traffickers.  Although this article is 
the first mention of Los Extraditables in the Colombian media, the group would not 
launch its first official communiqué until November 15th 1984. 
A series of four events led to the official launch of the first communiqué by Los 
Extraditables on November 15th 1984.  The first event was Pablo Escobar’s forced 
retirement from Congress on October 23rd 1983.  After this event, it was evident to DTO 
leaders that they could not openly participate in the political system as political 
candidates.  To influence policy DTO leaders changed strategies.  As a consequence, 
besides sponsoring anti-extradition politicians and influencing the judicial process, DTO 
leaders began using violence.  The shift towards violence led DTO leaders to behave less 
like mainstream candidates or interest groups, and more like armed political movements 
or terrorist groups.   
                                                        
79 The Colombian governments periodically practice “reformas tributarias” where the central bank buys 
dollars to stabilize the value of its currency vis-à-vis the dollar. Lehder was alluding to the fact that some of 
the dollars come from the black market and are usually derived from cocaine sales. 
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The second event that led to the launch of Los Extraditables, and shook 
Colombia’s political system, was the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara 
Bonilla on April 20th 1984.  Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, during the years 1983 and 1984, was 
the first high-ranking government official to aggressively pursue cocaine traffickers by: 
opening closed criminal investigations, grounding trafficker planes, and seizing the 
industrial-size cocaine refineries.  The seizure of the refinery Tranquilandia on March 
10th 1984 was praised in international news.  However, as a consequence of this seizure, 
criminal investigations revealed that Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was harassed by DTOs, 
because his telephone was wiretapped and he received death threats.  Finally, on April 
30th 1984, gunmen linked to Medellin-based DTOs assassinated Rodrigo Lara Bonilla 
and this event marked the first time that DTOs would use political violence to express 
their discontent with the government’s extradition and counter-narcotics policy.80 It 
would also lead to the implementation of the Extradition Treaty by the Belisario Betancur 
Presidency. 
The third and fourth events that led to the official launch of Los Extraditables was 
the implementation of extradition by Colombian authorities and the arrest of Jorge Luis 
Ochoa in Spain.  The assassination of Lara Bonilla was significant because the 
Colombian government felt compelled to pursue DTOs.  Consequently, Belisario 
Betancur’s government reversed its policy on extradition and placed extradition as the 
main tool to punish known traffickers.  The implementation of the extradition treaty 
placed extradition atop of DTO leader agendas.  Juan David Ochoa conveys, on a 
                                                        
80 Most evidence suggests that Pablo Escobar was the sole author of Lara Bonilla’s assassination and only 
one gunman, an eighteen-year-old Byron Velazquez Arenas, was arrested and convicted to 15 years of jail 
time.  The second gunman died while fleeing the crime and Colombian authorities linked both assassins to 
gunmen organizations in Medellin.   
155 
 
televised interview with PBS’s Frontline, how this event became a turning point in the 
lives of traffickers since the fear of being persecuted and extradited became a reality: 
Juan David Ochoa: Since the pressure after Lara Bonilla, the persecution was so hard against us 
and our families.  We thought it was a very dark future for us, so we decided that the best thing 
would be to leave the business alone.  We proposed this to ex-President Lopez, but that had no 
answer…  
 
Frontline: What did extradition mean to you? 
 
Juan David Ochoa: Extradition was something that we thought was very grave for us.  If 
someone would extradite you, that would be like being buried alive.  We respected and feared 
extradition… very much (Interviews – Juan David Ochoa, 2000). 
 
Because of the government clamp down and the potential threat that extradition posed for 
major traffickers, Medellin DTO leaders fled to Panama and on May 26th 1984 held 
negotiations with Colombian government’s Attorney General Carlos Jimenez Gomez and 
former President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 299; Castillo, 1987; 
Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).   
This first negotiation united Colombian drug traffickers and it led DTO leaders to 
propose to dismantle their cocaine businesses, which at the time controlled 70-80 percent 
of the world’s cocaine trade.  In exchange, traffickers wanted the Colombian government 
to grant them an amnesty to avoid being extradited to the United States (Eddy et al., 1988, 
p. 299; Clawson et al., 1996, p. 103).  The Betancur government rejected the trafficker 
proposal because it believed that its justice system could pursue arrests and extradite the 
traffickers responsible for Lara Bonilla’s death.  On July of 1984 the Betancur 
government signed U.S. government extradition requests and arrested the first traffickers 
whom were extradited on January of 1985.  On July 19th 1984, U.S. Federal Judge 
Herbert Shapiro issued an arrest warrant for Pablo Escobar and Jorge Luis Ochoa to 
begin the process of extradition to the United States, as a direct response to the 
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assassination of Barry Seal, cocaine pilot turned DEA informant.  The arrest warrant had 
a menacing effect on traffickers because they were officially being accused of a crime in 
the United States, which may lead to their eventual extradition. 
Since the Belisario Betancur government refused the DTO leaders’ Panama 
proposal, the leadership of Medellin-based DTOs dispersed to other countries like 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Spain, and Brazil, and later in 1984, as the government abated its 
pursuit, most traffickers returned to Colombia.  The only exception was Jorge Luis Ochoa, 
who was the only major trafficker, based in Medellin, who did not return to Colombia 
because he was arrested on November 15th 1984 in Spain.  As a consequence of his arrest, 
Ochoa had to await legal proceedings in Spain because the United States government 
placed an extradition request for him and Cali based trafficker Gilberto Rodriguez 
Orejuela.   
The time period from April 20th 1983 to November of 1984 was a period of 
drastic change for Medellin-based DTO leaders, as it marked the end of cocaine 
trafficking’s “golden years.” Drug Trafficking Organization leaders would have to worry 
for the first time about being pursued by Colombian and international authorities.  The 
culmination of these four events—the inability to openly participate in Colombia’s 
political system, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s assassination, the implementation of extradition 
by authorities, and the Jorge Luis Ochoa arrest in Spain—made the issue of extradition 
the number one priority for DTO leaders based in Medellin and the focus of their 
organizational cohesion.  As a result, the group of traffickers headed by Pablo Escobar 
and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha took the idea of Los Extraditables, originally 
ascribed to Carlos Lehder in July 1983, and launched the group’s first communiqué on 
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November 15th 1984—the same day of Jorge Luis Ochoa’s arrest in Spain (Legarda, 
2005).  According to Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, Pablo Escobar’s gunman, on the 
same date a campaign was organized in Medellin to tag street walls by spray-painting the 
slogan “Say no to extradition.” 
Whereas in 1981 the creation of MAS allowed traffickers to use violence against 
the M-19 guerrilla to stop kidnappings, in a similar fashion, after their legal political 
options were diminished, Los Extraditables targeted key politicians and members of the 
justice system to fulfill two objectives: First, to convey their opposition to the 1979 
Extradition Treaty with the United States.  The second objective was to coerce politicians 
in an effort to reach a negotiation so that DTO leaders could legalize their criminal status.  
The creation of Los Extraditables allowed DTO leaders based in Medellin to unite and 
form a more cohesive organization opposing extradition. The DTO leaders would 
essentially use a “carrot-and-stick approach” to ban extradition and legalize their status.  
The violence generated by Los Extraditables would be used as the “stick” in this 
approach.  The “carrot” or incentive that DTO leaders’ provided was their willingness to 
negotiate surrender to government officials in exchange for a permanent ban on 
extradition. The DTO leaders and government officials periodically organized backroom 
negotiations with an effort to reach an agreement.  The following discussion will center 
on the cohesion of Los Extraditables in their effort to accomplish their political goals.  
The discussion will focus on the group’s leadership, decision-making process, the 
group’s discipline, and how its internal organization allowed the Medellin DTOs to 
secure a ban on the extradition of nationals and favorable terms of surrender.   
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In contrast to Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS), which had no clear leadership that 
could impose an organizational objective, Los Extraditables had a clear leadership and a 
more organizied discipline because the group was able to collect funds from member 
traffickers with a decision-making style that was cohesive.  From the launch of the first 
Los Extraditables communiqué in 1984, it is widely believed that Pablo Escobar and Jose 
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha headed the group (Legarda, 2005; Casación 31761, 2011, p. 
52).  As leaders, Escobar and Rodriguez Gacha were responsible for deciding political 
targets and organizing terrorist attempts.  Jairo Velásquez Vásquez a.k.a.  “Popeye” 
testified that former Senator Alberto Santofimio Botero, Escobar’s political running mate, 
guided Escobar by choosing political targets (Legarda, 2005, p. 58).  Colombia’s 
Supreme Court corroborated Velásquez Vásquez testimony by studying other testimonial 
accounts, which showed that Alberto Santofimio Botero knew and was a close advisor to 
Pablo Escobar from 1982-1989, but also that Santofimio Botero was the intellectual 
author of the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento 
(Legarda, 2005, p. 58; Casación 31761, 2011, p. 20 & 23).  The Supreme Court ruled that 
the motives behind Alberto Santofimio Botero’s advice were grounded on his own 
political aspirations, since on August of 1989 Luis Carlos Galan was only a pre-candidate 
vying for the Liberal party’s nomination.  The Court’s conclusions indicate that when 
Escobar carried out the Galan assassination, Alberto Santofimio Botero –as a leader of 
the Liberal party– benefited from such action for two reasons: First, Alberto Santofimio 
Botero still had a chance at obtaining his party’s nomination in 1989.  Second, even if 
Santofimio Botero did not receive the nomination, he benefited from the assassination by 
furthering his position of power within the Liberal party, especially if he sought to 
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support Hernando Duran Dussan, who was more likely than Botero to win the Liberal 
presidential nomination of 1989 (Casación 31761, 2011, p. 42).   
Even though the Colombian Supreme Court and several journalistic and scholarly 
accounts have determined that the leaders of Los Extraditables were Pablo Escobar and 
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, the extent of the Ochoa brothers’ participation in the 
leadership and funding of Los Extraditables is uncertain.  In contrast to some journalists 
who have written on the Medellin-based DTOs (Gugliotta et al., 1989; Eddy et al., 1988, 
p. 312-314), Colombian officials from Medellin who were interviewed for this project 
and who were involved in counter-narcotics efforts during the 1980s, make a point of 
explaining that the group Los Extraditables did not include the Ochoa brothers.  Although 
the Ochoa brothers were deeply involved in the drug business and had business 
associations with other traffickers (Castillo, 1987; Gugliotta et al, 1989; Eddy et al., 1988, 
p. 290), it is difficult to ascertain the degree of decision-making power that the Ochoa 
brothers had within Los Extraditables.  Newspaper accounts of testimony given by 
Escobar gunman Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez suggests that the Ochoa brothers 
contributed a monthly fund of $250,000 dollars to Los Extraditables (Hermanos Ochoa, 
2009).81 Most of these inquiries are difficult to verify because Colombian authorities 
never investigated the role of the Ochoa brothers in Los Extraditables and the group’s 
main leaders were killed.  Moreover, the Ochoa brother’s surrender to Colombian 
authorities in 1991 muted all further allegations against them.   
                                                        
81 This amount of money coincides with amounts given by Clawson et al. on the “war tax” that Pablo 
Escobar expected from the Kiko Moncada and Fernando Galeano DTOs.   
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Most journalistic investigations on Los Extraditables focus on Pablo Escobar and 
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha as the main decision-makers among DTO leaders.  
During the years1983-1991, in which Los Extraditables were active, the Ochoa brothers 
were described by journalists and academics as marginal actors who participated in the 
invalidation of the Extradition Treaty in 1986-87 and who gradually negotiated their 
surrender with Colombian authorities in 1990 and 1991 (Clawson et al., 1996; Legarda, 
2005; Salazar, 2001:265; Gugliotta et al., 1989:336).   
During the time that Los Extraditables were in operation, the Ochoa brothers 
seemed to be less confrontational and more open to a negotiated solution to the illicit 
drug business than Pablo Escobar (Ochoa, 1989; Salazar, 2001, p. 161).  In his book, Un 
Narco Se Confiesa y Acusa, Fabio Ochoa explains that the problem of drug traffic in 
Colombia was political for several reasons: 
Yes it is political because… according to the government and the military the narcos want to take 
over the country and power… it is a livelihood, it is a social problem, it is an international 
problem, it is a war, it attempts against the democratic stability of the country, it is a class problem, 
people want a dialogue with traffickers, it is an economy, it is political because it benefits and 
affects millions of Colombians, because it is a pretext for creating state intervention policies, 
because it has created paramilitary forces that finance themselves with drug money…(Ochoa, 
1989, p. 106-107).   
 
Fabio Ochoa’s claim the book reads like an extended rant and attempts to show that drug 
traffic has political, social, and economic ramifications that should be publicly debated 
and dealt with.82 The book also suggests that as powerful entrepreneurs, government 
officials should take cocaine traffickers into account and, through the argument of being 
entrepreneurs, the Ochoa brothers actively sought a negotiation with state officials 
                                                        
82 The book is also full of sarcasm and tries to show the double standard confronted by traffickers, where 
members of high levels of society like their “narco-money,” but at the same time high levels of society did 
not want to associate with them because they are not formally educated or because traffickers come from a 
low socioeconomic status.   
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especially during 1990-1991 to legalize their status and prevent their extradition to the 
United States.   
Since Pablo Escobar’s death in December 1993, the Ochoa brothers have publicly 
distanced themselves from Los Extraditables.  In interviews they have explained that they 
did not believe that the use of violence against the state and society was useful in banning 
the extradition of nationals (Ochoa, 1989; Salazar, 2001:161; Interviews – Juan David 
Ochoa, 2000).   
Also, the Ochoa brothers have expressed that they were intimidated by Pablo 
Escobar’s use of violence, because he killed their brother-in-law83 of theirs.  In the 
interview that the Ochoa brothers granted to PBS’s program Frontline, when the 
interviewer asks Juan David Ochoa to explain who Los Extraditables were, Juan David 
Ochoa takes the opportunity define the group by distancing himself and his brothers from 
the group:   
Juan David Ochoa: The extraditables were all of us who are asked for in extradition .  .  ..  That's 
who the extraditables were.  But the group called "the extraditables" was a nickname that Pablo 
gave himself, so that he could direct all his violence and his terrorist actions towards the 
extradition.  It wouldn't point to him personally, but "the extraditables" terrorist group was Pablo 
Escobar (Interviews – Jorge Ochoa, 2000). 
 
During the interview Jorge Luis Ochoa’s mentions the fear he had of Pablo Escobar:  
Jorge Luis Ochoa: Frankly, he intimidated us, and many other people in Medellin, Cali, and 
Bogota.  He intimidated everyone… He even killed my brother-in-law.   
 
Frontline: What did you say to Pablo?  
 
Jorge Luis Ochoa: I couldn't say anything.  I was in prison in Spain when Pablo had him killed.  
But I couldn't say anything to him--what could I say to him? The same thing would happen to me 
(Interviews – Jorge Luis Ochoa, 2000).   
 
                                                        
 
83 According to Gugliotta et al., Jorge Luis Ochoa’s brother-in-law was a pilot and DEA informant, so this 
is why he was killed. Also Gugliotta et al. suggests that it was not Pablo Escobar who killed him, but 
Ochoa’s own gunmen (Gugliotta et al., 1989:78). 
162 
 
Considering Pablo Escobar’s experience as a gunman, his rise to power, and his control 
over criminal gangs and gunmen in the city of Medellin, it is very possible that Pablo 
Escobar was feared even in trafficker circles.  So it is quite possible that coercion is how 
Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were able to enforce discipline within 
Los Extraditables—where fellow traffickers were forced into supporting a war against 
political elites to obtain a ban on extradition.   
 Having said how fear and coercion played a role at the time that Los Extraditables 
were active, given the common desire of most traffickers to paralyze the Extradition 
Treaty so that they would not be turned over to U.S. authorities, and given the fire power 
most DTO leaders possessed—it is very possible that DTO leaders willingly cooperated 
with Pablo Escobar to obtain a ban on extradition without feeling intimidated by him.  In 
fact, a problem with the narrative painted by the Ochoa brothers, which describes them as 
victims of Escobar, is that during key moments when Jorge Luis Ochoa was apprehended 
in Spain in 1984 or when he was jailed in Colombia in 1987, communiqués were sent by 
Los Extraditables to major newspapers demanding Ochoa’s release (Gugliotta et al., 1989, 
p. 313; Interviews – Jorge Luis Ochoa, 2000).  In addition, judges who presided over 
Jorge Luis Ochoa cases, in Colombia in 1986 and later in 1987, released him under 
controversial judgments, which caused much embarrassment to the Virgilio Barco 
government84 (Jorge L Ochoa, 1991).  Also, the Ochoa brothers have admitted that they 
                                                        
84 The Reagan Administration penalized the Barco government because of Ochoa’s release by opposing 
Colombia’s inclusion in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, among other measures. DTO analyst 
Rensselaer Lee, believes that the Ochoa brothers offered judges “plomo o plata,” in other words, death if 
they convicted Ochoa, or a bribe of $3-20 million dollars to judges so that they would arrange for Jorge 
Luis Ochoa’s release from jail.  These large amounts of money show the cynicism and huge bribing 
capacity traffickers had because they undermined the United States government’s offering of $500,000 for 
Ochoa’s arrest and conviction (Lee, 1990, p. 125).  
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were involved in legally fighting the judicial validity of the extradition treaty 
(Interviews—Juan David Ochoa, 2000), but this process also involved the use of violence 
to intimidate judges.  Although these events tie the Ochoa brothers to Los Extraditables, 
it is still uncertain whether the Ochoa brothers actively participated in the decision-
making process of Los Extraditables. Statements made by Pablo Escobar’s gunman, Jhon 
Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, suggest that they only provided funds to the group (Hermanos 
Ochoa, 2009).  Finally, regardless of whether the Ochoa brothers had full, partial, or no 
involvement with the decisions and activities organized by Los Extraditables, their 
negotiations with Colombian authorities during 1990-1991 benefited from the violence 
and kidnappings generated by Los Extraditables because the Ochoa demands seemed less 
confrontational.   
 Carlos Lehder’s involvement in the leadership of Los Extraditables was minimal.  
As the newsmagazine Semana suggests in their 1983 article, Lehder’s major contribution 
to Los Extraditables was the group’s name and its anti-extradition stance.  However, 
from 1983 to 1987 it is difficult to know the decision-making power Lehder had in 
helping select the political targets or in funding the group because, as time passed by, 
many accounts suggest that Carlos Lehder became an unreliable member of the group 
whilst he became very vocal about his political views to the media –at a time when most 
traffickers were trying to avoid the attention of authorities (Streatfield, 2001; Eddy et al., 
1988, p. 168, 290, & 325-326).  According to journalists, by the time Lehder was 
apprehended and extradited to the United States on February of 1987, DTO leaders based 
in Medellin had already shunned him (Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 312; Streatfield, 2001), so 
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if Lehder had any decision-making power within Los Extraditables it lasted from 1983 to 
1987.   
 Throughout their bloody campaign Los Extraditables were very cohesive in 
selecting political targets to be bombed, assassinated, or kidnapped.  When government 
officials killed Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha in 1989, the main leader became Pablo 
Escobar, which simplified the group’s decision-making process of selecting political 
targets and increased the cohesiveness of Los Extraditables.  Most accounts given by 
Escobar’s gunman and others close to Medellin-based DTOs during 1983-1991 suggest 
that Escobar acted on his own without consulting other traffickers as to whom to 
assassinate or kidnap, so the organization was very cohesive (Legarda, 2005; Garcia, 
1996; Interviews – Fernando Arenas, 2000).  According to a pilot for Carlos Lehder, 
Fernando Arenas, who witnessed Carlos Lehder’s reaction to the Rodrigo Lara Bonilla 
Assassination, Pablo Escobar did not consult anyone when he made the decision to 
assassinate the Minister of Justice: 
When it happened… Carlos was angry--not about the assassination or the attempt--but because he 
was not warned by Pablo Escobar about what he was going to do.  We were caught with our guard 
down (Interviews – Fernando Arenas, 2000). 
 
Juan David Ochoa conveys on a televised interview with PBS’s Frontline that Pablo 
Escobar did not consult him on the Lara Bonilla assassination either.  He also explains 
how this event became a turning point in the lives of traffickers: 
Juan David Ochoa: The government of Belisario Betancur started the persecution against drug 
trafficking because of Lara Bonilla's death… That was from Pablo Escobar.  He made the decision.  
He didn't talk to any of us.  He simply thought, he had ideas and he carried them out.  At that time, 
since he was involved in politics, surely, maybe Bonilla was an obstacle for Pablo or something.   
 
Frontline: When you heard the news of Lara Bonilla's death, how did you react? 
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Juan David Ochoa: I heard the news and I thought, "Oh, this is grave news." Because you can't 
stand up to the government and society in that way.  I think it was a grave mistake to kill him, or 
anyone else, of the people that were killed…  
 
Frontline: Did you make a phone call to find out who had ordered it? What did you do?  
 
Juan David Ochoa: No.  I simply heard it on the news, and a few days later the persecution 
against us started.  And that's when we left for Panama.   
 
Escobar’s lack of consultation with other traffickers when making decisions on political 
targets would become his modus operandi especially in 1989 when the activities of Los 
Extraditables became more violent.  Pablo Escobar’s hired gunmen obeyed his orders 
and carried out the assassinations and kidnappings, which made the coercive nature of 
this organization highly cohesive.  Journalistic accounts suggest that other traffickers had 
little decision-making power as to who was killed or kidnapped, even though they would 
pay a “war tax” to fund Los Extraditables, so that Pablo Escobar could organize terrorist 
activities through the organization (Legarda, 2005, p. 168-169).  According to Jhon Jairo 
Velasquez Vasquez, Supreme Court witness to the assassination of Luis Carlos Galan 
(1989), Pablo Escobar made his decision by consulting with ex-Senator Alberto 
Santofimio Botero alone. When Escobar informed fellow members of Los Extraditables 
(whom helped fund and carry out the operation) of the assassination plan, Velasquez 
Vasquez claims Escobar told them the target was not up for discussion: “I am not 
consulting you, I am informing you so that you find good hiding places; either we finish 
him or he finishes us” (Legarda, 2005:168).   
The existence of a “war tax” strongly suggests that Los Extraditables had 
organizational discipline over its membership.  Los Extraditables collected funds from 
member DTO leaders located in Medellin to organize their attack against political elites 
in an effort to permanently ban the extradition policy.  Besides the major DTO leaders 
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explored in this project, other less internationally known but important DTOs in 
Colombia and whom contributed funds to Los Extraditables, were: Kiko Moncada, 
Fernando Galeano, Henry Perez, Ariel Otero, Albeiro Areiza, Jairo Mejia, and Fidel 
Castaño, among others (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 48; Salazar, 2001, p. 195; Legarda, 2005, 
p. 169; Hermanos Ochoa, 2009).  The total number of traffickers that contributed funds to 
Los Extraditables’s war effort is unknown, but it is suspected that members gave around 
$200,000 dollars a month to fund the violent campaigns to overturn the extradition treaty 
(Clawson et al., 1996, p. 48; Hermanos Ochoa, 2009).   
It is unclear if DTO leaders linked to Los Extraditables voluntarily gave funds to 
the effort or if they were required to contribute funds, but journalistic and scholarly 
accounts suggest that both positive and negative selective incentives played a role in 
obtaining group discipline.  Whereas some DTO leaders funded Los Extraditables 
voluntarily, those who refused to cooperate voluntarily were forced to cooperate through 
the use of coercion.  For some DTO leaders it was in their interest to see the extradition 
treaty permanently banned to prevent their potential extradition to the United States. For 
these leaders it was beneficial to contribute funds to Los Extraditables. However, DTO 
leader assassinations suggest that contributions were obligatory, so if DTO leaders did 
not cooperate with Los Extraditables they were threatened or killed.  Early discussion in 
the project at hand on the Ochoa brothers’ involvement in Los Extraditables suggests that 
the main enforcer of these “war taxes” was Pablo Escobar (especially after 1989), as he 
had significant amount of control over gangs of gunmen in Medellin.  Evidence of DTO 
leader assassinations, in particular the Kiko Moncada and Fernando Galeano 
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assassinations,85 suggests that DTO contributions were required and enforced by Pablo 
Escobar because organizational discipline in Los Extraditables was ultimately enforced 
through violence.  Also the Moncada and Galeano assassinations provide evidence that it 
was very probable that the Ochoa brothers contributed funds towards Los Extraditables’s 
war effort to prevent disagreements with Pablo Escobar after the death of Gacha. Since 
Pablo Escobar was the group’s sole decision maker and tax enforcer, his leadership made 
the actions taken by Los Extraditables highly cohesive because at least from 1983-1991 
the group was united in their objectives and member gave funds.   
Los Extraditables’ violent campaign against political elites was done to pressure 
government officials into overturning the treaty on extradition and obtaining favorable 
terms for their surrender.  Coercion in the form of violent events led the Virgilio Barco 
and the Cesar Gaviria presidential governments to establish backdoor negotiations with 
DTO leaders in an effort to end urban violence.  The following discussion will focus on 
the major events organized by Los Extraditables and how such events led to three DTO 
leader- government negotiations.   
The first communiqué that launched Los Extraditables was sent to major 
Colombian newspapers on the 15th of November 1984 on the same day Jorge Luis Ochoa 
was arrested in Spain.  The communiqué had a logo with the picture of Hernán Botero, 
one of the first traffickers arrested on July 1984 by Colombian authorities with the intent 
                                                        
85 Kiko Moncada and Fernado Galeano were killed in La Catedral prison when Pablo Escobar was 
incarcerated because he was reluctant to continue paying a “war tax” to Pablo Escobar after permanently 
banning the extradition policy. 
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of extraditing him to the United States.86 The letterhead of each communiqué released by 
Los Extraditables read “we prefer a tomb in Colombia than a dungeon in the United 
States.” The first message called for abolishing the extradition of Colombian nationals to 
the United States (Legarda, 2005, p. 58-59; Mollison et al., 2007).   
After the initial launch of the first communiqué in 1984, Los Extraditables wrote 
about 50 communiqués (Extraditables, 1991) as their anti-extradition campaign became 
more violent.  One in particular was written to threaten the lives of the Supreme Court 
justices deciding the constitutionality of the Extradition Treaty on December 1986.  This 
communiqué sample shows the level of intimidation public officials were exposed to 
from 1983-1991: 
We declare war against you.  We declare war against all members of your family.  As you may 
suppose, we know exactly where they are—we will do away with your entire family.  We have no 
compassion whatsoever—we are capable of anything, absolutely anything.  We also have families.  
Baquero (a pro-extradition Colombian Supreme Court Judge murdered earlier that year) had a 
family too, wife, sons, parents, and brothers.  He was a miserable government patsy and an anti-
nationalist, pro-yankee traitor to his country (Lee, 1989, p. 122).   
 
 During 1986 violence against members of the justice system ensued: two judges 
and a coronel of the police were assassinated, and when the Supreme Court invalidated 
the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, newly elected President Virgilio Barco tried to extradite 
traffickers via decree by issuing Law 68 of 1986 on December 14th 1986.  In retaliation, 
Los Extraditables assassinated Guillermo Cano three days later on December 17th 1986.  
Cano was the chief editor of El Espectador, Colombia’s 2nd most important newspaper 
and harsh critic of Drug Trafficking Oorganizations (DTOs).87 To emphasize Los 
                                                        
86 Hernán Botero was charged with money laundering and finally extradited to the United States on January 
5th 1985. 
 
87 Guillermo Cano not only uncovered Pablo Escobar’s criminal past, but also questioned the government’s 
ability to deal with the institutional threat posed by DTOs in Colombia.  One of his articles was “Donde 
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Extraditables’s opposition to extradition, on January 13th 1987, a political assassination 
was orchestrated against the outgoing Minister of Justice Enrique Parejo, because he was 
the first to authorize the extradition of traffickers.    
During the remainder of 1987 Los Extraditables were relatively inert because of 
their success in legally invalidating the extradition treaty.  In contrast, the Virgilio Barco 
administration sought to pursue DTO leaders not only by extraditing them, but also by 
confiscating their assets in Colombia.  The Virgilio Barco presidency was the first to 
create anti-money laundering laws via decree, which led authorities to search and 
confiscate DTO properties.  Such a hardline enforcement of counter-narcotics efforts 
eventually led Los Extraditables to react with various acts of violence that were 
logistically planned to try to obtain a negotiation with government officials.  On January 
1988 Los Extraditables kidnapped Conservative politician Andres Pastrana, the son of 
former President Misael Pastrana, and the Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos.  The 
kidnapping of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos on January 25th 1988 resulted in his 
immediate death, as a consequence of bullet wounds he received while being kidnapped.  
Consequently, as a sign of peace, Los Extraditables released Andres Pastrana to use him 
as an emissary who was to speak with President Barco about a negotiation with 
traffickers.  However, the early negotiations never took place.  Instead, Los Extraditables 
delayed pressing for negotiations with the government because the rivalry between the 
Medellin and Cali DTOs broke out on January 14th 1988, when Cali DTO leaders 
bombed the residential building “Monaco” where Pablo Escobar’s family resided.  As a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
están que no los ven?” (“Where are they, that you don’t see them”), this article criticized the government’s 
inaction in arresting traffickers whose whereabouts where public knowledge (Castillo, 1987, p. 197).  His 
final article was titled, “Se le aguó la fiesta a los mafiosos” (“The party is over for the mafiosi”), and it was 
written when Virgilio Barco launched the decree law that would extradite traffickers (Legarda, 2005, p.86).   
170 
 
consequence of this war between DTOs, the operations by Los Extraditables to obtain a 
negotiation with the government were on hiatus until September 1988.   
Although the period between January and September 1988 was one of relative 
peace for government officials who had been targets of Los Extraditables, the political 
environment in rural and urban areas was violent.  Virgilio Barco’s four-year presidential 
tenure witnessed 78,000 homicides, 300 car bombs, and 250 police officer murders (El 
Tiempo, 1990).  The urban violence mainly proliferated from the wars between drug 
trafficking organizations and the paramilitary extermination of the Union Patriotica 
political party members (Dudley, 2004).  As a consequence of this turbulent climate, 
when Los Extraditables sought to pursue a negotiation with government officials during 
September 1988, the government was willing to listen to proposals.  One of the proposals, 
which will be referred to as the Vallejo Arbelaez negotiation, was put forth by Joaquin 
Vallejo Arbelaez (a former cabinet member who became a trafficker emissary88) as he 
met with the Ochoa brothers, Rodriguez Gacha, and Escobar and heard their proposals 
(Salazar, 2001, p. 232).  According to Vallejo Arbelaez, during September of 1988 and 
February 1989, he met around 10 times with Presidential Advisor German Montoya to 
discuss a negotiation deal.  Traffickers proposed to surrender their drug trafficking 
business in exchange for permanently banning extradition and an amnesty for crimes 
committed.  In contrast to the 1984 Panama negotiation, during the Vallejo Arbelaez 
negotiation traffickers sough to keep their economic assets: 
                                                        
88 Apparently Vallejo Arbelaez had written a newspaper editorial in which he suggested a government-
trafficker dialogue to resolve the problem of violence in 1988, and right after, he was contacted by Guido 
Parra, Pablo Escobar’s lawyer, who proposed that Vallejo Arbelaez should become an emissary to propose 
a negotiation between the government and traffickers. 
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The “group A” is made up of the so-called Medellin Cartels, Bogota and the Coast, that controls 
the bigger share of the drug trafficking business in Colombia, and the names of the persons 
involved in these groups will be presented once the amnesty is approved.  The so-called “Medellin 
Cartel” that includes Bogota and the Coast, offers to retire completely from the drug business… to 
collaborate with the government in the eradication of the business and to return to a normal life 
under the law… The counteroffer: a) To end the extradition of Colombians.  b) An amnesty for 
crimes committed.  c) Patrimonial amnesty.  d) That subversives disarm since they kidnap, extort, 
and threaten properties… (La Bomba, 1989). 
 
Besides a patrimonial amnesty, DTO leaders were also proposing an agreement that 
would negotiate guerrilla disarmament.  This last point reflected Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez 
Gacha’s desire to limit the power of left-wing guerrillas and their sympathizers because 
through his paramilitary organization, Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y 
Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM), he had already been engaging in the 
extermination of the Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union), the political wing of the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).  The Vallejo Arbelaez negotiation was 
officially rejected by the Virgilio Barco government and instead the government 
launched “Operation Springtime,” which seized several cocaine labs in the Magdalena 
Medio region on February 1989.   
The year 1989 continued to be a bloodstained year, but increasingly so for 
Colombia’s political class because Los Extraditables began another campaign to press for 
negotiations.  On March of 1989, a judge and a lawyer were murdered for investigating 
Pablo Escobar’s role in the assassination of newspaper editor Guillermo Cano.  On May, 
the headquarters of a broadcasting network was bombed and an assassination attempt on 
the head of the Colombian intelligence agency, Departamento Administrativo de 
Seguridad (DAS), was thwarted.  On July of 1989, a bomb killed the Governor of 
Antioquia, Antonio Roldan Betancur and On August 18th 1989 the popular Presidential 
Candidate Luis Carlos Galan was assassinated.  All of these attempts at cornering the 
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Barco Administration into negotiating with DTO leaders failed to get traction, and 
instead, the attempts outraged the general public.  Luis Carlos Galan was a staunch anti-
extradition candidate whom was heading public opinion polls (La Guerra, 1989) because 
he was perceived as a reformist candidate who represented a younger generation that 
never had strong ties to the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties of the National 
Front.89 People’s perception of Galan’s leadership was reflected in newsmagazine 
Semana’s article analyzing how Colombia’s narco-violence killed Galan: 
When Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was killed, Semana editorial board chose “Death Foretold”90 as the 
title for the magazine’s cover.  When they assassinated Guillermo Cano, the title was “On Foot!”...  
On Friday August the 18th, at 11:30 in the evening, when we had to make a decision on the front 
cover’s title for the assassination of Luis Carlos Galan, the same journalists could not find words.  
There was such a sentiment of frustration that could not be expressed.  So the decision was to 
publish the leader’s photo and his birth and death dates… Sometimes the intimidation gives them 
(Los Extraditables) a temporary success.  They have succeeded in neutralizing the justice system, 
in infiltrating the Armed Forces, in preventing extradition, and in threatening the population.  This 
has produced a sense of impotence, which has led many to give up… With the assassination of 
Galan, they (Los Extraditables) thought they would unify public opinion in favor of a negotiation.  
But the opposite has taken place.  Public opinion unified not to capitulate, but to keep fighting no 
matter how much blood this implies…(La Guerra, 1989). 
  
As a result of the public’s frustration with Galan’s assassination, a poll taken by the 
newspaper El Tiempo right after the assassination showed a 77% approval for the policy 
on extradition (Matthiesen, 2000, p. 221). Consequently, the Barco Government 
increased its persecution of DTO leaders and with the approval of the Supreme Court 
issued Decree 1860 of 1989 to extradite traffickers (p. 220). The revival of the extradition 
policy led Los Extraditables to increase their capacity for generating violence.  After 
targeting specific political targets, the group began to stage dramatic and indiscriminate 
                                                        
89 The National Front was a power sharing agreement established in 1958 between the two major political 
parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, which were elite political parties that maintained electoral power 
through the use of patronage and clientelism.   
 
90 “Death Foretold” is also an ironic reference on the title of Colombian Nobel Laureate Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez’s fictional book “Chronicle of a Death Foretold,” published in 1981 about the failure of a 
community to stop the murder of the main character from taking place. 
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acts of violence.  In addition to the ongoing DTO wars and the paramilitary extermination 
of left wing political parties, during the last months of 1989, one hundred bombs were 
placed in public places such as supermarkets, hotels, banks, schools, and electric and 
telephone facilities (Escobar: 17 años, 1993).  One major act of violence occurred every 
month, with the first taking place on September 2nd 1989 when a truck filled with 
explosives blew up the newspaper El Espectador’s headquarters.  On October 17th 1989 
the headquarters of the newspaper La Vanguardia Liberal of Bucaramanga were also 
blown up.  On November 27th 1989 an Avianca Airliner was blown up with 107 
passengers on board and finally, on December 6th 1989 the Departamento Administrativo 
de Seguridad (DAS) building was bombed killing 70 and injuring 500 people (Escobar: 
17 años, 1993).   
 The government’s pursuit of Medellin-based DTOs was able to locate and kill one 
of Los Extraditables main leaders, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha along with his oldest 
son and his bodyguards on December 17th 1989.  Although Colombian authorities tried to 
close in on Pablo Escobar, he continued to be a fugitive and became the sole leader of 
Los Extraditables.  Finally on December 20th 1989 Los Extraditables kidnapped the son 
of Presidential Advisor German Montoya, which culminated in a series of strategic 
kidnappings of 20 family members of the Department of Antioquia’s political and 
economic elite. This last campaign will be termed as the Antioquia kidnapping campaign.   
 On December of 1989, after witnessing daily acts of violence, public opinion 
swayed again and 58 percent of Colombians favored negotiations with traffickers and 60 
percent believed traffickers should be granted amnesty if they retired from the cocaine 
trade (Clawson et al., 1996).  The shift in public opinion and the kidnappings of elite 
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members of society led the Barco government to strongly re-consider negotiating with 
traffickers.   
 During December of 1989 a group called Los Notables,91 composed of three ex-
presidents, Colombia’s Catholic Archbishop, and a member of the left-wing party 
Patriotic Union, served as mediators with the objective of getting the release of 20 
hostages.  Santiago Londoño White and J.  Mario Aristizabal, who were Escobar’s 
emissaries, were Medellin-based politicians that had dealt with Escobar during his short 
mainstream political career.  During the second negotiation effort, termed as the Lodoño-
Aristizabal-Montoya negotiation, Presidential Advisor German Montoya was determined 
to rescue his son and met with Escobar’s emissaries.  As a result, on January 15th 1990 
President Barco called a National Security Council meeting to discuss a negotiated 
solution with the Minister of the Interior, the Director of Intelligence, the Director of the 
Police, and the Military General in Command of the Armed Forces (Salazar, 2001. p. 
234).   
Los Notables and Escobar’s emissaries were able to write a third negotiated 
proposal, which was reportedly approved by the government official German Montoya 
(Clawson et al., 1996, p. 107).  The third proposal differed from the Panama and the 
Vallejo Arbelaez proposals because, in addition to surrendering their drug trafficking 
business and their weapons, traffickers offered to personally surrender to authorities in 
exchange for agreed upon constitutional and legal guarantees (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 
107; Salazar, 2001, p. 233).   
                                                        
91 Los Notables were composed ex-President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, ex-President Misael Pastrana, ex-
President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Monseigneur Mario Rebollo, and Diego Montaña Cuellar Leader of 
the Unión Patriótica. 
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 Virgilio Barco’s government strongly considered a negotiated solution to resolve 
the violence generated by Los Extraditables by holding a National Security meeting with 
Escobar’s emissaries.  However, at the January 15th meeting the Minister of the Interior 
Carlos Lemos Simmonds and Miguel Maza Marquez, the Director of Colombia’s now 
extinct intelligence agency the DAS, who had recently survived several attempts on his 
life (including the bomb attack that destroyed the DAS building a month and two weeks 
earlier), objected to the idea of negotiating with Los Extraditables.  In contrast, President 
Barco and German Montoya were more flexible in considering the proposal drafted by 
Los Notables and Escobar’s emissaries (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 108; Salazar, 2001, p. 
233-235).  For President Barco a negotiated solution to the problem of violence seemed 
attractive, whereas for German Montoya the return of his kidnapped son was paramount.  
Overall, President Virgilio Barco was undecided on whether to accept the latest trafficker 
proposal primarily because of the objections posed by his cabinet members and since 
Barco’s administration had been the only presidency to confront DTOs head on.  In 
contrast, the problem of violence was overwhelming and since Los Extraditables were 
providing the government with signs of credibility, while President Barco contemplated 
negotiating with DTO leaders, he delayed the administrative extradition of several 
traffickers to obtain the release of hostages and to honor the proposed truce offered by 
traffickers.   
To reciprocate the gesture made by the Barco government to meet with Escobar’s 
emissaries, on January 17th 1990 Los Extraditables announced a truce with the 
government and released German Montoya’s son along with other kidnapped victims 
(Clawson et al., 1996, p. 107; Salazar, 2001, p. 233-235).  On January 29th Los 
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Extraditables continued to give signs of credibility by turning over a bus loaded with 
dynamite.  On the eve of the February 14th 1990 Cartagena Summit organized by 
President Barco to discuss the “Drug War” with U.S. President George Bush and other 
Andean Presidents, Los Extraditables surrendered three large cocaine refineries in the 
Darien Jungle bordering with Panama (Traffickers surrender, 1990; Clawson et al., 1996, 
p. 107; Salazar, 2001, p. 233).   
  President Barco continued to be indecisive about negotiating with DTO leaders 
while he hosted the Cartagena Summit on Drug Control on February 15th 1990.  At the 
Summit, then U.S. President George H. W. Bush recognized that the “Drug War” was a 
global problem shared by cocaine producing and consumer nations.  As such, he 
promised to allocate $2 billion dollars towards counternarcotics efforts in Latin America.  
In expectation of increased U.S. counter-narcotics aid and reportedly after confiding with 
President George Bush on government-trafficker negotiations at the 1989 Cartagena 
Summit, President Barco opted not to negotiate with traffickers.  According to Clawson 
et al., Bush reportedly discouraged Barco from holding negotiations because he believed 
that Barco should use extradition as the centerpiece of Colombian counter-narcotics 
strategy (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 108).   
 After more than two months of relative peace, on March 29th 1990, the truce 
between Los Extraditables and the Barco government ended when military General 
Harold Bedoya declared Pablo Escobar’s hometown of Envigado a military emergency 
zone.  As a consequence, Los Extraditables announced that they would renew the war 
against the government because of human rights abuses perpetrated by Colombia’s 
national police, but their underlying intention was to pressure the government to begin 
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another negotiation (Escobar: 17 años, 1993; Mollison et al., 2007).  From April to July 
of 1990 Los Extraditables targeted the Medellin police and the number of assassinated 
police officers rose to 250 assassinations.  Also Los Extraditables began placing car 
bombs in public places in Bogota, Cali, and Medellin (Escobar: 17 años, 1993; Salazar, 
2001, p. 244), killing 93 people, injuring 450, and resulting in 3.7 million U.S. dollars in 
material damages.  The use of bombs subsided on July of  1990 in expectation of a 
change in the presidency. 
 On August 9th 1990, Cesar Gaviria became the President of Colombia.  After, 
promising to distinguish between drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, President Gaviria 
sought to provide DTO leaders with a political option so that they would surrender to 
authorities.  To test the seriousness of the Gaviria government proposal, on August 30th 
1990 Los Extraditables began a second series of kidnappings to speed up negotiations.  
These kidnappings will be referred to as the Liberal kidnapping campaign. 
 In response to the kidnapping of a team of journalists headed by Diana Turbay on 
August 30th 1990, President Gaviria issued Decree 2047 on September 5th 1990, which 
stipulated that if traffickers turned themselves to authorties and confessed to a charge, 
they would not be extradited.  However, Los Extraditables rejected Decree 2047 because 
of two issues:  First, the ban on extradition was conditioned to the admittance of a crime 
and Los Extraditables wanted total amnesty.  Second, there were no guarantees that the 
extradition ban would be respected in future presidencies—it was not a permanent ban on 
extradition.  After Decree 2047 was issued, the Ochoa brothers began negotiations with 
the government. 
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In reaction to Decree 2047, Los Extraditables continued the Liberal kidnapping 
campaign and kidnapped five relatives of Colombia’s political elite in less than two 
months, from September 19th to November 7th 1990.  The kidnappings were done to 
increase the pressure on President Cesar Gaviria so that he would permanently ban 
extraditions as stipulated in the 1991 Colombian Constitution.   
The Liberal kidnapping campaign mobilized influential politicians,92 hostage 
relatives, and public figures, like television personality Father Rafael Garcia Herreros, to 
act as mediators between Los Extraditables and the Gaviria government.  The main 
purpose of the kidnapping campaign was to obtain a negotiation with the Gaviria 
Administration to discuss: an extradition ban, the terms of surrender for DTO leaders, 
and the release of hostages.  Among those kidnapped were: Diana Turbay who was Ex-
President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala’s daughter.  Francisco Santos Calderon93—the son 
Hernando Santos the owner of the newspaper El Tiempo.  Marina Montoya was 
kidnapped in an act of revenge that would end her life because she was the sister of 
German Montoya, the advisor of Ex-President Virgilio Barco who failed to bring the 
1988 trafficker-government negotiation to fruition.   
The sister and wife of congressman Alberto Villamizar, who led the First 
Congressional Committee dealing with constitutional reform and international treaties 
was also kidnapped. Villamizar was a political colleague of President Cesar Gaviria 
because both Villamizar and Gaviria belonged to Luis Carlos Galan’s Nuevo Liberalismo.  
As a member of the Nuevo Liberalismo and as a leader of the House of Representatives, 
                                                        
92 Among the politicians involved were the group known as Los Notables, who were composed of three 
Colombian Ex-Presidents, among others.   
 
93 Francisco Santos became President Alvaro Uribe’s Vice President 2002-2010. 
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Alberto Villamizar was an ally of the Bentacur government in passing Colombia’s first 
anti-narcotics statue in 1985; as such, Villamizar was himself targeted by DTOs and 
survived an assassination attempt.  Therefore, it is ironic that to save his wife and sister, 
Alberto Villamizar was forced to act as the main mediator between Los Extraditables and 
the government.94  
The family members of the victims were influential members of the Liberal party, 
Gaviria’s political party.  The group Los Extraditables was very strategic when it selected 
its victims because all of the relatives had influence over Gaviria with the exception of 
Marina Montoya, who was kidnapped and kiled as an act of revenge (Garcia, 1996).  
President Cesar Gaviria was chosen to be the 1990 Liberal presidential candidate 
precisely because the son of assassinated presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan, 
publicly nominated Gaviria at his father’s funeral.  The kidnapping of many of his 
colleagues’ family limited Gaviria’s negotiating tools because he could not “play hardball” 
if he had Villamizar as intermediary.95  President Gaviria’s position was difficult because 
he had to negotiate knowing full well that Los Extraditables held his colleague’s wife and 
sister as well as the sons and daughters of Colombia’s most influential families.  The 
group’s compelling strategy created a hostage crisis, and this situation forced President 
Gaviria to negotiate with Los Extraditables and make quick decisions in a period of six 
months.   
                                                        
94 For more information on how the kidnappings and the trafficker-government negotiations took place see 
Noticia de Un Secuestro by Gabriel Garcia Marquez. 
 
95 Villamizar’s wife Maruja Pachon was the sister of Gloria Pachon the widow of Presidential Candidate 
Luis Carlos Galan who was assassinated.   
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Alberto Villamizar and Pablo Escobar’s lawyer Guido Parra mediated this fourth 
and final DTO leader-government negotiation, which will be referred to as the Villamizar 
negotiation.  As negotiations ensued, Los Extraditables and the government exchanged 
signs of credibility.  At the end of November 1990, Escobar ordered his men to slowly 
release members of the televisions crew that accompanied Diana Turbay when she was 
kidnapped.  Los Extraditables proposed the surrender of 200-300 traffickers in exchange 
for the following demands: (1) No extradition, (2) An amnesty, and (3) Special detention 
centers (Clawson et al., 1996).  The release of hostages on November and December of 
1990 led to the creation of Decree 3030 on December 17th 1990.  Decree 3030 gave two 
conditions: (1) A person condemned for various crimes could serve their sentences 
concurrently, and (2) To prevent extradition and receive lower sentences, traffickers had 
to surrender and confess to a crime.  At this point Fabio Ochoa turned himself in on 
December 18th 1990.  Los Extraditables did not accept Decree 3030 for the same reasons 
as before; the group wanted an amnesty and a permanent ban on extradition.   
During January 1991 a dramatic turn of events led Cesar Gaviria’s Administration 
to issue Decree 303.  Jorge Luis Ochoa surrendered on January 15th.  On January 24 Los 
Extraditables assassinated Marina Montoya after the Medellin gang Los Priscos, who 
were hit-men working for Pablo Escobar, were killed by authorities.  The next day, Diana 
Turbay was accidentally shot while authorities tried to rescue her from kidnappers.  On 
January 29th 1991 the government issued Decree 303 to prevent further hostage deaths 
and to reassure that it was committed to the negotiation process.  Decree 303 gave 
reduced sentences to persons that admitted to one crime and no extradition for persons 
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that turn themselves in.  In response to Decree 303 Pablo Escobar released Alberto 
Villamizar’s sister on February 4th 1991. 
The creation of Decree 303 was also tailor-made to suit the Ochoa brothers.  
Decree 303 was an improvement on prior decrees because its language was more precise 
in specifying that those who surrendered would not be extradited and because it gave 
reduced sentences to persons that admitted to one crime, instead of giving concurrent 
sentences for the admittance of various crimes.  Also this decree would retroactively 
cover persons that turned themselves in prior to January 29th 1991.  Still, at this point, 
extradition was not yet permanently banned.  However, on February 16th Juan David 
Ochoa became the last Ochoa brother to surrender to authorities.   
The political environment in the first two months of 1991 was deadly and this 
created a need for peace, which benefited Los Extraditables.  By February 1991, 1200 
murders had taken place just in Medellin; this is a rate of 20 violent deaths per day and a 
massacre every four days.  About 500 policemen were dead and indiscriminate acts of 
violence against civilians were common. For example, on February 16th an explosion at 
Medellin’s bull fighting ring La Macarena killed 25 people and wounded 143 people 
(Escobar: 17 años, 1993).  The explosion set by Medellin gangs was supposed to blow up 
a police station nearby, but instead it led to civilian deaths. 
On March 4th 1991 Alberto Villamizar co-authored a letter with the Ochoa 
Brothers to mediate the start of a negotiation for Pablo Escobar’s compliance with 
Colombian authorities.  The negotiation involved the plans to build a new jail and its 
security, which was part of the negotiation demands made by Pablo Escobar.    
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After the Constitutional Assembly drafted an anti-extradition article to 
permanently ban extradition on April 18th 1991, on April 22nd Pablo Escobar agreed to 
surrender and confess to a crime.  On May 15th the Constitutional Assembly started the 
debate on the extradition of nationals.  On May 21st Pablo Escobar’s lawyer presented 
three key points for his surrender: The first, demanded to screen the jail’s security.  The 
second discussed the police and military’s role within the jail.  And the third requested 
the retirement of the head of the DAS, then General Miguel Maza Marquez.96 In view of 
Pablo Escobar’s eminent surrender, the government basically allowed him to plan all 
aspects of his incarceration but did not agree to fire Gen. Maza Marquez.   
Pablo Escobar designed the jail on a piece of property that he exchanged with the 
municipality of Envigado months before his surrender.  Envigado was the city where 
Escobar grew up, so he had a lot of political influence.  The Envigado government 
constructed the La Catedral jail with $2 million dollars that Escobar donated for its 
construction (Clawson et al., 1996; Legarda, 2005, p. 255).  In all probability the 
credibility of the committee chosen to screen jail security was compromised based on the 
political posts these committee members held.  The committee was composed of the 
Mayor of Envigado, the prosecutor of Antioquia, and the Colombian Director of 
Prisons.97 After the conditions of Escobar’s incarceration were agreed to on May 24th 
                                                        
96 DAS was the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad an equivalent to the United State’s Federal 
Bureau of Investigations.   
 
97 During this period in Colombian history the Mayor of Envigado could not have made any decisions 
without the consent of traffickers.  Pablo Escobar had increased the budget of Envigado through donations 
from 1983 to 1989 by tenfold, so the city was spending about $40 dollars per capita on its citizens 
(Clawson et al., 1996:112).  Medellin is the capital of the Department of Antioquia.  If the regional attorney 
general of Antioquia wanted to remain alive, he could not make decisions that went against the wishes of 
Medellin-based DTOs, since many public officials during this time, including the Governor of Antioquia, 
received death threats if they did not succumb to DTO leader demands.  The Director of Prisons in 
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1991, Los Extraditables released the last hostages: Francisco Santos and Alberto 
Villamizar’s wife.  On May 25th 1991, the government called off all operations to capture 
Escobar and on May 29th the government vowed to guarantee that Pablo Escobar would 
not be extradited if he surrendered.   
 On the 2nd of June, DTO leader-government mediator, Father Rafael Garcia 
Herreros, announced that Pablo Escobar would surrender to authorities along with 100 
other traffickers.  Finally, after much debate on June 19th 1991, the Constitutional 
Assembly voted in favor of banning extradition and added Article 35 to the 1991 
constitution.  On this same date Pablo Escobar surrendered to authorities.  On July 3rd 
1991, Los Extraditables through their final communiqué announced that they were 
dismantling their military organization because of the National Constitutional 
Assembly’s vote against the extradition of Colombian nationals (Extraditables, 1991).   
The discussion on the political cohesiveness of Medellin-based DTO leaders’ use 
of violence finds that, once DTO leaders made the issue of extradition a top priority in 
their agendas, they gradually and cohesively used violence to pressure political elites and 
government officials to permanently prohibit extradition.  As events unfolded, in addition 
to banning extradition, DTO leaders based in Medellin used violence to pressure 
government officials into negotiating favorable terms for their surrender to authorities.  
Also the discussion on DTO leaders’ use of violence highlights three major 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Colombia has always been a legally compromised post because Directors have to deal directly with 
powerful criminals.  Uncorrupt directors do not last long because they cannot do their jobs without being 
threatened or bribed.  Prison directors are caught between the demands of powerful criminals that can buy 
them or kill them and the potentially corrupt politicians that supervise prison directors.  For this reason, 
directors usually retire early or receive bribes to survive such a dangerous post. 
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characteristics of this phase of organizational cohesion: the leadership’s persistence in 
obtaining its goals, its learning capacity, and finally its initial rifts among DTO leaders.   
From the first incident that marked use of DTO violence—the assassination of 
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla on April 20th 1983—to the indiscriminate use of car bombs, the 
major terrorist attacks, and the final kidnapping campaign of 1990-1991, the main 
objective of the group was to oppose the policy of extraditing Colombian nationals to the 
United States.  Because Pablo Escobar was the sole decision maker, the group’s 
cohesiveness was strong.  Usually the violent acts were characterized by retaliations 
against the actions of government officials or offensives that consisted of pro-actively 
using violence to pressure politicians into negotiating a ban on extradition and favorable 
terms of surrender.  The cohesiveness of the violent strategy goes through two phases.  
The first was a selective assassination phase taking place from 1983-1988. Whereas the 
second phase from 1988-1991 still used violence in a highly selective manner, but it was 
used in conjunction with indiscriminate terrorist activities to create havoc and a sense of 
urban insecurity.  As a consequence, the second phase was more successful in pushing 
politicians to negotiate with DTO leaders.   
During the first violent phase, the selective assassinations of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, 
Supreme and criminal court judges, Guillermo Cano the editor of El Espectador, 
Ministers of Justice, and of Luis Carlos Galan, were used by Los Extraditables to retaliate 
against the policy of extradition and push for its prohibition.  However, these acts led the 
government to counterattack.  
In the second violent phase, as DTO leaders progressively obtained negotiations 
with cabinet level officials from the end of 1988 to the middle of 1991—during the 
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Virgilio Barco and the Cesar Gaviria presidencies—the use of violence was done 
selectively, but in combination with terrorist actions to corner the respective 
administrations into negotiating.  Specifically, as negotiations broke down, the use of 
violence became more indiscriminate to show DTO power and conversely to show the 
government’s inability to control violence.  As a consequence, the use of indiscriminate 
violence such as the explosion of an airliner and the destruction of the DAS building was 
done to make the government capitulate.  What aggravated the problem of violence for 
the governments in power during the second violent phase was that violence was not only 
generated by DTOs against the state, but also by DTO wars, and by paramilitary and 
guerrilla groups.   
When indiscriminate violence, such as car bombs, was paired with the use of 
selective violence, such as the kidnappings of business and political elites, this 
environment created a higher level of pressure for Presidents to negotiate because the 
kidnappings created crises.  The combination of discriminate and selective violence was 
effective because Colombian Presidents were unable to control terrorist acts and, in 
addition, the violence used by DTO leaders became more personal for Presidents in 
power because they knew the people who were affected by DTO attacks.  For example, 
Virgilio Barco seriously considered negotiating with DTO leaders when his Presidential 
Advisor’s son was kidnapped along with 20 prominent business elites from Antioquia on 
December of 1989.  The Antioquia kidnapping campaign was the event that led to the 
first DTO leader-government truce and because of this crisis Virgilio Barco made 
negotiations with DTO leaders a top cabinet level issue for the first time.  In contrast, 
prior to the Antioquia hostage crisis, the violence generated by DTO leaders only pushed 
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Colombian Presidents Belisario Betancur and Virgilio Barco to increase their counter-
narcotics efforts, such as reinstating extradition via Decree 1860 in 1989. In addition, 
selective assassinations bolstered public outrage with DTOs assassinations.   
During the second violent phase, the final rise in indiscriminate violence from 
March to July of 1990, coupled with the Liberal kidnapping campaign resulted in the 
fourth and final Villamizar negotiation, which led to a permanent Constitutional 
prohibition of extradition and in a negotiated surrender of the major leaders of the 
Medellin-based DTOs—the Ochoa brothers and Pablo Escobar.  The organization of the 
Liberal hostage crisis was a success for DTO leaders because they finally obtained the 
Presidential attention needed to reach an agreement with the government.   
The decision making process of Los Extraditables, which mainly relied on the 
opinions of its leader, Pablo Escobar, showed the high degree of organizational 
cohesiveness that the group had in pursing its political objectives and in implementing its 
violent strategy.  The accounts presented in this project suggest that Pablo Escobar was 
the group’s sole decision-maker, which made deciding the group’s goals and strategies a 
highly cohesive process.  It is important to note that Pablo Escobar was able to learn how 
to strategically use violence to obtain political results at each stage of the event.   
During the first violent phase from 1983-1988, when Pablo Escobar was 
selectively assassinating public officials, the group Los Extraditables was unable to 
convince politicians to negotiate with DTO leaders or their mediators because the 
assassinations only strengthened the Colombian presidencies of Belisario Betancur and 
Virgilio Barco to pursue counter-narcotics policies since these mentioned Presidents felt 
their actions were supported by public opinion’s outrage.  In fact, the Andres Pastrana 
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and Carlos Mauro Hoyos kidnapping on January of 1988 was the first attempt by Los 
Extraditables to use hostages in an effort to establish negotiations. However, this first 
hostage attempt failed because Hoyos died and Pastrana never became an emissary once 
released.  When Los Extraditables organized the Antioquia kidnapping campaign on 
December of 1989, for the first time the group obtained the attention of the Barco 
government because the government allowed Pablo Escobar’s emissaries to present the 
DTOs leadership’s concerns at a cabinet level meeting.  However, because Los 
Extraditables released all the hostages in mid January and committed to a truce, as a 
gesture of “good faith” (since they believed that the government would engage in 
negotiations) once the hostages were released, Los Extraditables lost their negotiating 
leverage.  Consequently, the Barco government, uncompelled to negotiate with DTO 
leaders, went on an offensive against Escobar on March of 1990 by declaring Envigado, 
his hometown, a military objective.   
As the leader of Los Extraditables, Pablo Escobar learned from the Antioquia 
kidnapping campaign how to implement a more effective hostage crisis.  From March to 
July of 1990 police officers were targeted and car bombs were placed in urban centers to 
create chaos as soon as DTO-government negotiations fell. Once Cesar Gaviria took over 
the Presidency on August of 1990, Los Extraditables’ Liberal kidnapping campaign 
quickly started a negotiation process.  Instead of releasing hostages once the government 
agreed to hear DTO proposals, as was done during the Antioquia campaign, the Liberal 
kidnapping campaign became a prolonged process to obtain political results, which 
coincided with the proceedings of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).   
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The similarities between the Liberal hostage crisis and the Antioquia crisis relied 
on the ability of Los Extraditables to choose hostages that would personalize the crisis for 
the presidents in power. Since the Liberal hostage crisis involved the relatives of 
colleagues belonging to President Gaviria’s own political party, the Liberal Hostage 
Crisis became a highly personal event were Gaviria had to negotiate to save the lives of 
people he knew.  Another similarity between the two kidnapping campaigns was that 
Pablo Escobar kidnaped the family members of a key politician, so the politician would 
become both a victim and mediator.  Whereas in the Antioquia campaign German 
Montoya became a DTO leader-government mediator to Barco, as Montoya’s son was 
kidnapped; similarly, in the Liberal hostage crisis, Alberto Villamizar became the main 
DTO leader-government mediator, since both his sister and wife were hostages.   
The Liberal kidnapping campaign became a more effective hostage crisis because 
Pablo Escobar stretched the crisis by releasing hostages according to their political 
importance and, also as negotiation points were accomplished.  Consequently, and in 
contrast to the Antioquia hostage crisis, Escobar as the leader of Los Extraditables did 
not cede his negotiating leverage until most of his demands were met.  During the Liberal 
hostage crisis Pablo Escobar’s lawyer asked for: no extradition, an amnesty for crimes 
committed, and special detention centers, but the final DTO-government negotiation 
resulted in the following compromise: no extradition, a reduced sentence for admittance 
of one crime, and the construction of a special detention center.   
Finally the Liberal kidnapping campaign coupled with the Medellin DTO leaders 
influence on the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was a convergence of the 
legislative and violent strategies to permanently ban extradition and obtain favorable 
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terms of surrender.  While the executive was forced to reach an agreement with DTO 
leaders on their terms of surrender (as a consequence of the hostage crisis), the financial 
influence of DTO leaders on NCA assemblypersons facilitated the passage of the 
Constitutional Article forbidding the extradition of Colombian nationals.  Both strategies 
came to fruition when on June 19th 1991, the NCA voted against extradition and Pablo 
Escobar surrendered to authorities at La Catedral—the detention center constructed for 
Escobar in the city of Envigado.   
The discussion on the cohesiveness of the DTO’s violent strategy as implemented 
by Los Extraditables also highlights the initial rifts separating DTO leaders.  By 1983 
following the Rodrigo Lara Bonilla assassination, as the Colombian government 
intensified its pursuit of traffickers, DTO leaders realized that to avoid state persecution 
they had to seek a negotiated solution to their legal troubles.  The DTO leaders also 
agreed that the issue of extradition became the most important agenda, since traffickers 
wanted to avoid being sent to the Unites States on drug trafficking charges. While Pablo 
Escobar was willing to fulfill these objectives by using violence, others –in particular the 
Ochoa brothers, preferred peaceful negotiation with the government.  The accounts 
presented here suggest that in 1984 Medellin-based DTO leaders created Los 
Extraditables to force a negotiation process with government officials.  At the beginning 
Los Extraditables was highly cohesive in pursuing and fulfilling their objective because 
Pablo Escobar was the group’s main decision-maker and because DTO leaders based in 
Medellin provided funds to launch the violent campaign against political elites.  
Nevertheless, the initial rifts between DTO leaders began to show towards the end of 
1990.  While Los Extraditables organized the second kidnapping campaign from 
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September to November of 1990, as soon as President Cesar Gaviria issued Decree 2047 
on September of 1990, the Ochoa brothers began negotiating with the government 
separately from Pablo Escobar.  By December of 1990 Fabio Ochoa surrendered to 
authorities, and by mid February of 1991 all of the Ochoa brothers had surrendered to 
authorities following Decree 303.  In contrast, Pablo Escobar organized the Liberal 
hostage crisis and turned himself in once extradition was permanently prohibited in the 
1991 Constitution.  The Ochoa brothers’ separate negotiation process suggests that they 
wanted to resolve their legal status separate from Los Extraditables’ Liberal hostage 
campaign, even if it meant being extradited by another presidency or serving long 
sentences for admitting to one crime as the early Decree drafts demanded.  Moreover, the 
Ochoa brothers were tired of the government’s pursuit: 
When we presented ourselves to the law, there was a lot of violence.  But the whole world knew it 
was Pablo Escobar.  We presented ourselves even when the treaty was in force.  They had not 
removed the treaty…  In 1990 we presented ourselves, and the [extradition] treaty was repealed in 
1991.  And so then we were very removed from everything.  We were hiding and they were 
looking for us at that time to kill us… They weren't looking for us to extradite us, but to kill us.  
And I think that we paid very highly for that (Interviews- Jorge Luis Ochoa, 2000). 
 
Once in jail, the Ochoa brothers became intermediaries between mediator Alberto 
Villamizar and Pablo Escobar to obtain the release of hostages and to negotiate Escobar’s 
terms of surrender (Interviews – Juan David Ochoa, 2000). 
Finally, this section on the cohesiveness of the violent strategy shows the 
evolution of the terms of the four DTO leader-government negotiations.  The 1984 
Panama Negotiation was the most generous offer proposal created by the DTO leaders.  
Traffickers proposed to dismantle their businesses, surrender laboratories, runways, and 
aircraft, which according to DTO calculations would set the illicit drug industry back for 
at least 10 years.  Drug Trafficking Organization leaders proposed to bring their financial 
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assets to Colombia, which would be taxable income that would increase government 
revenue and to “help rehabilitate drug addicts” (Lee, 1990:140-143).  In exchange DTO 
leaders wanted an amnesty for crimes committed and to not be extradited.   
In contrast, the 1988 Vallejo Arbelaez Negotiation was the least generous 
proposal created by the DTO leaders.  In the Vallejo Arbelaez Negotiation DTO leaders 
proposed to surrender their illicit business in exchange for a permanent ban on extradition 
and an amnesty for crimes committed, but in addition they wanted a patrimonial amnesty 
and the surrender of leftist subversives—a demand the government had little ability to 
implement.   
The 1989 Londoño-Aristizabal-Montoya Negotiation was a more pragmatic 
proposal created by DTO leaders and emissaries, also it served as a blueprint for the 
fourth and last negotiation.  The 1989 Londoño-Aristizabal-Montoya Negotiation terms 
were basically the same as the 1988 Vallejo Arbelaez proposal, but the emissaries 
suggested that the DTO leaders should surrender to authorities in order to add more 
credibility to the proposal.   
Finally for the 1990-1991 Villamizar Negotiation, it was the Cesar Gaviria 
government, based on the previous negotiation, that set the negotiation proposal through 
Decree Law 2047 published on September 5th 1990, which stipulated that traffickers 
should: surrender and confess to a crime to avoid extradition.  The proposal would set off 
a series of offers and counter offers.  As the leader of Los Extraditables, Pablo Escobar’s 
counter offer was: no extradition, an amnesty, and construction of special detention 
centers.  Finally, the government issued Decree Law 303 on January 29th 1991, which 
gave reduced sentences for admitting to one crime and no extradition for persons that 
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surrendered.  After agreeing to Decree Law 303, on May 21st 1991, Pablo Escobar was 
granted the construction of the special detention center, La Catedral.  Although DTO 
leaders did not get the amnesty they wanted, they were successful in obtaining a 
patrimonial amnesty, such as not disclosing business assets (like airstrips, cocaine 
refineries, or routes); more importantly, they were promised not to be extradited, received 
low sentences for admitting to one crime, and were allowed special detention centers.98 In 
exchange, the government obtained their surrender and hoped to decrease urban violence. 
Political Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 1991-1993 
 The organizational cohesion of Medellin-based DTO leaders drastically weakened 
after Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers surrendered to authorities.  During the 1990-
91 Alberto Villamizar negotiations between DTO leaders and government officials, the 
Ochoa brothers sought a separate negotiation process, which allowed the brothers to 
surrender to authorities by February of 1991, while Los Extraditables were in the midst 
of a hostage campaign.  The Ochoa brothers saw the Gaviria government decrees as an 
opportunity to avoid being held responsible for the violence generated by Los 
Extraditables and to end the government’s persecution: 
Frontline: Why did you decide to turn yourselves into the government?  
 
Juan David Ochoa: We were tired of having to run.  We were afraid we would get killed.  We 
wanted a normal life with our family, to dedicate ourselves to our businesses, to our kids, and once 
and for all to finish with the headache, that nightmare that we lived.  
 
Frontline: Did the government win the war? 
 
Juan David Ochoa: All of us won.  The government won, in the sense that they didn't have to 
persecute us anymore.  And we won also because we solved our problem.  There's no winners or 
                                                        
98 Although Pablo Escobar constructed his own detention center, the Ochoa Brothers and other DTO 
leaders that surrendered to authorities added amenities to their prison cells like kitchens, offices, televisions, 
phones, and computers, and took advantage of family and conjugal visits as permitted by Colombian penal 
code.   
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losers.  Everybody was a winner, when there is a settlement like ours (Interviews – Juan David 
Ochoa, 2000). 
 
The Ochoa-government agreement illustrated fissures between the Ochoa brothers and 
Pablo Escobar as the leader of Los Extraditables because Escobar wanted to obtain a 
negotiation process through the use of violence, while the Ochoa brothers believed that 
non-violent methods to obtain a negotiation process would result in a more favorable 
outcome.  Although the Ochoa brothers distanced themselves from Los Extraditables and 
the violence generated by this group to obtain a negotiated solution to their legal status, 
they indirectly benefited from the violence because it led President Cesar Gaviria to start 
negotiations with them.  Without the use of violence it seems improbable that the 
government would have negotiated with traffickers because both the Betancur and Barco 
governments failed to be receptive to trafficker demands when their proposals were 
offered in the midst of relative peace—at the 1984 Panama negotiation, or at the 
beginning of 1990 during the Antioquia kidnapping crisis, when DTO leaders released all 
the hostages without conditions.  As discussed earlier, the government was most 
responsive to DTO leader demands after Los Extraditables engaged in both 
indiscriminate violent campaigns and hostage crises.  In fact, the theatrical terrorist acts 
of late 1989 and the pervasive car bombs of the 1990s led President Cesar Gaviria to 
condemn “narcoterrorism” while campaigning. Yet, the violence also led Gaviria to 
create a negotiated opportunity of surrender for traffickers with the objective of reducing 
urban violence. Consequently, the Ochoa brothers took advantage of this opportunity.  
 Other Medellin-based DTO leaders also began to distance themselves from Pablo 
Escobar once he was imprisoned at La Catedral. As the leader of Los Extraditables, 
Pablo Escobar had organized the war against the political establishment and had received 
194 
 
contributions from fellow traffickers to fund the war, where payments ranged from 
$100,000 to $250,000 a month to obtain a prohibition on extradition (Aranguren, 2001, p. 
145; Clawson et al., 1996, p. 47; Hermanos Ochoa, 2009).  Escobar had agreed with other 
DTO leaders that, once he surrendered to authorities, DTO leaders based in Medellin 
would continue paying Pablo Escobar the “war tax” while he was imprisoned. They 
agreed because Escobar was powerful and he had pushed for a constitutional ban on 
extradition.  According to some accounts (Clawson et al., 1994; Salazar, 2000), after 
Escobar surrendered, he had increased the “war tax” from $250,000 a month to a million 
dollars a month by July of 1992.  As a consequence of this increase, once DTO leaders 
refused to pay, a conflict ensued which resulted in the death of four DTO leaders: Kiko, 
William Moncada, Fernando, and Mario Galeano.  Some accounts (Legarda, 2005; 
Salazar, 2000; Aranguren, 2001) suggest that in addition to the “war tax,” because 
Escobar had little monetary liquidity as a result of his “war effort,” he continued his 
activities in the drug business and used kidnappings of fellow traffickers to support his 
organization.99 It is believed that Pablo Escobar had the Galeano and Moncada brothers 
killed to set an example for other DTO leaders, who: (1) thought about refusing to pay 
the war tax, or (2) considered taking over Escobar’s market share in the cocaine trade.  
As a result, some traffickers that had supported the activities of Los Extraditables in their 
anti-extradition efforts united to oppose Pablo Escobar because of the exemplar DTO 
leader assassinations.  Consequently, the vigilante group Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar 
                                                        
99 The Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, a.k.a. “Popeye” (Legarda, 2005), account suggests that some of 
Escobar’s gunman stole $20 million dollars from Fernando Galeano and when Galeano and Moncada went 
to La Catedral prison to speak with Escobar, Escobar refused to give the money back and had Galeano and 
Moncada killed and, allegedly, their assets were signed over to Escobar (Legarda, 2005). 
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(PEPES, Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) emerged following the death of the Galeano and 
Moncada DTO leaders on July 3rd 1992.  This group’s leaders, Carlos Castaño and Don 
Berna,100 who in the mid-1990s would participate the anti-insurgent paramilitary group 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), pursued Pablo Escobar and his allies, and 
created a feud among Medellin-based DTO leaders.  
The organizational cohesion of Medellin-based DTO leaders broke down because 
of four main reasons: the death of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, the imprisonment of 
the Ochoa brothers, Pablo Escobar’s imprisonment, Escobar’s war tax increase, and 
finally, Escobar’s assassination of the Moncada and Galeano brothers.  Rodriguez 
Gacha’s death left a void in terms of gun power and funding for the activities of Los 
Extraditables.  The imprisonment of the Ochoa brothers, removed their leadership 
position within DTO leaders and distanced them from violent acts.  Escobar’s 
imprisonment reduced his capacity as an enforcer of DTO leaders because he was 
running out of funds, and because other DTO leaders such as Don Berna began 
challenging Escobar’s capacity to control urban gangs of gunmen throughout Medellin.  
In addition, some DTO leaders believed that since the group’s main objective—a ban on 
extradition—had been accomplished, a war tax was unnecessary.  Finally, because Pablo 
Escobar had four of his fellow DTO leaders killed, DTO leaders believed Escobar could 
not be trusted. The creation of Personas Encontra de Pablo Escobar, People Against 
Pablo Escobar (los PEPES), signified the collapse of Medellin-based DTO leader 
                                                        
100 “Don Berna,” a.k.a.  “Adolfo Paz,” is Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano who had worked as chief 
security man for the Fernando Galeano organization and was well connected among gunmen in Medellin 
(Aranguren, 2001).  He became part of the AUC and after Pablo Escobar’s death “Don Berna” became one 
of Medellin’s most powerful DTO leaders because by 2004 he consolidated power among gangs in 
Medellin.  He was extradited to the United States on drug trafficking charges on 2008.   
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cohesion, because the Pepes epitomized the collective action problem that Medellin DTO 
leaders where having after the Extradition Treaty was banned and Pablo Escobar 
surrendered to authorities. The accomplishment of a goal such as banning extradition and 
the failure to create a new organizational objective, coupled with a distrust of Escobar as 
a leader, led DTO leaders to decrease their cooperation since they did not have a new 
common goal to accomplish.   
Analysis 
 The discussion on the economic and political cohesion of DTOs showed the 
influence of external events over these organizations, and the capacity of DTOs to change 
their environment through the use of resources to impact politics.  Economically, DTO 
leaders were able to take advantage of the trade opportunities available as a consequence 
of the U.S. counternarcotics policies, which prohibited the sale and production of cocaine 
domestically and internationally, thereby inflating the price of a good that has a market 
demand.  In addition, the risk involved in producing and transporting cocaine from 
Colombia to the United States increased the price of this commodity at each stage of the 
trade, which makes the trade on a prohibited commodity like cocaine a profitable venture 
for smugglers.  The high earnings that DTOs obtained from the cocaine trade also allow 
traffickers to wield political power.  The great political influence allowed DTOs to run 
for public office and sponsor politician campaigns, but their increased political power 
also led to their increased persecution. The following discussion will summarize how the 
economic and political cohesion enjoyed by DTOs allowed them to fulfill their political 
objectives. 
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 Economically, the organizational objective of Medellin-based DTO leaders was to 
reduce risks and increase profit.  Whereas at the beginning of their incursion in the 
cocaine trade DTO leaders were small specialized dealers, by the time they became 
wealthier Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos 
Lehder were able to create full service DTOs or had large scale specialized smuggling 
organizations.  When smuggling cocaine DTO leaders could use their full service 
organizations designed to produce and export cocaine, but they could also work with 
freelance dealers specialized in specific trade functions.  If a trafficker would use his own 
full service DTO, all employees worked cohesively to fulfill the objective of making 
profit.   
The organizational cohesion of a drug trafficking organization was driven by 
positive and negative selective incentives.  The main positive incentive driving DTO 
leaders and employees to work cohesively and with discipline was the higher than 
average salaries received from working in a DTO.  Whereas DTO leaders made 
millionaire profits, DTO employees at all stages of production earned higher than average 
profits. A raspachin, who is one of the lowest paid workers in the trade, could make 
earnings equivalent to the Colombian minimum monthly wage in one week.  The need to 
make stable profits led DTO leaders and employees to create networks of high 
interpersonal trust to avoid using violence and to ensure organizational discipline; 
because the higher the degree of interpersonal trust that existed within an organization 
and among DTOs, the lesser need for violence to enforce discipline and resolve conflicts.  
For this reason, strong familial and friendship networks were built to prevent DTO 
member betrayal.   
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The use of negative selective incentives within and among DTOs also resulted in 
a high degree of organizational cohesion and discipline.  Violence was a negative 
incentive that was widely used to enforce contracts among DTOs and to insure 
organizational cohesion within a DTO.  Intra-DTO violence deterred employees from 
cheating DTO leaders, and since many employees had familial and friendship ties, it was 
easier for organizational enforcers to track down cheaters within an organization. Inter-
DTO violence was used to settle disputes among DTOs in the absence of legal conflict 
resolution, such as courts. Although violence was widely practiced to enforce discipline 
within and among DTOs, as a consequence of the weak law enforcement institutions in 
Colombia, the use of violence for some DTO leaders was an enforcement mechanism of 
last resort because its use attracted the attention of authorities, which could pose legal 
problems for organizations.   
The section on the economic cohesion of DTOs also delves on the economic 
relationships among DTO leaders.  Cooperation among DTO leaders was done in an 
effort to maximize profits in practicing economies of scale and to allow the cocaine trade 
to be flexible enough to avoid and keep ahead of authorities.  One of the most notorious 
cooperation among national level DTO leaders was the creation of the industrial sized 
coca paste refinery called Tranquilandia, where DTO leaders would process coca paste in 
massive quantities so that it could be exported in ton quantities on airplanes or in cargo 
shipments.  The economic cooperation among national DTO leaders lasted from 1983, 
with the creation of the group MAS, until January of 1988, which marked the start of the 
war between the Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organizations—Pablo Escobar and 
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the Cali based Rodriguez Orejuela brothers primarily fought over the control of cocaine 
market share when international wholesale cocaine prices plummeted.  
Politically, DTO leaders based in Medellin cohesively worked to influence 
politicians. DTO leaders ran in elections, donated to political campaigns, contested the 
judicial validity of the Extradition Treaty, and used violence to fulfill their main political 
objectives—to prohibit extradition and resolve their legal problems.  Although the 
electoral, judicial, and legislative strategies worked because they invalidated the Treaty 
on Extradition through the use of the legal system, underlying all of these strategies was 
the strategy of violence used by DTO leaders to influence politics. Using violence as a 
strategy allowed DTO leaders to reduce presidential autonomy. The creation of Los 
Extraditables was done to coerce policymakers into invalidating the 1979 Treaty on 
Extradition, which was seen as the main threat to DTO leaders.   
In general, the political cohesion of Los Extraditables was strong because Pablo 
Escobar was sole leader, had clear objectives, and was supported and unchallenged by 
other DTO leaders.  Moreover the activities organized by Los Extraditables were well 
funded by Medellin-based DTO leaders who contributed monthly dues of approximately 
$200,000 dollars a month.  From 1983 to 1991, this strong organizational cohesiveness 
allowed Pablo Escobar to have the necessary coercive power to compel Presidents 
Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria to negotiate with DTO leaders.   
The interest group model used in this project is useful to look at the evolution of 
Medellin DTO leader cohesion because it answers two questions: (1) how do 
environmental factors affect a group’s cohesion? And (2) how does a group change its 
internal dynamics to cohesively achieve policy objectives? In the case of Medellin-based 
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drug trafficking organizations, the hypotheses of the Micro and Macro interest group 
model explains group cohesion and fragmentation.   
Hypothesis 1 of the Macro Model, designed to test the influence of external 
events on groups, states that: developments in the internal organization of an illicit 
interest group should follow changes to its role within a larger political environment.  In 
the case of Medellin-based DTO leaders, the salience of the issue of extradition in 1983 
and 1984, led DTOs to invalidate the Treaty on Extradition, as a consequence of— Pablo 
Escobar’s forced retirement from Congress on October 23rd 1983; the assassination of 
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla that increased Colombian government counternarcotics efforts; the 
U.S. Government indictments on Pablo Escobar, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and the 
Ochoa brothers; in addition to the Spanish government arrest of Jorge Luis Ochoa.  These 
events led Medellin-based DTO leaders to realize that the extradition of nationals should 
be prohibited and that is why they began to influence policy through legal and violent 
means.   
Hypothesis 1a states that: changes to the internal organization and structure of an 
illicit interest group are related and deal with the environmental events that influence the 
group and, furthermore, the changes made should be collective goods because they 
benefit the organization as a whole.  In the case of Medellin-based DTOs, the Extradition 
Treaty’s invalidation was seen as a collective goal because, if achieved, DTO leaders 
would have a Colombian “safe-haven” from U.S. legal prosecution.  Consequently, 
Medellin-based DTO leaders cooperated and collectively funded the implementation of 
several strategies to invalidate the Treaty.   
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Both Hypotheses 1 and 1a test the Macro model because they shows how external 
variables influence internal group behavior.  In the case of Medellin-based DTOs, 
external factors examined in this section provide evidence that supports the claim that 
DTO leaders were motivated to organize based on environmental factors that 
consequently influenced their behavior.  Environmental factors, like increased Colombian 
government persecution, U.S. indictments, and trafficker arrests, led DTO leaders to view 
extradition as an important issue, the model allows a researcher to focus on the type of 
internal changes that an organization may undergo.  The formation of the group Los 
Extraditables to counteract the Treaty on Extradition is an obvious internal change to an 
environmental challenge.  However, when the discussion on cohesion focuses on the use 
of violence and the capacity that Pablo Escobar had for learning and changing strategies, 
the model allows for a focus on subtleties—even thought it is popularly known that Pablo 
Escobar and Los Extraditables used violence to influence policymakers and to change 
policy—the model allows the researcher to learn why a group’s violent targets changed 
from selective political assassinations to selective political kidnappings and also answers 
why were selective political kidnappings were used in conjunction with indiscriminate 
targets like car bombs or blowing up buildings, airliners, and newspaper headquarters.  
Without a closer examination of the environmental factors that influence a group’s 
leadership, it is impossible to fully understand a group’s inner workings to predict the 
strategies that will be implemented to change policy. 
The first hypothesis that tests the Micro Model is Hypothesis 2a, which states: 
that if members of an illicit interest group need to deal with a particular issue, then they 
will work together to solve the issue and, as a result, the political achievements obtained 
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by the group will benefit all actors.  Because overturning the 1979 Treaty on Extradition 
became Medellin-based DTO leadership’s highest priority, DTO leaders worked together 
in a cohesive fashion. Consequently the period of 1983-1991 was the period of highest 
cohesion, as most DTO leaders funded and employed a judicial, a legislative, and a 
violent strategy—to achieve the invalidation of the extradition treaty.  Traffickers pooled 
funds to hire lawyers that disputed the judicial validity of the 1979 Treaty, and 
successfully obtain favorable judgment.  Drug Trafficking Organization leaders also 
financed the campaigns of congresspersons and NCA assemblypersons to constitutionally 
ban extradition.  Concurrent with the judicial and legislative strategies, DTO leaders 
pooled funds to organize violent campaigns against judges and politicians through Los 
Extraditables to compel them to annul the policy of extradition.  It is during this period 
that Medellin DTO leaders’ actions appear more akin to a terrorist organization than an 
interest group.  
Hypothesis 2a complements Hypothesis 2b that states: once a group has clear 
leadership and influence, the group will have greater incentive to discipline its 
membership and attain internal cohesion.  Medellin-based DTO leaders, in particular 
Pablo Escobar, learned from the formation of MAS that to achieve a common goal, a 
group needed clear leadership and discipline.  Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS), as an 
anti-subversive organization, was a loose association of traffickers with little discipline. 
Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) was a more pragmatic organization created to deal with 
a hostage crisis, but it disintegrated because other DTO leaders did not want to succumb 
to the leadership of Pablo Escobar.  Whereas MAS was short-lived, it took Medellin-
based DTO leaders about a year to create Los Extraditables in 1984, but this organization 
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would now have clear leadership, funding, and discipline:  Pablo Escobar and Jose 
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha became the group’s leaders until Rodriguez Gacha’s death.  
DTO leaders based in Medellin agreed to contribute funds to finance campaigns and 
violent offensives.  Finally, Pablo Escobar, as the group’s chief enforcer, was respected 
and feared among DTO leaders for his power and economic wealth, which allowed him 
to convoke DTO leaders, create strategies, and finally enforce DTO leader agreements if 
leaders failed to cooperate.   
Hypothesis 2d, which also examines the internal workings of a group, states that: 
when a group has realized a common goal, in periods of transition, consensus among a 
group’s membership will decrease and the membership will pursue individual goals, 
which may deteriorate the group development.  The period dating from June 1991 to 
December 1993 was a transitional period for Medellin-based DTOs because of their 
success in prohibiting extradition, but also because Pablo Escobar surrendered to 
Colombian authorities.  This period was paradoxical because DTO leaders accomplished 
their objectives, but their alliances were beginning to disintegrate as a consequence of 
their political success.  Some of these alliances began to deteriorate as early as 1990 
when the Ochoa brothers began their own negotiation with government officials.  During 
this period of transition marked by Escobar’s surrender to authorities on June 19th 1991, 
DTO leaders began pursuing individual pursuits. Although they initially agreed to 
continue to pay a “war tax” to Pablo Escobar, their support for Escobar began to wane 
especially after two events: (1) When Escobar raised individual DTO leader contributions 
from about $200,000 dollars a month to one million dollars a month. (2) When he 
ordered the assassination of four DTO leaders for questioning his authority.  After these 
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two events, which culminated with Pablo Escobar’s prison escape in July of 1992, several 
Medellin-based DTO leaders challenged Pablo Escobar and created their own group, Los 
PEPES, to assassinate him.   
Hypothesis 2d complements Hypothesis 2c, which states that: when a group has 
no clear leadership or is unable to impact policy, there will be little incentive for a 
group’s leaders to organize and discipline their members.  The period, from July 1992 
until Pablo Escobar’s death on December 1993, was a period of chaos where Medellin-
based DTOs had no policy impact and in which these groups were essentially criminal 
groups engaged in organizing vendettas.  Revenge killings were difficult to control, and 
they affect DTOs’ leadership and general membership because the violence generated at 
all levels was hard to reign.  The DTO leaders and gangs in the city of Medellin initially 
became divided between those who followed Pablo Escobar and those who followed Los 
PEPES, and this clear division finally ended when authorities killed Escobar.  However, 
the period that followed Escobar’s death (1994-2004) was a period of chaos and death in 
Medellin because different DTO leaders vied to control the cities gangs and cocaine trade, 
and eventually, after about ten years of conflict, Don Berna consolidated power in 2004, 
but this “peace” only lasted for about four years, ending when Don Berna was extradited 
to the U.S. in 2008.   
To conclude, tracing the evolution of organizational cohesion of DTOs and DTO 
leaders allows researchers to examine how groups are affected by external events and 
how a group’s internal structure is reorganized to manage such events with an effort to 
alter policy, so that policy suits the group’s best interest.  If the Macro organizational 
aspects of this discussion are left out, the historical account can become mythological 
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biographic tales of individual drug dealers and their larger than life experiences, because 
the conditions that gave rise to these leaders are omitted from the analysis.  If the Macro, 
external factors, influencing DTOs become the sole subject of discussion, then it is 
impossible to know with certainty how DTOs adapt to their environment and 
consequently impact policy.  Moreover, focusing only on the Micro organizational 
aspects, by studying the individual actions of DTO leaders and their interaction, the study 
would leave out interactions between DTO leaders (as participants in an organization 
similar to a trade association) and their greater social context. Omitting the social context 
would reduce the capacity to understand how individuals impact policy.  Finally the 
analysis of a group’s cohesion, coupled with an analysis of selective incentives and an 
organizational approach is important because the model explains and illustrates why 
individuals are driven to work for a common goal, but also how such alliances form and 
dissolve.   
Group Expertise and Technology 
 A group’s expertise focuses on a group’s human capital and how a group uses 
such skills to influence policy.  The expertise the leaders and employees of Medellin-
based DTOs evolved over time because as DTOs became wealthier and more specialized, 
the organizations became both economically and politically relevant.  The economic 
specialization was faster than the political specialization because DTOs were primarily 
businesses.  As DTO leaders became millionaires, around 1978, DTOs grew and 
developed which led a greater number of employees to be hired by the specialized 
divisions of said Drug Trafficking Organizations.  Also with growth came more 
specialization, since DTO leaders were less involved in the more basic shores of a DTO.  
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It is not until the 1982 elections that DTO leaders openly delve into politics and hire 
consultants or become surrounded by politicians. 
When DTO leaders analyzed in this project started trafficking cocaine in the mid 
1970s, traffickers would specialize in one aspect of the business, such as the acquisition 
of coca paste, whereas others specialized in the actual transportation and smuggling of 
cocaine to the United States.  For example, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha specialized in 
acquiring coca paste from Bolivia and Peru and refining it in Colombia.  The Ochoa 
brothers specialized in transporting refined cocaine to the United States at first, through 
the use of human mules, and later through the use of small airplanes.  Pablo Escobar also 
specialized in procuring coca paste in the early trafficking stages, when he would pick up 
the coca paste in Ecuador or Peru via land or air, but would outsource the management of 
human mules to the United States to mule managers, like Griselda Blanco, whom 
associated with Escobar and other traffickers to export cocaine.  Carlos Lehder 
specialized in cocaine transportation to the United States and in providing landing 
facilities to other traffickers.   
With time, specifically in the early 1980s, DTO leaders became wealthier and the 
business grew to such a degree that drug entrepreneurs were able to build “full service” 
organizations that encompassed most aspects of the trade.  At this point of development, 
DTO leaders still relied on outsourcing certain aspects of the business at their 
convenience, but they could also delegate the work to specialists within their own 
organization.  Coca farmers, coca paste refiners or “cooks,” coca paste dealers, chemists, 
hidden compartment builders, engineers, pilots, radio operators, security personnel, 
lawyers, accountants, public relations consultants, and real estate agents, among other 
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workers, were hired by DTOs for the six divisions of what can be termed as “full service” 
DTOs.   
The six divisions of full service DTOs organized the workload involved in the 
traffic of cocaine and used specialized labor to produce cocaine.  In the 1970s and early 
1980s most traffickers obtained coca paste from coca farmers in Peru and Bolivia 
because Colombia had not yet become a coca producer.  For this reason this project’s 
DTO divisions start with the procurement of coca paste in other Andean countries instead 
of with coca farming.  The first division of the illicit drug traffic was in charge of 
obtaining raw material for making cocaine.  Initially traffickers like Pablo Escobar and 
his cousin Gustavo Gaviria would pick-up coca paste from Ecuador by land or air 
transport.  Once Escobar became wealthier, the procurement of coca paste was delegated 
to workers within his organization or by outsourcing coca paste from other organizations 
specialized on dealing with coca paste.   
The second division of a DTO was responsible for refining coca paste.  Coca 
paste refinement was done in small countryside labs, in urban centers, and at industrial 
sized labs found in hard to reach jungle areas—the most notable refining lab was 
Tranquilandia.  The use of industrial sized labs was done once DTO leaders were 
wealthier and were able to finance large-scale labs, which were monitored by workers 
close to each DTO leader involved in such cocaine refining cooperative (Eddy et al., 
1988).  Labs hired security personnel, managers that would monitor input materials used 
to transform coca paste to cocaine as well as the output, and cooks that would do the 
actual transformation.  The third division of the business was in charge of shipping the 
cocaine through routes.  This division involved human mules and their managers, pilots, 
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cocaine distributors in destination countries, and government officials such as politicians 
and/or police.  The cocaine shipping was one of the riskiest parts of the business, but also 
the most profitable for wholesale cocaine dealers.  The Ochoa brothers and Carlos Lehder 
became very rich because they were the first to specialize in the most lucrative aspect of 
the cocaine business.  However, Carlos Lehder made traffickers that specialized on the 
production of cocaine like Pablo Escobar very rich because, when Lehder began 
trafficking, he needed cocaine producers to supply his routes. As a consequence, 
specialization was how business associations were made between major traffickers like 
Escobar and Lehder, and others.   
Finding safe routes was pivotal to a successful cocaine business and this division 
of traffic needed the assistance of government officials.  When the traffic started and 
cocaine was shipped through the use of human “mule” and small airplanes that would fly 
directly to secret airstrip along the U.S. coastline, finding safe and remote places for 
refueling or for loading shipments was instrumental.  Carlos Lehder’s ownership of 
Norman’s Cay in the Bahamas, from the late 70s to the early 80s, was essential for 
traffickers because they could land and refuel at a “safe station.” However, many times 
“safe stations” were created with the aid of government officials in Central America and 
the Caribbean Islands (Clawson et al., 1996).  Paying off officials in countries where 
layovers were done to refuel, pick up cocaine, or drop off money was a necessary 
business cost to reduce risk.  This is why Panama’s General Antonio Noriega and 
Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden Pindling were key players for money laundering 
and/or to facilitate cocaine shipping (Eddy et al., 1988). Lower level officials were also 
paid off to facilitate traffic. During the 1970s Mexican local officials and police were 
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paid off to allow traffickers to land airplanes in small airstrips. Pioneer traffickers like 
Jaime Builes would pay off the Mexican police to allow his shipments to land so that they 
could be transported through the Mexican border into the United States (Castro, 1994).   
The fourth division of the business picked up the wholesale shipment and sold it 
to U.S. retailers.  In addition to distribution managers, this division employed money 
launderers.  Pick-up teams like those established by Fabio Ochoa, Max Mermelstein, Jon 
Roberts, Mickey Munday, and Rafael Cardona Salazar or by Griselda Blanco’s 
organization, were all infamous Miami wholesale distributors for the Medellin DTOs that 
would manage the product pickup and money delivery (Mermelstein, 1990).101 This 
division would then have to send the money back to Colombia either by shipping it 
directly in hidden compartments of goods like laundry machines or cars, or by starting 
the laundering process at financial institutions in the United States or elsewhere.  Money 
launderers varied in skill, they could range from high-end bankers working for financial 
institutions to non-skilled workers employed by a DTO.  Non-skilled money launderers 
were in charge of regularly wiring small amounts of cash or by depositing small amounts 
of cash in U.S. banks, which then could be withdrawn through the use of automated teller 
machine (ATM) cards in the United States and Colombia.   
The fifth division of the business dealt with security, since DTOs needed a 
security apparatus to protect themselves from authorities from guerrillas, but also to 
resolve disputes among traffickers.  The security division involved payment of bribes so 
authorities would allow traffickers to obtain gun permits, smuggle shipments, and to 
establish informants on the activities of law enforcement (Castro, 1996). The security 
                                                        
101 For more information on this team see the documentary “Cocaine Cowboys.” 
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division of DTOs also involved hiring gunmen to carryout political assassinations, 
silencing witnesses, and intimidating judicial system officials.  To defend their assets and 
families from guerrilla harassment, traffickers created small militias to fend off guerrillas.  
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha was strongly anti-guerrilla and was the first DTO leader 
to organize militias in conjunction with cattle ranchers to oppose FARC guerrillas in the 
Magdalena Medio region.  Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) and Associacion Campesina 
de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM) were created for this 
purpose, which have left a legacy of paramilitarism in Colombia.   
Since the drug industry cannot turn to courts to settle business disputes, traffickers 
settled disputes among themselves through the use of  “trafficker mediators,” where DTO 
leaders discuss how to resolve a problem at the lower levels (Castillo, 1987).  However, 
the use of violence was another way to resolve problems and this led traffickers to hire 
bodyguards and gunmen.102  Violence in Medellin became a specialized business on its 
own right, where assassins were contracted to kill in venues termed as “offices” or 
oficinas.  Assassin managers would pay out the contract once it was carried out on behalf 
of the client, but if an assassin failed to carryout the contract in a specified period of time, 
then his/her death would be contracted to another assassin, and so forth (Interview Jair 
Bedoya, 2005; Interview DSS0040, 2005).   
The sixth and final division of the business was the legal and administrative 
division.  This aspect of a DTO sought to create ways to represent DTO leaders in courts 
and to launder cocaine money proceeds by establishing legal businesses and to clean up 
revenues from the drug traffic.  The legal teams managed the ownership of properties, 
                                                        
102 Castillo (1990) suggests that Rodriguez Gacha mediated between Escobar’s DTO and Cali based DTOs. 
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supervised contracts, and represented traffickers in commercial and criminal courts.  
Teams of lawyers specialized n extradition were hired to invalidate the 1979 Treaty of 
Extradition in 1986, and to write the language for constitutional Article 35 that banned 
the extradition of nationals in 1991.  Accountants and financial planners managed and 
created legal avenues that would clean drug proceeds by ‘fixing books’ that disguised 
revenues through creative accounting, establishing faux businesses, and managing legal 
businesses to make more licit money.  Finally this division many times was in charge of 
funneling trafficker funds to political campaigns, and some DTO leaders hired many 
politicians and consultants to run campaigns or their political organizations. 
The specialization and expertise of DTOs allowed these organizations to run their 
business with the overall objective of making profit, which in the 1980s, the estimated 
billions of dollars that DTO leaders made translated economic wealth into political power.  
DTO leaders invested their money into their political campaigns or those of receptive 
politicians in order to have greater status and influence within Colombian society.  
Gradually, as legal avenues were closed to DTO leaders, DTO wealth and expertise was 
used to fund violent offensives primarily aimed at public officials.  Many of the 
employees like lawyers and security personnel hired to manage the economic aspect of 
the business later handled political aspects of the business for DTO leaders, such as 
judicially invalidating the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, lobbying legislators, and/or 
advising on the political targets for the implementation of the violent offensive—to ban 
extradition and obtain a negotiation process.  
Throughout every division of the business, illicit drug organizations relied on 
technology for their development.  Technology helped DTOs conceal the cocaine trade 
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from authorities.  In the 1980s, even before Global Positioning System (GPS) devices 
became commercially popular in the new millennium, GPS devices aided in the 
navigation of boats and planes to avoid authorities, but also in locating the coordinates 
where shipments that had been unloaded in the ocean.  Communications equipment such 
as landline telephones, fax machines, portable two-way radios, beepers, satellite and 
cellular phones allowed DTOs to communicate with their U.S. distribution cells and keep 
track of shipments, which facilitated transactions and were also used to avoid authorities.  
Fishing boats, speedboats, and small aircraft allowed traffickers to transport cocaine 
shipments.  Compartment builders were hired for hiding drugs or money in clothing, 
luggage, airplanes, boats, and within shipments of goods.  Chemists were hired to create 
products that would be made out of cocaine, which would pass of as ceramic figures or as 
book covers (Caen, 2008; En caja, 2008).  Engineers were hired to construct shipping 
vessels such as submarines and geneticists developed high quality coca crops that grow at 
a variety of elevations.  In sum, the use of technology allowed traffickers to reduce risks 
and increase profits, which in turn gave traffickers greater economic and political power. 
Group Size, High Low Demanders 
 The size of a group is an important variable because it can determine the interest 
and capacity that a group’s members have in achieving a common good.  It is believed 
that small organizations are more efficient than larger ones because its members have a 
greater interest in achieving objectives.  In small organizations members can 
voluntarily103 do the work necessary to obtain a collective good because it is more likely 
                                                        
103 By “voluntarily” it is meant that individual members will provide a good without the use of incentives or 
of coercion. 
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that the benefit will exceed the costs of doing work.  If the membership is smaller, the 
benefits will not have to be divided among so many members, which gives members a 
greater incentive to do the work necessary to achieve a group’s objective.  The size of the 
group allows the membership to coordinate their actions quickly.  Small groups are also 
able to keep their members accountable for their responsibilities because the members 
know each other.  The close relation among members of an association allows a 
mechanism of “peer pressure” (or “social sanctions,” as Mancur Olson would have put it 
(Olson, 1971:60-65)) to make members to evaluate their coordinated effort and keep 
members accountable for their actions. 
 The exact number of DTO leaders based in Medellin during the 1980s is not 
known but some researchers and journalists estimate that around 10 to 60 core 
organizational leaders existed in the 1980s.  When they started to operate, DTOs were 
composed of a very small number of merchants that specialized in a particular part of the 
trade.  According to Juan David Ochoa, only about 50 to 60 merchants existed in Bogotá, 
the Coast, Medellin, and in southern Colombia, in his words, “…There were groups of 
people that were friends of course...” (Interview – Juan David Ochoa, 2000). This number 
is vague because it does not differentiate between DTO leaders and managers. Clawson 
and Lee’s analysis of the illicit drug industry in the 1990s estimate that around 10 to 13 
core organizations were involved in the drug trade (Clawson et al., 1996:19-21).  They 
cite Sidney Zabludoff’s104 study that suggests that 10 core organizations existed with 500 
hundred-core managers.  Francisco Thoumi suggests that 13 core organizations managed 
                                                        
104 Sidney Zabludoff, “Colombian Narcotics Organizations as Business Enterprises,” in U.S.  Department 
of State, Bureau of Research and Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, Economics of the 
Narcotics Industry Conference Report (Washington DC: State Department and CIA, 1994).   
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the industry.  Journalistic accounts based on the MAS meeting suggest that at the peak of 
Medellin-based DTOs, there was a number between 20-200 DTO leaders that met to 
discuss business, political influence, and paramilitary activities, but these numbers again 
do not distinguish between leaders and managers.  If the numbers for the core 
organization leaders provided by Juan David Ochoa, Zabludoff, and Thoumi are 
considered then it could be said that there were at least 10 and at most 60 core 
organization leaders.   
 This number is small enough to constitute a small business association that 
organized to discuss business and policy issues.  From this project’s discussion on the 
organizational cohesion and the representativeness of the Medellin-based DTOs 
cooperation among DTO leaders in Medellin was at least moderate, since DTO leaders 
pooled resources for business ventures like Tranquilandia and donated funds to anti-
extradition politicians, or to form the groups MAS and Los Extraditables.  Their 
coordination generated great economic and political benefits for each DTO leader since 
the extradition of nationals was an issue that concerned all DTO leaders of the time and 
many voluntarily contributed resources either in funding or manpower to convince or 
coerce politicians and public opinion that a ban on extradition was necessary.   
 Besides “peer pressure,” some DTO leaders, in particular the Ochoa brothers, 
reported that fear was also a motivating force, which drove DTO leaders to cooperate in 
the campaigns organized by Los Extraditables.  “Peer pressure” in a small group like 
Medellin-based DTO leaders, would have manifested itself by the need for each DTO 
leader to show to others that he/she was doing their part in invalidating the Extradition 
Treaty –so as to look involved in the process.  If a DTO leader did not do their respective 
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job or avoided paying dues, it is suggested that coercion was used by a groups’ leaders to 
prevent “free riders,” i.e. people who did not contribute to a collective effort but benefit 
from the efforts of others (Ainsworth, 2002:225).  In the Medellin case study, an example 
peer pressure can be the expressions of fear that the Ochoa brothers have mentioned 
about Pablo Escobar. An example of coercion used among Medellin DTO leaders was the 
Moncada and Galeano assasinations, where Pablo Escobar, as the enforcer in Los 
Extraditables, collected a “war tax” from fellow traffickers so that he could pressure the 
government to ban extradition. Escobar allegedly raised the “war tax” in July 1992 from 
$200,000 to $1,000,000 a month.  When members of the Gaelano and Moncada 
organization failed to comply, Escobar ordered their assassination to enforce discipline 
(Clawson et al., 1996:47-48).   
 The size of an organization, as a determinant of what drives a group of individuals 
to accomplish a common good, is complemented by whether the organization has high 
demanders or low demanders for a good.  In small organizations, typically most of its 
members are high demanders for a good and will strive to accomplish said good.   
In the case of Medellin-based DTOs, all leaders were high demanders for banning the 
extradition of nationals because they did not want to be sent to a jail in the United States 
where they could serve long sentences.  When Carlos Lehder was extradited he was 
condemned to serve 100 plus years.  In the following quote Juan David Ochoa expresses 
the fear of being extradited, “…If someone would extradite you, that would be like being 
buried alive.  We respected and feared extradition…” (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 
2000).  The fear, of being far away from their family, losing their property and lifestyle, 
is the reason the political coordination among DTO leaders made them an illicit interest 
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group.  High demanders are members who place a higher value on a particular good than 
the rest of the membership.  Consequently, a high demander may be more apt to pay most 
if not all of the cost of producing a collective good.  Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Gacha, in forming Los Extraditables, crowned themselves as the highest 
demanders for the extradition ban because, apart from financing political campaigns, they 
used violence to compel government officials.  The motto of Los Extraditables 
communiqués read “we prefer a grave in Colombia to a dungeon in the United States,” 
and in line with their motto, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar died 
invalidating extradition. Yet, all the violence generated by DTO leaders only resulted in 
ephemeral results, since U.S. government pressure on Ernesto Samper’s presidency 
amended Article 35 of the 1991 Constitution to allow for extradition of nationals from 
1997 onwards.   
 Low demanders for extradition in DTOs were lesser known DTO leaders and 
DTO employees that did not contribute much from their own resources to ban extradition, 
but benefited when the ban took place.  Lawyers or accountants of DTOs, who had a high 
risk of getting extradited if they were apprehended by authorities, were low demanders 
for extradition since they did not contribute much of their resources to overturn the 
Extradition Treaty, but benefited from not being extradited.   
 The combination of small groups of 10 to about 60 DTO leaders and their high 
demand to see the 1979 Treaty on Extradition invalidated, so that they would not be sent 
to the U.S. legal system, allows the cooperation among DTO leaders to be very effective 
since they were willing to contribute resources for a common good.  Whether it was peer 
pressure to do their part in banning extradition or fear of being punished for not 
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contributing resources to overturn the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, the high demand for 
banning the policy extradition drove DTO leaders based in Medellin to cooperate in 
achieving this common objective, which they believed would allow them to remain in 
Colombia with their lifestyle intact.   
Representativeness  
Representativeness is a group’s policy position relative to society (Bashevkin, 
1996).  This variable measures the ability a group has to convince members of society 
that its political objective represents them.  It is assumed that if a group represents a wide 
sector of society, then it is possible that it will receive support for its cause and 
consequently it will be successful at influencing policy.  Medellin-based DTO leaders not 
only built local, but also national electoral and public support for overturning the 1979 
Treaty on Extradition.  Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and the 
Ochoa brothers created a nationalist argument, which presented the issue of extradition as 
a violation of Colombia’s sovereignty.  They proactively campaigned against extradition 
by sponsoring candidates, launching their own political campaigns, and distributing 
propaganda on the issue.  In forming paramilitary organizations to combat leftist 
guerrillas, some DTO leaders also sought to increase their representativeness among 
traditional cattle ranchers and landowners.  The following discussion will be limited to 
the Medellin-based DTO leaders—Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo Rodriguez 
Gacha, and the Ochoa brother’s—involvement in politics, legal and illegal, to show their 
desire to influence public opinion and the opinion of politicians in Colombia.   
Pablo Escobar started his political life by mainly sponsoring Liberal politicians.  
In his quest for a national congressional seat in the 1982 elections, around 1979, Escobar 
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established two social organizations, a newspaper, and sponsored a political party 
(Legarda, 2005:35).  The social organizations were Civismo en Marcha (Civic-
mindedness on the March) and Medellin Sin Tugurios (Medellin Without Slums).  He 
created a party that was an offshoot of the Liberal party called Renovación Liberal en 
Antioquia (Liberal Renovation in Antioquia) and a newspaper called Medellin Civico 
(Civic Medellin).  Civismo en Marcha allowed Escobar to fund social projects and donate 
about 100 lit soccer courts to marginal neighborhoods throughout Medellin (Salazar, 
2001:78).  Medellin Sin Tugurios was a project that built about 500 homes for people that 
were living in Medellin’s trash heap called Moravia.  These two organizations along with 
other social projects in towns surrounding Medellin allowed Escobar to build a strong 
base of electoral support among the urban and rural populations.  At the end of his life, 
when he was being pursued, it was this populist base of support that viewed him as a hero 
and allowed him to remain in hiding and survive persecution from government and 
enemies.105   
Pablo Escobar’s political party, Renovación Liberal, sponsored Jairo Ortega for a 
congressional position.  Ortega was a former lawyer for the Lopez Gomez organization 
that employed Escobar (Castillo, 1987; Salazar, 2001, p. 91).  Escobar’s campaign 
                                                        
105 Many people tell stories of Pablo Escobar when he was a fugitive. People of Medellin and in 
surrounding towns give accounts that people knew where Escobar was, but did not report him to authorities 
because at some point in time Escobar did something for their own neighborhood or town.  Overall he was 
seen as a hero for sharing his wealth with less fortunate sectors, who would hide him throughout Medellin.  
A popular account in the town of La Ceja, Antioquia (where at some point Escobar had bought his father a 
farm) reports that around 1984 during the persecution, Pablo Escobar would dress up as a nun.  
Townspeople knew it was Escobar, but no one did anything because he had not done anything wrong in La 
Ceja.  He reportedly offered to improve healthcare services in La Ceja, but was turned down by town 
officials.  The fact that he shared his wealth with poor sectors was enough to get sympathizers. Some 
people believe that they did not report Escobar to authorities even though there was a bounty on his head, 
because it is believed that whoever picked up the reward money could be killed in reprisal (Author’s 
interview with locals from La Ceja).   
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centered itself on the defense of natural resources and on the promotion of sports.  For his 
background information, Escobar presented himself as a sportsman who promoted sports 
in various municipalities and as an industrialist and a developer.   
In preparation for the 1982 general elections Pablo Escobar and Jairo Ortega 
initially joined a new faction within the Liberal party called El Nuevo Liberalismo.  Luis 
Carlos Galan and Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who were two up-and-coming politicians, 
launched this faction to separate themselves from the clientelist practices of the Liberal 
Party.  Galan and Lara Bonilla were perceived as reformers and inspired a lot of 
optimism amongst people who wanted a less corrupt system of politics associated with 
Colombia’s mainstream political parties.  Ironically, it is believed that Pablo Escobar 
wanted to belong to the Nuevo Liberalismo faction because Galan and Bonilla were a 
new force in the political system and Escobar was hoping that, as a new force, the Nuevo 
Liberalismo faction would accept him since he was presenting himself to mainstream 
society as a progressive entrepreneur (Entel, 2009).  In the documentary “Sins of My 
Father,” about the life of the son of Pablo Escobar, the film reveals how Escobar initially 
expressed his support for Galan and Lara Bonilla’s Nuevo Liberalismo.  Rodrigo Lara 
Restrepo, Lara Bonilla’s son recalls the event:  
He (Rodrigo Lara Bonilla) told me, that they, my father and Galan, went to the Magdalena Medio 
and he told me that they did not understand why they were receiving so much support.  Why so 
many euphoric people were coming (to the political rallies) to support them, when they had never 
in their lives been to these municipalities, so they didn’t understand! So my dad said, ‘that is great, 
what a success, what resonance the campaign has had!’ So they started to ask (people), ‘so tell us 
why are you…who is the political leader that is bringing you over here (to the rally)?’ And they 
(the people at the rally) said, ‘that is Don Pablo Escobar who tells us to vote for you and Don 
Pablo is generous, he gives us refrigerators, and gives us money!’ and (my father would say) ‘who 
is this Don Pablo Escobar? Who is so nice, this Mr.  Escobar!’ He (Rodridgo Lara Bonilla) asked 
around, and would tell me, if my memory doesn’t fail me, and he asked some one at the Medellin 
stock market, and they said, ‘look, that man is extremely rich, but extremely dangerous’ (Entel, 
2009). 
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As the interview reveals, the two politicians investigated who Pablo Escobar was and 
found out that he was a drug trafficker.  When Galan and Lara Bonilla found out that 
Jairo Ortega joined their movement and was placing Escobar as his alternate, they were 
outraged.  Because they were the reformers of corrupt political practices, Rodrigo Lara 
Bonilla and Luis Carlos Galan publicly expelled Escobar from the Nuevo Liberalismo 
faction at a campaign event held at the landmark Parque Berrío in downtown Medellin 
(Salazar, 2001, p. 92).  This expulsion made Lara Bonilla and Galan political enemies of 
Pablo Escobar and very likely cost them their lives.   
After being publicly humiliated, Pablo Escobar and Jairo Ortega allied with 
Alberto Santofimio Botero’s wing of the Liberal Party. Alberto Santofimio Botero had 
been a Minister of Justice for the Alfonso Lopez Michelsen presidency and the president 
of the lower chamber of congress in 1978—a seat he had to resign from because of a 
corruption scandal (Guillen, 2007, Salazar, 2001, p. 92).  For the remainder of the 
electoral campaign, Ortega and Escobar were able to mobilize the votes of people from 
marginal neighborhoods that benefited from Escobar’s social projects.  Their political 
appeal was that they represented a new emerging entrepreneurial force.  The trio, 
Santofimio, Escobar, and Ortega, would campaign using Escobar’s airplanes and would 
arrive at political rallies with an entourage that included other politicians and a famous 
television presenter Virginia Vallejo (La bella, 2006).  The 1982 political campaign was a 
success because it won Botero a senatorial seat, Ortega a lower chamber seat, and 
Escobar became Ortega’s congressional alternate.  Escobar and Ortega arrived at the 
Colombian House of Representatives to openly oppose the extradition of nationals.   
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Escobar’s incursion into legal politics ended about little over a year after 
becoming a congressman.  The newly appointed Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara 
Bonilla, started clamping down on traffickers in late 1982 and early 1983 by: opening 
closed investigations, grounding trafficker airplanes, showing trafficker links to football 
and politics, and limiting weapon permits domestically and abroad (Salazar, 2001, p. 116).  
During 1983 and 1984, the United States government had processed many extradition 
petitions.  However, since the newly elected President Belisario Betancourt was opposed 
to the extradition of nationals on the basis of being an infringement of Colombia’s 
sovereignty, Lara Bonilla ignored the petitions.  Nevertheless, because the government 
was beginning to crack down on traffickers, as the extradition requests were being 
processed, and in reprisal for being expelled from the Nuevo Liberalismo faction, Pablo 
Escobar and Jairo Ortega orchestrated a congressional debate on August 16th 1983 to 
tarnish Lara Bonillas’ moral prestige.  They presented a campaign check signed by 
trafficker Evaristo Porras and cashed by Lara Bonilla.  After much scandal and 
controversy, President Betancur backed his Minister of Justice.  Many experts on this 
subject believe that Betancur showed support to Lara Bonilla because he was afraid that 
traffickers would use their contribution records to extort favors or silence politicians, 
since many campaigns that year received trafficking proceeds otherwise termed as 
dineros calientes (“hot monies”) (Castillo, 1987; Salazar, 2001).   
After the debate on “hot monies,” a September 1983 report on ABC news 
presented Pablo Escobar’s involvement in the cocaine business.  Soon after, Guillermo 
Cano, the director of the newspaper El Espectador openly accused Escobar of being a 
cocaine trafficker by exposing a 1976 arrest.  It is at this point that Lara Bonilla begun a 
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judicial investigation into the 1976 assassination of two DAS agents killed after Escobar 
and his cousin were arrested for trafficking cocaine paste from Ecuador.  After Escobar’s 
criminal past was uncovered, on October 20th 1983, Escobar’s parliamentary immunity 
was lifted and he was forced to resign his post, which ended his legal political career.  
Soon after, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was killed in April 30th 1984 after the government took 
over the industrial sized cocaine lab, Tranquilandia, at service of Medellin-based Drug 
Trafficking Organizaions.   
The direct electoral involvement of Pablo Escobar in politics is brief and 
representatively inconsequential.  His political campaign dealt with superficial issues.  
Even while in Congress, the major debate Escobar participated was to tarnish the image 
of a politician (Lara Bonilla) who crusaded against drug trafficking.  Ironically, while 
Escobar was an alternate congressman, he was unable to push for policies that would 
undermine the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, his biggest political objective (Eddy et al., 
1988, p. 300).  What little social representation escobar achieved, he mostly 
accomplished in a preparation for the congressional elections while building an electoral 
base of support.  It was during this early stage that Escobar helped marginalized sectors 
of society by constructing housing for the homeless and soccer fields in low-income 
neighborhoods. 
Besides forming legal political ties with marginalized sectors, Escobar formed 
links to guerrilla and paramilitary organizations.  These links were apparent especially 
active after he is denied participation in legal politics.  Pablo Escobar was not generally 
regarded as an individual with leftist ideological leanings precisely because he was a 
pioneering entrepreneur of the illicit drug business.  However, his populist politics and 
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the social work he did for marginal neighborhoods throughout Medellin point to his 
leftist tendencies.  He forged a relationship with M-19 commander Ivan Marino Ospina 
after a truce was achieved between MAS and the M-19 after the kidnapping of the Ochoa 
sister, Martha Nieves Ochoa (Salazar, 2001, p. 102-104).  According to paramilitary 
leader of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), Carlos Castaño, he and other 
traffickers were present when M-19 Commander Carlos Pizarro spoke to Pablo Escobar 
about the 1985 attack on the Palace of Justice that killed eleven Supreme Court Judges 
(Aranguren, 2001, p. 39-48).  Castaño mentions that traffickers present at the meeting 
(including his brother Fidel Castaño) pooled weapons and money.  According to 
interviews done with M-19 members, they admit to a relationship with Pablo Escobar, 
but they suggest that the relationship was forged at first with M-19 commander Jaime 
Bateman and especially with commander Ivan Marino Ospina (Salazar, 2001, p. 102-104).  
According to Jorge Luis Ochoa and Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez a.k.a.  “Popeye” who 
was one of Pablo Escobar’s gunmen, both mention that Pablo Escobar discussed the 1985 
Palace of Justice attack with Ivan Marino Ospina (Legarda, 2005, p. 142).106 Movimiento-
19 de Abril (M-19) Commanders, Jaime Bateman and Ivan Marino Ospina died before 
the November 1985 attack of the Palace of Justice materialized.  So, Carlos Pizarro, as 
the new M-19 commander, possibly had some communication with Pablo Escobar to use 
his airstrip at Hacienda Napoles for the receipt of munitions from Nicaragua.  The deaths 
of the two commanders and the interviews with former M-19 members indirectly 
corroborate Carlos Castaño’s account that he witnessed a meeting between Escobar and 
                                                        
106 Ironically, around 1985, Carlos Lehder while on a radio program declared a newfound admiration for 
M-19 politics because of their anti-extradition stance even though he helped form MAS because the M-19 
tried to kidnap him (Orozco, 1987).  Lehder admitted to the press that he met with Ivan Marino Ospina.  As 
a result, M-19 commanders demoted Marino Ospina. 
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Pizarro (Aranguren, 2001, p. 39-48).  According to M-19 members, the 1985 Palace of 
Justice attack was the idea of the M-19 command and that Pablo Escobar did help, but 
that he did not provide much armament or money (Salazar, 2001, p. 141).  Jorge Luis 
Ochoa believed that Escobar knew that burning legal records on extradition would not 
benefit him judicially because authorities had copies.  Ochoa said that the original plan 
involved kidnaping the Justices to another country, and that Escobar wanted to support 
the attack just because he liked the action (141).  Even so, the deaths of eleven Supreme 
Court Justices stalled the judicial process for at least a year.  The inability to fill these 
vacancies stalled the process of revising extradition cases and the further assassination of 
judges led many judges and lawyers to avoid becoming justices because many feared for 
their lives.  Escobar’s involvement in the M-19’s Palace of Justice attack failed to 
materialize into support from left-wing or general sectors of the population because this 
attack has been one of the most unpopular events in contemporary Colombian history and 
has tarnished the political careers of former M-19 members that have attempted to 
participate in electoral politics.   
Los Extraditables, a group that has been extensively discussed in the cohesion 
section of this project, was instrumental in changing the political attitudes of Colombian 
society on the issue of extradition.  Los Extraditables, created to pressure politicians into 
invalidating the 1979 Extradition Treaty and to open a negotiation with traffickers, was 
successful in shaping people’s attitudes towards the issue of extradition.  Although at first 
the public was indifferent to the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, the initial violence generated 
by DTO leaders led public opinion to be outraged at DTO violence.  The first instance of 
public outrage was felt on April of 1984 with Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s assassination.  
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When the press covered news of a Panama negotiation, people were outraged that 
government officials would negotiate with traffickers and this latter anger led the 
Belisario Betancur and Virgilio Barco governments to pursue traffickers.  The last bout of 
public anger against DTO leaders position on extradition took place when Presidential 
candidate Luis Carlos Galan was assassinated on August 1989.   
However, as the war between DTOs, Los Extraditables and the state, and between 
paramilitaries and guerrillas became prolonged events, the public grew tired of urban and 
rural violence.  In late 1989, the targets of Los Extraditables became less selective and 
their violent campaign sought to demonstrate their power by blowing up large targets to 
forcefully convince the general public that a negotiation with authorities was needed to 
obtain peace.  By targeting people's sense of insecurity Los Extraditables succeeded in 
changing public opinion, from public outrage towards early political assassinations, to 
public acceptance of DTO leader demands such as the need for negotiation, amnesty, no 
extradition, and peace.  In December 1989, four months after Galan’s assassination, a 
survey done by the newsmagazine Semana found that 58 percent of those polled favored 
a negotiation with traffickers and 64.3 percent favored pardons for traffickers if they 
retired from the trafficking business (Clawson et al., 1996:100).   
Because of Galan’s assassination, Cesar Gaviria –a friend and member of Galan’s 
Nuevo Liberalismo wing of the Liberal Party, was elected by a wide margin of votes on 
March of 1990 mainly as a show of popular support for Luis Carlos Galan.  Cesar Gaviria 
was a complex candidate because his campaign message was conciliatory instead of 
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combative, which is what many107 expected since he was a close advisor108 to Galan 
before his death.  Gaviria campaigned promising to end narco-terrorism and the violence 
it generated by offering traffickers a negotiated option, which coincided with public 
opinion polls.  On November of 1990 another survey conducted by Semana found that 60 
percent of those polled favored an amnesty for traffickers and 80 percent answered that 
they would accept an “Extraditable” as a cabinet minister –if it meant that Colombia 
would be at peace (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 101).  The poll reflected the general 
exhaustion with the car bombs attacks in Colombia’s major cities and that most people 
wanted peace at any cost.   
By November of 1990 most indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated by Los 
Extraditables had subsided, while the selective Liberal kidnapping campaign was 
underway. This campaign led Gaviria to negotiate terms of surrender with traffickers.  By 
1991, 82 percent of the Colombian population believed that extraditing nationals should 
be invalidated through the creation of a Constitutional Article (Botero, 1991).  This 
opinion gave NCA assemblypersons the support they needed to prohibit the extradition of 
nationals in the 1991 Constitution.  The immediate need for an end to urban violence was 
an argument that helped many Colombian’s rationalize their support of invalidating the 
1979 Extradition Treaty as a tool to combat DTO leaders.  In the view of many 
Colombians, the “War on Drugs” was going to be a prolonged war because the demand 
for cocaine would continue to fund DTO leaders’ war against the state, consequently, 
many believed that the bloodshed in Colombian streets would be difficult to stop.  
                                                        
107 Members of the George H. W. Bush administration thought Gaviria would continue Barco’s hardline 
approach. 
 
108 Cesar Gaviria was Luis Carlos Galan’s chief of debate in Galan’s presidential campaign. 
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According to this logic, if politicians could reach an agreement with DTO leaders, the 
agreement would not end the “War on Drugs,” but it was thought that in the least a DTO-
government agreement could end the violence in Colombian streets.  In 1991, this anti-
violence position aligned with the anti-extradition position pursued by DTO leaders 
increased the representativeness of Pablo Escobar as leader of Los Extraditables vis-à-vis 
the general population.   
Pablo Escobar’s involvement with MAS gave way to his participation in other 
paramilitary organizations.  Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) had little representativeness 
impact in Colombian society because it was a subnational organization in pursuit of 
another subnational organization, the M-19, and though it sought to obtain the acceptance 
of the general population or authorities by spreading anti-kidnapping flyers in stadiums, it 
was an organization that appealed mostly to traffickers.   
Soon after, Pablo Escobar joined forces with Rodriguez Gacha and other 
landowners to fund right-wing paramilitary forces that would primarily protect their 
properties from FARC harassment in the Middle Magdalena region.  According to 
judicial investigations into the massacre of individual leftist activists or sympathizers of 
the FARC’s political wing the Union Patriotica (UP), Pablo Escobar was involved with 
the Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio 
(ACDEGAM) (Castillo, 1990, p. 233).  The ACDEGAM was a paramilitary group 
composed of cattle ranchers and drug traffickers turned landowners in the Magdalena 
region.  Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio ‘s 
(ACDEGAM) leaders were Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Henry Perez.  Pablo 
Escobar’s involvement in ACDEGAM was less extensive as was Rodriguez Gacha’s, but 
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Gacha sought to defend properties located in the region from being taxed by the guerillas 
and that is why he gained legitimacy among landowners and paramilitary leaders in the 
Magdalena region such as Henry Perez.  However, after the 1989 death of Rodriguez 
Gacha and Henry Perez the relations between Pablo Escobar and paramilitary groups was 
short lived, especially after 1992 when Escobar escaped from prison since many of these 
paramilitary leaders, in particular Carlos Castaño, formed Los PEPES to pursue Escobar.   
In sum, of all the organizations that Escobar formed or participated Los 
Extraditables had the most representativeness and policy impact.  The local social 
projects he built had a following among marginalized sectors of Medellin whom felt 
much loyalty towards him.  Los Extraditables was a violent organization, but its 
persistence and strategy gradually led the general population to oppose extradition and to 
approve of a negotiation with traffickers.   
Carlos Lehder became politically active when he returned to Colombia around 
1978.  Around 1980 he began offering money to politicians for their campaigns (Orozco, 
1987, p. 63).  He created the political party Movimiento Latino Nacional (MLN) in 1983 
and bought a newspaper called Quindío Libre.  In a sociological analysis of Lehder’s 
impact on the town of Armenia, Quindío during the early 1980s, Jorge Eliécer Orozco 
depicted how Lehder destabilized the political and social environment of the town.  
Lehder launched the careers of politicians with budgets that far surpass those of career 
politicians with 20 years of service.  Politicians sponsored by Lehder were given: 
airplanes to campaign across the Department of Quindío, free media (Lehder would buy 
newspaper ads and stories), and organized events called ‘Patriotic Saturdays.’ During 
Patriotic Saturdays candidates could explain their platforms and people were given 
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lunches with cash prizes.  Basically, Lehder obtained votes by appealing to the masses 
through populist messages and by giving out money (Orozco, 1987).  People would write 
to Lehder asking him for money to fix their houses, pay tuitions, and hospital bills among 
other favors.  Carlos Lehder even created an organization so that peasants could buy land 
without needing down payments.  All of the economic favors were popular and done in 
an effort to obtain political support. 
Lehder’s financing of political campaigns included contributions to the campaigns 
of his opposition.  He did this to compromise them so that they would not accuse his 
candidates of receiving ‘dirty money.’ Since Lehder’s money was tempting, many 
opposition candidates received the money because without Lehder’s contribution the 
electoral competition would be skewed towards Lehder’s own candidates, so opposition 
candidates received contributions to level the playing field (Orozco, 1987:145).  In an 
interview, Lehder said to have contributed to the political campaigns of national 
politicians in both the Liberal and Conservative parties—which included Senatorial 
candidate Alberto Santofimio Botero (Escobar’s Candidate) and both Presidential 
Candidates Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and Belisario Betancur (Orozco, 1987:145 and 
225-226).  In 1982 and 1983 when President Betancur would openly refer to the 1979 
Treaty of Extradition as an infringement to Colombia’s sovereignty, Lehder praised 
Bentacur for being a defender of Colombia and regarded him as a proud exponent of 
“Colombia’s peasant heritage” (Orozco, 187:157).   
In Lehder’s newspaper, Quindío Libre, he would present a variety of political 
ideas.  Lehder opposed traditional political parties, the imperialist American government, 
multinational companies, and also the policy of extradition (Orozco, 1987:154-172).  He 
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was a nationalist, and his paper promoted a form of fascism (where the Latin race, 
specifically “the Paisa” culture of north central Colombia, was regarded as the supreme 
race).  Lehder fostered Colombian industry, promoted environmentalism and the 
legalization of marijuana.  When speaking against the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, Lehder 
denounced President Turbay Ayala and his Ambassador to the U.S. government Virgilio 
Barco, referring to them as “damned puppets of the imperialist mechanism at the service 
of the American interests and government” (168).109 He believed that Article 17 of the 
Penal Code protected Colombian nationals from being extradited because it stated, “that 
in no case would Colombia offer the extradition of nationals nor would concede those 
already condemned of political crimes” (208).  Lehder believed that Law 27 of 1980, 
which recognized the 1979 Treaty of Extradition between Colombia and the United 
States, should not exist because, according to him, the constitution should not override 
the penal code.  He would use this nationalist stance to appeal to people’s sense of 
patriotism and therefore gain political support.   
Initially Lehder’s political party was seen as something innovative and was 
offering ideas that were more practical than what traditional parties had done in the past.  
Many students, unions, and politicians linked to traditional parties became part of the 
Movimiento Latino Nacional (MLN) because they saw Lehder and his politicians as 
innovative, but overall they saw him as a person with a lot of economic means that could 
fund their own political projects (Orozco, 1987, p. 153).  Lehder’s own political 
aspirations lasted until 1986 when he ran for the Senate. However his movement was 
                                                        
109 This quote denotes how Lehder was so hard to classify because he referred to himself as a fascist but his 
rhetoric was communist. 
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weakened as early as June 1983 when Lehder openly admitted of being a drug trafficker 
to Yamid Amat, a journalist of the national Caracol Radio chain.  During the interview he 
spoke of Norman’s Cay, his transportation business, and denounced the 1979 Treaty of 
Extradition.  After these declarations, on October of 1983 Lehder was a fugitive and his 
economic largesse was being misspent.  For the March of 1984 elections MLN obtained 
10,857 votes out of a total of 97,422 departmental votes but, despite the low number of 
votes and thanks to proportional representation, Lehder’s party won two Departmental 
congressional seats and 11 city council seats.   
On April 30th 1984 ,when Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was 
assassinated, President Belisario Betancur changed his nationalist anti-extradition policy 
in order to actively pursue traffickers.  After holding President Belisario Betancur in high 
regard, in a letter written on September of 1984, Lehder expressed that Betancur was a 
traitor and a hypocrite.  According to Lehder, Betancur not only received funding from 
traffickers, but also that Bentacur campaigned using trafficker airplanes, one of which 
was painted in the Conservative party’s blue campaign colors (Orozco, 1987, p. 226; 
Escobar, 2000, p. 158; Salazar, 2001, p. 93).  Given the national turmoil over the violent 
impact of drug trafficking in 1984, the Governor of Quindío forbade Lehder’s candidates 
from taking over their elected posts.  Even as a fugitive, Lehder ran for a Senatorial seat 
on March of 1986, which he lost.  He was later captured on February 4th 1987 and 
immediately extradited via decree.  Although Lehder used the same clientelist strategy 
and formed the same type of organizations and media outlets as Pablo Escobar to obtain 
political power, Lehder’s political message failed to obtain traction with the public in 
Quindio or in Colombia because his ideas were scandalous and less mainstream.  Mostly, 
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politicians and some citizens were interested in his money than his nationalist, populist, 
and fascist ideas.   
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha “El Mejicano” was a major contributor to political 
campaigns of Conservative politicians and a founder of paramilitarism in Colombia.  
According to Fabio Castillo, a journalist who did in-depth inquiries on the lives of 
traffickers at the height of their power, Rodriguez Gacha was the primary benefactor of 
Belisario Betancur’s presidential campaign in 1982 (Castillo, 1987).  Rodriguez Gacha 
along with Carlos Lehder, Pablo Escobar, and the Ochoa brothers admitted they 
contributed to the 1982 presidential campaign of Liberal candidate Alfonso Lopez 
Michelsen so he would oppose the extradition treaty.  Though Lopez denied that he 
knowingly received the funds, his campaign manager was Ernesto Samper Pizano.  
Samper later was involved in one of the biggest campaign finance scandals when he 
became President in 1994 and was accused of receiving $6 million dollars from Cali 
DTOs.  Lopez only admitted that while campaigning in Medellin, for Samper, he stepped 
into an Intercontinental Hotel suite full of people, but that he did not know who they were 
(Salazar, 2001, p. 93-95; Lopez et al., 2001, p. 142). 
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha also supported the political campaigns of many 
local level politicians especially in the Middle Magdalena Region throughout the 1980s.  
The Magdalena region was an area where he owned large tracts of land.110 Rodriguez 
Gacha like Lehder also admitted to being a drug trafficker in a TV interview granted to 
                                                        
110 During this period of time many traffickers bought large tracts of land in areas harassed by guerrillas 
because they were cheap, as landowner wanted to sell them because they did not want to deal with 
guerrillas.  The Magdalena Medio region was one harassed by guerillas were Pablo Escobar, Rodriguez 
Gacha, and many other traffickers bought land.  Needless to say this area has suffered from violence 
because it, to this day (2012), is caught in the crossfire between traffickers turned paramilitaries and 
guerrillas.   
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journalist German Castro Caycedo.  Rodriguez Gacha did not see anything wrong with 
his profession probably because he was brought up surrounded by illegality throughout 
his life.  He believed that he had a right to his wealth even if it was made by dubious 
means.  His frankness to the media on his profession was evidence of his amorality when 
it came to the drug business and the use of violence.  Since he funded the careers of 
politicians, and because in many instances police and military forces provided him with 
protection against guerrillas, in his view, legal sectors in Colombia were compromised 
and had little credibility (Castillo, 1987, p. 238).  For Rodriguez Gacha, people were 
naïve if they did not know the system worked through corruption and violence.  In his 
“dual” worldview, where people were his allies or his enemies, politicians, members of 
the justice system, and guerrillas operating in the Colombian political system could be 
bought, but if legal sectors and guerrillas were an obstacle they thus could be killed.   
In the face of FARC guerrilla harassment in the Magdalena Medio region, and 
because of ideological and business disagreements he had with the guerrilla’s leadership 
(Dudley, 2004; Castillo, 1990), Rodriguez Gacha formed alliances with cattle ranchers 
and founded Movimiento de Restauración Nacional (MORENA).  This group was a 
movement that agglutinated the supporters of the ACDEGAM with those of Tradición 
Familia y Propiedad (TFP).  While ACDEGAM was a military organization that 
coordinated counterinsurgency efforts (Clawson et al, 1996, p. 187), MORENA was the 
political wing of this counterinsurgent paramilitary group.  Its political platform 
supported: democracy, the right to life, education, political, social, and economic 
development, but it opposed the leftist UP, which was the political wing of the FARC in 
the 1980s.  Fifty percent of MORENA was supposedly funded by Rodriguez Gacha 
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himself and the rest of the movement was to be funded by cattle ranchers led by Henry 
Perez (Castillo, 1990, p. 238-239).  For the 1988 elections, MORENA was able to fund 
the careers of Magdalena Medio politicians and won six mayoral races (Lee, 1989, p. 
136; Dudley, 2004, p. 121).  Rodriguez Gacha became a true patron who worked within 
clientelist parameters because he not only launched the careers of politician, but also 
personally paid citizens to vote for his candidates (Cockburn et al., 1990).  Pablo Emilio 
Guarin Vera, a famous paramilitary leader, won a congressional seat for MORENA.  One 
of MORENA’s mayors, Luis Rubio had a warrant for his arrest because he was charged 
with helping mastermind a massacre that killed 40 people in two villages of the banana-
growing region of Uraba in the north of Colombia (Lee, 1989, p. 161, Castillo, 1991, p. 
228, Clawson et al, 1996, p. 189, Dudley, 2004, p. 121).  Besides making allies with legal 
sectors of Colombia’s cattle ranching community, Rodriguez Gacha’s paramilitary 
operations in the region involved organizing massacres and assassinations of UP 
members, which were done with the complicit knowledge of police and military 
commanders (Castillo, 1991, p. 228; Dudley, 2004).  
In sum, Rodriguez Gacha’s political views coincided with those of newly rich 
traffickers and traditional landowners who had been harassed by guerrillas, such as the 
FARC, which charged landowners guerrilla war-taxes on their property.  Rodriguez 
Gacha’s participation in electoral politics shows that he contributed funds to the same 
anti-extradition candidates as other traffickers.  He also sought to finance the campaigns 
of extreme-right wing politicians who saw the political left as an enemy that should be 
eliminated.  Rodriguez Gacha like Pablo Escobar and Carlos Lehder used clientelist 
methods to buy votes and obtain support for the campaigns of his candidates.  Although 
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Rodriguez Gacha was skeptical of the legality of government officials, he believed in the 
need to defend private property at all costs and that is why he was respected among 
landowner and paramilitary circles. 
The Ochoa brothers were politically less vocal than the rest of the Medellin-based 
DTO leaders analyzed in this project.  The Ochoa brothers were not concerned in forming 
a political party or movement, they used violence to a lesser degree than Pablo Escobar 
and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, though they were key actors in the formation of 
MAS in order to rescue their sister Martha Nieves Ochoa and the Ochoa brothers were 
suspected of organizing the assassination of U.S. Federal Witness pilot Barry Seal.  The 
main interests of the Ochoa brothers was to make profit and use their money to influence 
politicians in order to ban extradition.  Since the Ochoa family was famous nationally for 
raising horses, they had a higher social status than most traffickers (Terrorismo, 1982; 
Eddy et al., 1988).  Due to their higher social status, the Ochoa brothers built ties with 
Colombia’s political and economic elite without recurring to violence (Streatfield, 2010).  
Proof of their good political networks were the declarations of key businessmen done to 
vouch for the origins of their wealth and their legal standing, which were done during the 
1984 detention of Jorge Luis Ochoa in Spain (Castillo, 1991, p. 64).   
As it has been mentioned, especially during the 1982 presidential elections, the 
Ochoa brothers gave money to the presidential campaigns of Liberal Alfonso Lopez 
Michelsen and Conservative Belisario Betancur.  These donations reflect that IIGs 
behaved similar to legal interest groups because the Ochoa brothers and other DTO 
leaders gave funds to opposing parties to insure that whomever won would enact 
favorable policies.  Yet, individual DTO leaders had their own preferences and according 
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to Juan David Ochoa, the Ochoa brothers favored Liberal candidates since they 
considered themselves Liberals (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).  Their political 
involvement during the 1982 elections highlights some moderate coordination among 
Medellin-based DTO leaders because the Ochoa organization supported the same 
candidates as other DTOs leaders.   
Analysis 
The wealth generated by illegal drug proceeds allowed DTO leaders based in 
Medellin to become politically powerful at local and national levels.  At local levels 
Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were able to build 
strong bases of support by exchanging economic favors for redundant electoral support.  
This type of exchange was not new in Colombia because its political culture has strong 
clientelistic overtones especially in rural and poor urban sectors where political patrons of 
all stripes broker favors, such as government services, for votes.  The emergence of 
cocaine traffic simply injected more money in the clientelistic electoral system and DTO 
leaders themselves not only became political patrons or leaders that could buy votes from 
citizens, but also launched the campaigns of many political candidates.  In contrast to 
traditional party patrons, traffickers during the 1980s did not need to control the state 
bureaucratic apparatus to dole out favors to citizens; traffickers had their own cocaine 
proceeds to finance political campaigns.  The political rally example of Lara Bonilla and 
Galan’s first encounter with Pablo Escobar’s economic power illustrates that these 
traffickers were looking for “the political leader” that would send them outstanding 
electoral support—a public support that was bought through gifts of household 
appliances.  Whether it was Escobar’s Renovación Liberal, Lehder’s Movimiento Latino 
237 
 
Nacional, or Rodriguez Gacha’s MORENA, all of these political parties or movements 
used clientelism to gain local support and were successful in doing so.  Also, the 
interaction of DTOs with politicians showed their capacity to act as illicit interest groups 
because they were able to fund political campaigns in exchange for policy outcomes. 
By participating in legal electoral politics, be it their personal candidacies or the 
sponsoring of anti-extradition politicians, traffickers were able to place the issue of 
extradition on the political agenda of many politicians and the general public specifically 
by focusing on nationalist arguments.  Traffickers were able to sell their particularistic 
goal—their right not to be extradited for drug traffic—as a violation of national 
sovereignty, a general issue that affects all Colombians.  Though their electoral strategies 
varied, the donations to similar politicians with anti-extradition positions like Alberto 
Santofimio Botero, Belisario Betancur, and other candidates, showed that DTO leaders 
had some degree of coordination.   
 Although DTO leaders used clientelism and legally participated in the electoral 
process, they also worked with or founded illegal armed groups such as M-19, Los 
Extraditables, MAS, and ACDEGAM.  Pablo Escobar’s collaboration with the leftist 
guerrilla M-19 was of a utilitarian nature where he helped them acquire munitions so they 
would destroy judicial records.  DTO leader participation in paramilitary organizations 
like MAS and ACDEGAM was also utilitarian, where these right-wing organizations 
were created to counteract actions of left-wing guerrillas and to defend the lives of 
hostages and to protect private property. However, in contrast to the collaboration of 
some DTO leaders with left wing organizations, the right-wing agenda was accepted by 
legal sectors such as landowners and cattle ranchers in the Middle Magdalena region.   
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 Finally, although a wide range of the population repudiated many of the actions 
committed by Los Extraditables, the public’s opposition to the group’s actions was 
malleable.  The power and ruthlessness of DTOs in their creation of Los Extraditables 
and in their implementation of violent campaigns showed the weakness of the presidency 
in its inability to monopolize the use of force.  Although DTOs sold the issue of 
extradition as a broad nationalist concern, for urban dwellers, the issue of extradition 
became a personal safety issue because people were more concerned about their own 
safety in cities living amidst violence.  Los Extraditables violated dwellers sense of 
personal security with the staging of car bombs, or the blowing up of airliners, 
government buildings, and police stations.  For the great part of the population, if 
approving of negotiations with DTO leaders, amnesties, and cabinet positions for 
members of Los Extraditables, would lead to peace, then support for such policies was 
acceptable, rather than suffer persistent terrorist attacks employed by Los Extraditables.  
The issue of personal security was more important for urban populations than was the 
Liberal kidnapping campaign, or fighting “the Drug War.” The latter two issues were not 
problems directly affecting the general population. Instead, the concern of popular 
opinion was the increase in the use of indiscriminate violence by DTOs. The violation of 
personal safety was essentially the success of the DTOs violent campaign because it 
showed the power of DTO leaders to coerce the general public into accepting their policy 
demands not only on extradition, but also for an amnesty for crimes committed, if peace 
could be achieved.  As a consequence, the issues pursued by DTO leaders overlapped 
those pursued by the general population thereby increasing the representativeness of 
DTO leaders vis-à-vis the general population.  The use of clientelism, the use of 
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nationalist rhetoric, and finally the use of violence and the states' inability to control it, 
led public opinion to accept the traffickers' position on the issue of extradition as a means 
to put a stop to urban violence and to increase the public's sense of personal security. As 
a consequence, Cesar Gaviria was able to win the 1990 presidential elections by being 
able to tap into the public’s desire for security, by offering a negotiated option to 
traffickers.  
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 With an effort to understand the political influence of informal organizations 
involved in the psychoactive drug trade, I ask three main questions at the outset of this 
project: Under what conditions do illicit interest groups (IIGs) develop? What effect do 
IIGs have on policy? And, what are the effects of these groups on democratic 
institutions? The questions are influenced by my own research on U.S.-Colombian 
relations and by the works of Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer Lee’s real-time research 
on Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in Colombia. Both Thoumi and Lee conclude 
that DTOs—although illegal—operate in similar fashion to interest groups, which band 
together to protect their established interests and, as a consequence, actively seek to 
influence political decisions.  
 My previous research on U.S.-Colombian relations focused on the Colombian 
executive branch and its capacity to implement international counternarcotics agreements. 
My research conclusion was that “pressure groups” such as DTOs have a significant 
impact on the implementation of bilateral counternarcotics agreements. 
  In addition, Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer Lee’s pioneering work during the 
1980s paved the way towards a serious inquiry into: (1) how the cocaine industry works 
(Thoumi, 1994; Lee, 1990); (2) what were the early incentives that allowed DTOs to 
flourish (Thoumi, 1994); and, (3) the dynamics between the government and DTOs (Lee, 
1990; Clawson et al., 1996). Thoumi and Lee’s initial insights on the relations between 
DTO leaders and politicians inspired my project. Both Thoumi and Lee concluded that 
“…narcotics barons (were) possibly the dominant interest group in Colombia” primarily 
because of their substantial economic power (Lee et al., 1999).  
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In another study analyzing DTO-government negotiations, Lee and Clawson 
(Clawson et al., 1996) concluded that DTO leaders had limited political agendas, which I 
found to be an interesting conclusion because such behavior was reminiscent of legally 
established interest groups that have narrow agendas and have valuable political impact.  
Consequently, my dissertation sought to build on previous research by analyzing illicit 
groups, such as DTOs, through the lens of an interest group model. The interest group 
model allows for the study of DTOs as informal political organizations. Initially I argue 
that an interest group model would be useful, especially in analyzing real-life 
circumstances because DTOs play a measurable role in affecting politics in similar ways 
to established groups. Specifically, when a DTOs’ non-violent mechanisms for 
influencing policy are taken into account. 
  My dissertation’s main argument is, however, that although DTO leaders’ agenda 
may be limited, their political impact merits the study of DTOs as illicit interest groups. 
In studying “criminal” organizations through an interest group model researchers can 
fulfill three goals: (1) examine external influences that lead to a group’s development; (2) 
examine internal dynamics that permits a group’s organization the pursuit of a common 
policy objective; and, (3) examine a group’s political impact on its environment. As such, 
it is possible to learn why informal organizations continue to exist and have an impact on 
politics.    
 To answer the project’s three main research questions on the political influence of 
Medellin-based DTOs I devised an interest group model that studied their effect on 
politics, as well as, an organizational analysis to study their political lifecycle.  The 
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following discussion will center on: a brief overview of the model, the project’s three 
main questions, implications, and areas for future research.  
 In a nutshell, the interest group model created for the analysis of Medellin-based 
DTOs is a hybrid model called the Macro-Micro-Model (covered in Chapter 2).111 The 
structure of the model fused two differing schools of thought within interest group 
literature—the pluralist and institutionalist schools of thought—which have 
complementary approaches to the study of societal groups and their interaction with state 
institutions. The theoretical differences between the two models may lead researchers to 
conclude that these models are theoretically incompatible. However, the opposite is true 
because the models’ differences compensate for each model’s own deficiencies. The 
fusion of both models increases their explanatory power, by utilizing their deficiencies as 
complementary parts, in similar fashion to pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. For example, the 
more descriptive aspects of the pluralist model are compensated by the analytical 
qualities of the institutionalist approach. Also, the “impartial absence” of the state in the 
pluralist model is compensated by the institutionalist focus on how a state’s institutions 
delimit group competition. Consequently, the hybrid Macro-Micro-Model provides for a 
more complete explanation of interest group behavior.  
 The Macro-Micro-Model is useful because it works with valid variables that have 
previously been used to measure the effectiveness of group’s effort in influencing policy. 
In essence, the model provides two sets of independent variables. The Macro-model 
studies a set of external influences on group development. As such, the Macro-model 
                                                        
111 The name of the model was derived from Amie Kreppel’s organizational analysis on the EU legislature 
(Kreppel, 2002).  
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focuses on the conditions or context in which a group flourishes. The Micro-model on the 
other hand, examines a set of internal variables of a group’s organizational dynamic to 
explain policy successes or failures. Since the Micro-model examines a group’s internal 
dynamic, it can focus on showing why and how a group embarks on achieving a policy 
goal. The Micro-model can also show how a group’s internal dynamic leads to a group’s 
demise. Finally, the model also studies a group’s influence on democratic institutions by 
examining the interaction between an IIG’s organization and a state’s autonomy.  
 The hybrid Macro-Micro-Model I constructed in the dissertation allows 
researchers to draw a causal relationship between external variables and the internal 
functioning of a group, while at the same time identifying the influences that cause a 
group to develop and disband. In The model, as applied to Medellin-based DTOs in this 
project, shows how external variables affect a group to form and, in turn, how internal 
variables allow Medellin DTO leaders to influence policy, but also how the group 
dynamic results in a group’s decline.    
 The first question my dissertation set out to answer was: under what conditions do 
illicit interest groups, such as DTOs, develop? My research found supporting evidence 
that external environmental conditions do, in fact, lead to group development.   
 Political events such as the creation of the “Drug War” by the Nixon 
Administration had political and economic effects, which led to the formation of DTOs as 
economic entities. When an historical perspective is taken, the role of Medellin-based 
DTOs in the psychoactive drug trade was opportunistic and its behavior was similar to 
other informal organizations that have participated the trade. United States government 
policies designed to prohibit the production and sale of psychoactive drugs, like cocaine, 
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overvalued the drug’s price because the policies increased the risk involved in trading 
cocaine across U.S. borders. Consequently, the policies, which aimed at reducing the 
supply of drugs in the international market, unintentionally stimulated trade as an illicit 
commodity, by default of the high profit margins to be had by traffickers.  
Directly influenced by the profitability of the cocaine market and following an 
economic logic, Medellin-based DTO leaders sold cocaine to meet the international 
market’s underground demand and to benefit from the high profit margins at a time (a 
wholesale kilo of cocaine was priced at $60,000 dollars). In the words of Jorge Ochoa, 
“The business started growing like any other business. It becomes like a ball of snow. It 
grows by itself, and demand makes it grow… It seemed like a game, and nobody paid 
attention to it. Nobody, nobody. That was something very easy, I thought” (Frontline, 
2000a).   
 The last phrases of Jorge Ochoa’s quote is telling of the deficiencies in state 
capacity, which directly contributed to the economic and political rise of drug trafficking 
organizations. My research found that DTO members and law enforcement authorities 
concurred that, during the mid-1970s, heroin and marijuana were of primary concern for 
U.S. law enforcement officials, in part because heroin and marijuana were socially 
trendier than cocaine during this period. It is not until the early 1980s that U.S. authorities 
begin to focus law enforcement capabilities on the cocaine trade. Consequently, during in 
the 1970s, when DTO leaders began to experiment with the cocaine business, the lack of 
international and domestic controls on the cocaine trade allowed DTO leaders to obtain 
great economic wealth and to increase their trafficking organizations to the point of 
creating vertically integrated businesses, otherwise known as full service DTOs.  
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 Weak state capacity in the form of corrupt law enforcement allowed DTO leaders 
to purchase influence in order to protect their trafficking routes.  The accounts of Pablo 
Escobar’s early incursions into the smuggling world revealed that DTO leaders learned 
from their mentors how to buy off public officials. These accounts also reveal that public 
officials, specifically police and military personnel, sought smugglers to obtain extra 
income, which shows how corruption is a symbiotic relationship. My study found that 
counternarcotics efforts create contrasting roles for law enforcement officials because, on 
one hand, officials have to enforce the law and curve smuggling operations but, on the 
other hand, the high profits derived from the drug trade lure authorities to become active 
participants and sometimes facilitators of the trade.  
 The study also found that weak state capacity contributed to the rise of non-state 
actors like rural paramilitary groups, left-wing guerrillas, and urban gangs. In the absence 
of state institutions that may provide security throughout the Colombian territory, power 
vacuums have created a “problem of stateness” because state institutions do not enforce 
rule of law equally throughout a territory. Subnational groups fill the geographic power 
vacuums in rural and urban areas left by state institutions and set their own authority 
upon the population. My research found that DTOs created paramilitary groups to protect 
their newly acquired rural assets—Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) developed to 
counteract the M-19 guerrilla’s harassment, and later another paramilitary group, 
ACDEGAM, was created to fight off FARC guerrilla activity in the Magdalena Medio 
Region. Even though MAS and ACDEGAM ceased to exist, the legacy of DTO funded 
paramilitary groups persists today (2012). Evidence of the persistence of paramilitary 
activity is the emergence of the now demobilized Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
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(AUC) during the mid-1990s, and the current development of a myriad of other armed 
groups linked to new DTOs termed by Colombian government officials as BACRIM—
Bandas Criminales (Criminal Bands). The BACRIM operate throughout Colombia and 
have mainly formed to fend off FARC guerrilla activity. The BACRIM span across the 
Colombian territory and have taken over the illicit drug business of DTO leaders who 
have been arrested, extradited, or killed by Colombian authorities (El Espectador, 2011). 
Some of the known BACRIM groups are: Los Urabeños,112  Aguilas Negras, Los 
Rastrojos,113 Los Paisas, and the Ejercito Revolucionario Popular Anti-Subersivo de 
Colombia (ERPAC),114 among others. Since the 1980s, the creation of DTO-linked 
paramilitary groups has continued a legacy of protecting rural properties with non-state 
actors and has led to human rights violations, forceful land takeovers, an internally 
displaced population of 3.7 million (HRW, 2012), and a high homicide rate of 33 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC, 2011).   
 State capacity is also an important variable, when discussing the rise of urban 
gangs because the inability of state institutions to establish the rule of law in urban 
centers has caused the creation of hundreds of gangs linked with DTOs, which in turn 
                                                        
112 The group, Los Urabeños, (during January 2012) staged a boycott, which forced businesses to close and 
which blocked several highways in Northern Colombia to protest the death of one of its members by the 
Colombian government. This has led many to question the capacity of the Colombian government to keep 
paramilitary groups from influencing commerce and security in many regions (El Tiempo, 2012, January 5; 
El Tiempo, 2012, February 26).  
 
113 Recent reports on BACRIM activities suggest that different paramilitary groups have negotiated a cease-
fire with left-wing guerrillas, in particular the FARC, to profit from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and 
extorsion. Where the FARC supplies the different DTOs with coca paste for cocaine production and DTOs 
become responsible for exporting the cocaine (El Tiempo. 2012, February 15).  
 
114 The ERPAC, on December of 2011, engaged in talks with Colombian government officials to arrange a 
process were its members and its leadership would be able to surrender to authorities (El Tiempo, 2012, 
January 17). 
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have professionalized networks of hit-men or gunmen and have extended their activities 
into the practice of urban extortion and the urban retail sales of drugs. The role of gangs 
in urban centers supplants state actors because gang member leaders not only provide 
security but also oversee and arrange the installation of public utilities and roads. 
 In addition to the economic logic that clearly motivated many individuals towards 
the business of trafficking illicit drugs, my research found that the state of the Colombian 
economy is a distal but contextual cause that led many individuals to pursue a career in 
smuggling. Colombia’s high-income inequality and constrictive social class structure 
provides few options in terms of upward mobility and consequently leaves individuals of 
low socioeconomic status with limited low-income job prospects. The low socio-
economic status of most DTO leaders drives many to enter the illicit drug business 
because they desire to rise above their original social status. During the 1970s the illicit 
drug business became a vehicle for social mobility, so the smuggling of imported goods 
and the export of illicit commodities like cocaine provided many individuals with the 
opportunity to become, in some cases, wealthier than traditional economic elites. In 
addition, my study found that the “special” social status enjoyed by smugglers within 
Colombian society made smuggling goods an attractive career choice especially for many 
young men and women of low income.  Although smugglers belonged to the underworld, 
they were respected and considered businessmen who met a demand for imported 
products at affordable prices. The biographical sketches of most traffickers, but 
especially of Jaime Builes, Pablo Escobar, and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, illustrate 
how smuggling provided instant upward mobility even in a society with high income 
inequalities and rigid social class structures. Because the economic incentives that drive 
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the cocaine industry have not changed, since the 1970s and 1980s, the illicit drug industry 
has become a career choice not only for young people in Colombia, but throughout Latin 
America as the informal trafficking networks have expanded beyond Colombia.  
 Social conditions such as consumer tastes and immigration trends also led DTOs 
to flourish. The shift in consumer demand for cocaine and the establishment of cocaine as 
a “status drug” increased the demand for the illicit drug in the 1970s. The demand 
directly influenced Colombian DTOs because as demand grew, industrial-size labs like 
Tranquilandia were built to refine cocaine. Drug Trafficking Organizations transported 
bigger shipments of cocaine to meet demand. Instead of shipping kilos through human 
mules, during the 1980s DTOs modified their operations to send large shipments so that 
tons of cocaine could be transported via airplanes or in cargo ships.  
 Today methamphetamine is “the fastest-growing illicit drug in the world” and its 
consumption ranks second to marijuana as the most-used illegal drug. According to the 
United Nations, consumption of synthetic drugs has surpassed cocaine and heroin 
(Beaubien, 2012). U.S. consumer demand for methamphetamines and increased 
regulation of precursor chemicals to make methamphetamines in the United States has 
caused the wholesale price of a kilo of methamphetamine to increase to $25,000 dollars 
(The Economist, 2012; Beaubien, 2012). In similar fashion to the Colombian DTOs of 
the 1980s, the rise in price and demand for methamphetamine has driven Mexican DTOs 
to industrialize their drug production of methamphetamine to meet demand. The 
industrialization of methamphetamine has risen chiefly because the price of selling a 
wholesale kilo of methamphetamine is higher than a wholesale kilo of cocaine, which is 
priced at about $12,500 according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
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(UNODC, 2010, p.79). Also, the production of methamphetamine is a more efficient 
business venture for Mexican DTOs because a smaller dosage of “meth” has a greater 
psychoactive effect than cocaine. Consequently, DTOs can obtain more profit from a kilo 
of methamphetamine than a kilo of cocaine. Mexican criminology experts believe that the 
market of methamphetamine has also developed because the drug’s production is more 
efficient than the marijuana and cocaine production in Mexico. For instance, the 
production of Mexican marijuana is less profitable and requires DTOs to rely on farmers 
to grow the plant. The cocaine traffic relies on other intermediary dealers to send 
wholesale shipments from the Andes to Mexico. Instead, methamphetamine production 
can be done in Mexico, which thereby increases the profit margin for Mexican Drug 
Trafficking Organizations (The Economist, 2012).115  
 The increased involvement of Mexican DTOs and other country specific DTOs in 
the illicit drug industry vis-à-vis their Colombian counterparts can be explained by the 
existence of immigrant networks in the United States. The availability of Colombian 
immigrant networks in the United States, from the 1960s to the 1980s, initially allowed 
Colombian DTOs to have a comparative advantage over all other DTO networks in Latin 
America. Colombian DTOs had both, access to the illicit commodity and access to the 
U.S. market. The linkage to the U.S. market during this period was made via a network of 
Colombian immigrants in major U.S. cities who were linked to DTOs. Peruvian, Bolivian, 
and Mexican DTOs of the time did not have as much access to both, the upstream and 
downstream aspects of the business. Originally Colombian smuggling networks were 
                                                        
115 Mexican DTOs do have to obtain precursor chemicals from India, China, and other countries to create 
methamphetamine. The international market for precursor chemicals is difficult to control because 
precursors are legal and can be shipped to any number of countries, which can later send the precursors to 
Mexican DTOs.  
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initially helpful at reducing the risk of U.S. government infiltration into a DTO’s 
operations. However, once U.S. authorities focused their efforts in targeting Colombian 
DTO networks within the United States, the networks became conspicuous and 
authorities successfully disrupted the smuggling networks. The disruption allowed 
Mexican DTOs and other country specific DTOs to take over most of the U.S. cocaine 
distribution networks. In addition, the dissolution of the Medellin and Cali DTOs that 
operated in the 1980s until the mid-1990s contributed to the rise of other country specific 
DTOs which operated from the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico. Immigrants 
from these areas took over the U.S. distribution cells for the “new” DTOs. The loss of 
Colombia’s comparative advantage in the U.S. distribution marked led Colombian DTOs 
to become specialized solely on the cocaine wholesale traffic to Mexican DTOs, and to 
DTOs operating in Central America, Latin American transit countries, and Europe.   
 In contrast to Colombian DTOs, Mexican DTOs currently have a comparative 
advantage to other country specific DTOs because of their proximity to the U.S. border, 
but also because of the larger Mexican immigrant population (when compared to the 
smaller Colombian immigrant population), which resides in the United States. Since 
Mexico has a larger immigrant population, it makes DTO networks less conspicuous than 
the smaller Colombian DTOs that operated in the 1980s. Mexican DTOs operating with 
Mexican distribution cells in the United States are harder to disrupt because they can hide 
within the larger population of Mexican immigrants. Moreover, the smuggling networks 
built by Mexican DTOs throughout the 20th century for the smuggling of marijuana are 
currently being used for cocaine and methamphetamine (Astorga, 2004, p. 90; Beaubien, 
2012).  
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 Although technology plays a minor role in the political development of DTOs, it 
plays a major role in the economic rise of drug trafficking organizations. Airplanes and 
communications equipment allowed pioneering DTOs to increase their wealth by 
allowing for the transport of massive quantities of illicit drugs to international markets. 
Since the technology to produce and refine cocaine has been relatively accessible, the 
simplicity of the technology has allowed a many actors to participate in the trade and 
contribute towards the expansion of the drug trade. With the passage of time, DTOs were 
able to develop technology to create transportation innovations. Whereas traffickers in 
Colombia have developed the use of submarines to transport drugs, Mexican traffickers 
have created long underground tunnels to facilitate the trade and reduce the risks of being 
apprehended by authorities.   
 My study found that a state’s legal parameters also had an influence in the 
development of DTOs in Colombia.  The lax regulation of practices like money 
laundering and political campaign financing has been instrumental in the development of 
DTOs both economically and politically. Economically, early counternarcotic efforts 
(1960s and 1970s) underestimated the demand and market value of cocaine. The legal 
system had little control over dollar transfers and such deficiencies benefited DTOs 
because they could readily obtain the drug proceeds without much supervision. 
Consequently, once traffickers became wealthy enough they acquired banks to directly 
control and legalize their drug proceeds through money laundering schemes. In the area 
of campaign finance, the Colombian legal system did not regulate how politicians 
obtained their political funding until as late as the mid-1990s. As such, it was not illegal 
for politicians to receive funding from DTOs and this lack of regulation allowed 
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traffickers to have great political influence. DTO influence was evident not only in the 
1982 election but also during the 1991 Constitutional Convention, which led to the 
invalidation of The 1979 Extradition Treaty (via a Constitutional Article). At the frontline 
of the “war” against political corruption, some politicians have tried to protect regulations 
on money laundering and on financing of political campaigns, and others, influenced by 
DTOs, have introduced legislation to limit regulations or punishments. Since the 1980s, 
legal battles have taken place during major political scandals involving politicians and the 
Cali DTO (mid 1990s), and some politicians and the AUC paramilitary group during the 
2000s. Both scandals have implicated at the least 10% of congresspersons during the 
respective congressional years in which the scandals took place.  
 The individual preferences of Colombian officials examined in the study suggest 
that government officials created a permissive environment that allowed for the 
development of DTOs. During the 1970s, as the cocaine trade began to take off, 
authorities did not regulate the trade because they did not believe or foresee that the trade 
would have negative repercussions on society, such as high homicide rates, the disruption 
of the court system, and terrorism. For example, the 1979 Extradition Treaty was not 
implemented until 1985 because President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) was 
philosophically opposed to the Treaty claiming an infringement to Colombia’s 
sovereignty, rather than on the calculus that the treaty was the only legal tool available 
with which to regulate DTO leaders and the illicit drug trade. Also, economically, the 
cocaine trade benefited the growth of legal sectors of the economy. Consequently, 
political elites or state officials did not perceive traffickers at the time as a security threat. 
The DTO leaders examined in this research did not have pending investigations and they 
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were not actively pursued for their involvement in the cocaine trade in the 1970s or early 
1980s.  Socially, DTO leaders were discriminated against by elites because of their lack 
of formal education and social status. To counteract their lack of social pedigree, 
traffickers constructed parallel social institutions like social clubs and bilingual schools in 
order to lead a comparable lifestyle enjoyed by elites.  
 Politically, DTOs (as emergent economic groups) were implicitly accepted by 
politicians during the 1970s and consequently became more powerful during the early 
1980s. I found that the 1982 election year was a turning point in the relationship between 
politician preferences and DTO leaders. During the 1982 elections, many politicians from 
all political parties openly accepted campaign donations from DTO leaders. Because of 
their wealth, DTO leaders of the time believed that they were entitled to participate in the 
political process and to make demands like any other legal actor. The 1982 presidential 
elections were a turning point in the interaction between politicians and DTO leaders 
primarily because reformist politicians like Rodrigo Lara Bonilla and Luis Carlos Galan 
began to politically and publicly exclude traffickers from the political system. The 
political exclusion gradually led to the use of violence a means to represent DTO interests. 
For the most part, and after the 1984 assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, in rhetoric, 
state officials and the presidency condemned DTO involvement politics. However, 
political scandals such as the “narco-cassettes” and  “proceso 8000” scandals of the 
1990s, and the ongoing “parapolitica” scandal, which developed in 2006, reveal that 
some politicians continue to accept DTO leader influence and campaign donations.   
The implicit acceptance of politicians towards DTO leaders continues because of 
electoral concerns such as (1) the continually rising political campaign costs and (2) 
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major governability issues as a result of state capacity problems—in many areas of 
Colombia, politicians have to ask permission from DTO leaders to run for public office 
(Semana, 2010, April 29). This last factor reveals that the “problem of stateness” does 
have great implications for the quality of a democratic regime because it is difficult to say 
that a consolidated democracy exists when candidate selection in a geographical area 
depends more on the political influence of DTO leaders rather than on the influence of 
voters.  
 After examining the external variables that influence a DTO’s economic and 
political development, it is evident that the variables used to study DTO development are 
useful across time and space. Variables such as: the profitability of the illicit drug 
business; income inequalities; weak law enforcement and laws; the preferences of state 
officials; the tastes and demand of drug consumers; and the presence of immigration 
networks among others, were useful in analyzing group development in Colombia in the 
1980s, and they are still useful to explain group development in the new millennium 
because said external influences can be used to analyze the rise of new DTO groups or 
new paramilitary groups. As such, the use of the Macro-model goes beyond analyzing the 
rise and actions of one kingpin or a singly drug trafficking organization, and it is useful in 
analyzing the development of a variety of groups given same contextual setting.  
The second question my project sought to answer was: what effect do IIGs have 
on policy? The dissertation focused on the policy of extradition because DTOs 
challenged the 1979 Treaty on Extradition. The treaty became an issue of concern for 
DTO leaders when Pablo Escobar, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder 
perceived that their livelihood was threatened due to two major events: The first event 
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was the increased government clampdown on traffickers in reaction to the assassination 
of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. As part of the government’s pursuit, the 
Betancur administration implemented the 1979 Extradition Treaty for the first time. The 
second event, which led to the official launch of the terrorist group Los Extraditables, 
was the arrest of Jorge Luis Ochoa in Spain on November of 1984. The arrest personally 
and directly affected a major DTO leader, especially since the United States used the 
arrest as an opportunity to issue indictments against Jorge Luis Ochoa and the other 
Medellin-based leaders in an effort to have Jorge Luis Ochoa extradited from Spain to the 
United States.   
For the first time, since Medellin-based DTO leaders began trafficking in the 
1970s, the three events threatened DTO leaders with the stark reality of serving actual 
prison time in the United States. The realization led Medellin-based DTO leaders to unite 
human and economic organizational resources to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty.  
The different skillsets that DTO leaders acquired early in their youth influenced 
how they pursued changes in policy. DTO leaders studied in this project obtained training 
while smuggling goods when they were young. All had mentors that taught them the 
smuggling trade and how to deal with authorities. As a result, the level of formal 
education did not have an impact in their ability to influence politicians, whereas 
informal training did have an impact. Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha 
were initially trained as gunmen, while Carlos Lehder and the Ochoa brothers began their 
training in the actual smuggling of goods. The difference in training marked how DTO 
leaders dealt with politicians. Lehder and the Ochoa brothers were less confrontational 
with politicians, whereas Escobar and Rodriguez Gacha were purposively confrontational. 
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Overall, the Ochoa brothers seemed more prone to seek a negotiated solution to problems 
not only with politicians, but also with other traffickers. 
The economic resources derived from the drug trade enhanced the capacity of 
traffickers to make contacts with politicians willing to adopt their policy demands.  The 
wealth derived from the cocaine traffic enabled traffickers to launch their own political 
campaigns and the campaigns of politicians at national and local levels of government.  
Drug trafficking organization leaders went to political party conventions, used their own 
airplanes to fly candidates to events, and funded political campaign material like banners, 
flyers, and newspaper advertisements. Traffickers used their wealth to create charity 
programs such as the construction of homes for people living under levels of extreme 
poverty, soccer stadiums, and provide school supplies for school children, among other 
activities. These charity programs allowed DTO leaders to obtain followers. In addition, 
the wealth of DTO leaders allowed DTOs to hire experts to help carryout policy demands. 
When DTOs engaged in the judicial strategy for overturning the 1979 Treaty on 
Extradition, they hired teams of lawyers to engage in the legal battle.  
 Drug trafficking organizations increased their issue’s representativeness by 
successfully influencing politicians and by appealing to a wider sector of society through 
nationalist arguments in favor of invalidating the issue of extradition. When DTO leaders 
began their political participation, they practiced non-violent means to influence the 
political system. DTOs financed the careers of politicians at all levels of government 
(local, departmental, and national). Drug trafficking organization leaders relied on 
traditional political practices used such as clientelism to launch the careers of politicians 
and to obtain popular support for their agendas. During this time period, it is probably 
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more useful to analyze these groups as simply another set of political actors engaging in a 
very traditional Colombian political practice—clientelism (Martz, 1997). The anecdote, 
in which the son of former Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla shares the story of 
how his father stumbled upon the name Pablo Escobar while on the 1982 campaign trail, 
reveals the ease in which nouveau rich traffickers emulated clientelist political customs to 
obtain political power (Entel, 2009). According to the anecdote, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla is 
told by a political rally attendee that Pablo Escobar was the political leader who gave 
people appliances in exchange for their attendance to Lara Bonilla’s Nuevo Liberalismo 
political rally. The account, which describes how political leaders exchange material 
goods for political participation, is not any different, than the actions of established 
Colombian politicians of the time, whom disbursed government jobs, scholarships, a bag 
of groceries, or a lunch to constituents in exchange for constituent participation at a 
political rally or for their vote (Leal Buitrago et al., 1991).  During 1982, none of the 
DTO leaders discussed in this project had an active criminal investigation against them; 
they were relatively unknown and the image they were trying to present of themselves 
was of being business entrepreneurs. Their “clean record” and economic power allowed 
DTO leaders to feel entitled to participate in the political process. Funding campaigns to 
obtain favorable political outcomes can also be seen simply as the exercise of another 
traditional practice of any large-scale business bent on influencing the policy process.  
The difference is that in contrast to licit business interests, once legal avenues were 
closed, DTOs used violence and started acting like an armed social movement with a 
limited political agenda.   
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 Of the traffickers that actually campaigned for public office, only Carlos Lehder 
mentioned his opposition to the 1979 Extradition Treaty between the United States and 
Colombia. Other traffickers, who were candidates or political campaign financiers, were 
initially silent on the matter in an effort to become elected to office. Paradoxically, once 
in office, DTO candidates like Pablo Escobar failed to obtain policy objectives because, 
as soon as their trafficker backgrounds were disclosed to the general public, they were 
ostracized from public life by political elites within the legislature. The ousting of DTO 
leaders led them to focus more on financing the campaigns of politicians instead of 
directly running for office.  
In implementing policy objectives, Medellin-based DTO leaders efficiently 
carried out strategies to accomplish policy goals because said association was a small 
sized group of approximately 10 to 60 DTO leaders. The small group of DTO leaders was 
comprised of high-demanders for the invalidation of the 1979 the Extradition Treaty as 
all of them were threatened with extradition to the United States if apprehended by 
authorities. The desire to ban extradition was a major incentive to unite economic 
resources. Consequently, DTO leaders organized and implemented a judicial, a 
legislative, and a violent strategy to invalidate extradition. Moreover each paid a “war tax” 
of about $200,000 to the terrorist group Los Extraditables to wage a war against political 
elites with the objective of banning extradition and obtaining favorable terms of surrender 
with an effort to legalize their status in Colombia.  
In particular, Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were such high 
demanders for a ban on extradition that they became the leaders of Los Extraditables, 
which gave them a high degree of decision-making power. Since Escobar and Gacha 
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were known for their ruthless use of violence, both had the capacity to collect the “war 
tax” from other DTO leaders and insure discipline. However, at least from 1983-1991, 
the incentive to ban extradition to protect their livelihoods in Colombia increased the 
political cohesion of all Medellin-based DTO leaders in an effort to invalidate the 
extradition treaty. Also, during this time period, the presence of internal variables such as 
strong political cohesion, leader skillsets, economic resources, group incentives, and 
capacity to ensure discipline, allowed DTO leaders to obtain short-term policy successes 
such as the judicial invalidation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty in 1986 and the 
Constitutional invalidation of extradition in the 1991 Constitution; but the successes were 
strongly tied to the use violence.  
My study found that initially, when DTOs engaged in non-violent mechanisms for 
influencing policy, DTOs behaved more like an interest group, however, as legal 
mechanisms to influence government policy closed off, Medellin-based DTO leaders 
began engaging in politics by other means and behaved more like a terrorist organization. 
Drug trafficking organization leaders gradually changed their political strategies to mimic 
existing guerrilla movements—in particular, the actions of the urban guerrilla group the 
M-19. Drug trafficking organization leaders organized as Los Extraditables to protest 
Jorge Luis Ochoa’s arrest in Spain and, on November 15th 1984, launched their first 
communiqué. Since the organization’s political objective was to overturn the 1979 
Extradition Treaty, Los Extraditables used violence to intimidate or assassinate 
government officials especially those tied with law enforcement. Los Extraditables used a 
variety of terrorist methods including the use of car bombs, the staging of theatrical 
bombs on buildings and airplanes, and the use selective political kidnappings. The violent 
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actions were done to pressure government officials, in particular the presidency, to 
invalidate the policy of extradition and to create a negotiation process that would allow 
DTO leaders to receive a criminal amnesty similar to that received by guerrilla group 
members. Although DTO leaders were not granted the political status or the amnesty 
given to the members of guerrilla organizations like the M-19 and other contemporary 
guerrilla organizations, the violent strategies used for closing off the presidency’s policy 
options did work and allowed DTO leaders to negotiate favorable terms of surrender.   
 That violence reached such extreme levels is rooted in the fact that the state itself 
relied on violence to respond to these groups. As Thoumi and others have argued, the use 
of extreme violence is a perverse logical extension of the illicit nature of the industry and 
the absence of legal mechanisms to resolve disputes either between competing trafficking 
groups and between these and the state. My findings indicate that the confrontational 
dynamic between the state and Medellin-based DTOs allowed Medellin-based DTO 
leaders to influence policy because they used a combination of selective and 
indiscriminate violence which was effective in reducing the presidency’s political 
maneuverability but also in targeting public opinion. First, the use of selective 
kidnappings reduced President Gaviria’s capacity to use violence on Los Extraditables 
because it was feared that in retaliation Los Extraditables would assassinate the 
kidnapped victims.  Second, the use of violence worked as a political strategy because 
DTO leaders were able to shift public opinions on the issue of extradition to the point that 
public opinion polls showed that people supported a negotiation with traffickers and, in 
1991, 82 percent of the Colombian population believed that extraditing nationals should 
be invalidated through the creation of a Constitutional Article (Botero, 1991).    
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 Finally, the use of violence worked as a political strategy because violence was an 
effective tool in reducing the general public’s morale in support for government’s efforts 
to stop narco-terrorism with violence. Moreover, the pervasive use of violence by all 
existing non-state actors in Colombia during 1989 and 1990 exhausted public tolerance 
for violence. During the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, the Medellin-based 
group through Los Extraditables was able to use violence to shift public opinion’s 
concern with the issue of extradition. As a consequence of car bombs and other urban 
violence, public opinion increasingly associated the extradition issue with public security 
concerns, instead of an issue concerning international relations and drug trafficking. As a 
security issue Colombian urban dwellers believed that invalidating the extradition of 
nationals was of paramount concern to reduce violence.   
 In sum, to offset counternarcotics efforts economically powerful DTO leaders 
pooled resources to ban extradition. The creation of a group like Los Extraditables 
allowed DTO leaders to intimidate political elites and law enforcement institutions to 
obtain a negotiation process. This last point leads to the third question I asked at the 
outset of this project—what effect do IIGs such as drug trafficking organizations have on 
democratic institutions? Drug trafficking organizations had short-term and long-term 
effects on democratic institutions. In the short run, DTOs had a disastrous effect on the 
judicial system. The systematic killing and intimidation of judges presiding over criminal 
cases and the M-19 attack on the supreme court, which was partially funded by Pablo 
Escobar, had a devastating effect on the ability of judges uphold rule of law.  The high 
level of intimidation led many to abstain from practicing their professions or to receive 
bribes to avoid death.  
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 It is known that DTO influence did reach the legislature in 1982 as is evident with 
the election of Pablo Escobar and Jairo Ortega to Congress and Santofimio Botero to the 
Senate. Yet the degree of influence that Medellin-based DTOs had on the legislature from 
1982-1991 in unknown because no in-depth government investigation was ever done on 
the legislature in order to ascertain the degree of Medellin-based DTO influence on the 
1989 legislature and the 1991 Constitutional Assembly.  
 My study’s analysis of state autonomy shows that DTO leaders specially reduced 
the presidency’s maneuverability. Starting in 1986, with the invalidation of the 1979 
Extradition Treaty, the presidential power of Virgilio Barco was dramatically limited on 
the issue. From 1990 to 1991 President Cesar Gaviria’s power was also reduced as DTOs 
used coercion via selective kidnappings and through the use of indiscriminate acts of 
terrorism, which shifted public opinion in favor of DTO policy objectives—a permanent 
ban on extradition and favorable terms of surrender.  
In the long run, DTO influence on democratic institutions is mixed. After DTO 
leaders accomplished their policy goal of invalidating the 1979 Extradition Treaty on 
June 1991, the group’s cohesion and discipline began to disintegrate, as a consequence of 
internal disputes. The group’s unraveling also decreased the DTO leaders’ capacity to 
maintain their pressure on politicians or government officials. With time, in the absence 
of DTO pressure and because the U.S. government pushed the Colombian presidency to 
reinstate the policy of extradition, the constitutional ban on extradition was repealed, 
albeit without DTO reprisals thereby increasing state autonomy on this matter.  
On the one hand, the rise of DTOs has increased counternarcotics efforts, 
strengthened the judicial system, and placed some legal restrictions on activities like 
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money laundering and campaigns finance. On the other hand, the long-term effect of 
DTOs on democratic institutions is that their political influence is pervasive especially at 
local and national levels of government and within the state bureaucracy. The influence is 
substantiated by the cyclical political corruption scandals involving presidents, senators, 
congressmen, city councils, mayors, and all types of state agencies. Another long-term 
effect is the continuous rise of DTO financed paramilitary groups and gangs, both of 
which dramatically reduce the quality of life for those living in marginal sectors were the 
state is unable to protect populations from the whims of powerful sub-national actors.    
The practical significance of this study is that its analysis can be used to examine 
the political influence of the illicit drug trade, as the trade has gradually expanded to 
more countries in Latin America since the 1980s. Many countries that had an 
insignificant illicit industry in the 1980s are now major transit countries for cocaine and 
other drugs.  Some of these countries possess similar economic and political contexts to 
Colombia, which have led to the political rise of DTOs. As the drug trade has spread 
from the Andean region to Central and South America, studying Colombia and the rise 
and development of DTOs can help explain the political impact of DTOs on the 
democratic institutions of countries newly engulfed by the illicit drug trade. For example, 
many countries in the region have: an increased number of actors engaged in the illicit 
drug trade because it is profitable; high levels of income inequality; weak law 
enforcement and laws; legacies of using violence for resolving conflicts, clientelistic 
practices; a reliance on private security to protect property and lands; a strong legacy of 
smuggling; and a large immigrant populations in the United States.   
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The use of the hybrid Macro-Micro-Model allows for a holistic examination of 
the persistent social, economic, and political context that continuously gives rise to DTOs. 
It avoids focusing solely on the personal characteristics of DTO leaders. It also corrects 
research biases by examining the political impact of “criminal” groups, especially in 
contexts where the state apparatus is weak vis-à-vis DTO leaders. Future research on the 
political influence of DTOs will test the model across time and space by including more 
cases within Colombia and throughout region.  
Finally, the study of drug trafficking organizations is politically valuable even if 
their policy agenda is limited. Their political impact should be studied because they are 
economically powerful, organize continuous attempts to undermine the legal system over 
time, finance campaigns at national and local levels, and enhance the formation of armed 
social movements in weak states.  
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